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Much of the existing literature on Latin American democracies leads us to expect 
limited civil society involvement in policy making.  Scholars tend to emphasize a 
plethora of institutional, structural, and societal factors that conspire against meaningful 
citizen participation in the region.  However, in the dissertation, I demonstrate that non-
governmental organizations and other civil society groups have managed to exert 
considerable influence over policy making.  In some cases, they have been effective 
agents of change through their efforts to shape the content of policy, collaborate with 
government officials, and pressure legislators to adopt reforms.  This finding is puzzling 
given the received wisdom, which suggests that groups’ advocacy efforts will meet with 
little success.     
 The main goal of my project is to explain why some civil society organizations 
are more likely than others to achieve policy influence in democratizing countries.  
 vii 
Focusing on the strategies that groups use to influence the policy process, I identify two 
important “pathways” to participation:  the successful framing of issues and the formation 
of effective civil society alliances.  I argue that when civil societal actors frame ideas in 
persuasive ways and join forces in alliances, they increase their chances of participating 
in policy agenda setting, formulation, and adoption.  This approach helps solve the puzzle 
of influence in environments where access to the political system is restricted and/or 
individual groups lack resources and political strength.  
I test the theory with empirical evidence collected in Argentina and Chile.  
Specifically, I perform a comparative analysis of multiple cases of policy making drawn 
from three issue areas:  the environment, the rights and well-being of children, and 
transparency in government institutions.  By offering an original theory of civil society 
participation in policy, I seek to bridge a lacuna in the democratization literature, which 
has largely neglected this theme, and to contribute to the comparative politics field.  The 
central themes motivating my research are political participation and influence, the 
exercise of citizenship, and the impact of civil society activism in democratizing nations.  
These themes have implications for both the consolidation and the quality of democracy. 
 viii 
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Chapter 1:  Theoretical Perspectives 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
In the early 2000s, Argentina was mired in a profound economic, social, and 
political crisis.  As a result of the nation’s economic debacle, more than one-half of the 
population and an estimated two-thirds of all children were living in poverty.
1
  Growing 
numbers of children were abandoning school, working in the informal economy, and 
suffering — and dying — from malnutrition.  During this period, disgust with governing 
elites increased to epic proportions, as the public repudiated the policies that had brought 
only “hunger and misery.”
2 
 Indeed, scores of Argentines clamored for the removal of all 
politicians from power.  Perceptions that corruption was rampant within the country’s 
institutions also fueled the flames of discontent.   
In the midst of the crisis, various civil society groups sought policy change.  
Children’s advocates called attention to the plight of Argentina’s youth, while proponents 
of political reform pushed for greater transparency in government institutions.  Some of 
these groups fared better than others in their attempts to engage and influence the policy 
process.  At times, civil societal actors succeeded in articulating demands, contributing 
information and analysis, and collaborating with policy makers. 
Throughout the dissertation, I examine advocacy efforts such as these and explain 
why certain civil society organizations (CSOs) are more likely to achieve policy 
                                                 
1
 The sources for these figures are Cáritas Argentina and Fundación SES. 
 2 
influence.  Drawing on empirical evidence from Argentina and Chile, I demonstrate that 
non-governmental organizations and other CSOs in Latin America have managed to exert 
considerable influence over policy making in some instances.  This finding is surprising 
in light of the existing literature, which leads us to expect limited civil society 
involvement in policy decision making and influence in democratizing countries.  
Although scholarly works seldom address these themes directly, they often suggest that 
successful advocacy is unlikely.  The literature on Latin American democracies in 
particular discusses an array of institutional, structural, and societal factors that conspire 
against meaningful citizen participation and policy engagement.   
To begin with, scholars often underscore the exclusionary and elitist features of 
the countries’ formal political institutions.  In Chile, for example, authoritarian enclaves, 
de facto powers vested in designated senators, the military, and other non-elected 
individuals, and the over-representation of the right in the legislature all contribute to the 
nation’s status as a “protected” democracy (e.g., Bickford 1998; Posner 1999; Segovia 
1999).
3
  Similarly, in reference to Argentine politics, scholars frequently emphasize the 
“delegative” nature of governance (O’Donnell 1994) and presidential rule by decree, or 
decretismo (e.g., Carey and Shugart 1998).
4
  Such characteristics bode ill for non-elite 
inclusion in decision making.  
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 Página 12, issue dated 3/24/03.  All translations from the original Spanish are my own. 
3
 These features are often considered to be the enduring effects of Chile’s pacted transition from 
authoritarian rule:  the concessions that facilitated regime change but have since become “impediments” to 
further democratization (e.g., Posner 1999).   
4
 This is the case despite the fact that Argentina’s constitution does not bear the mark of a constrained, 
pacted transition and even includes “semi-direct” democratic mechanisms (i.e., popular initiatives and 
referenda).  For a critique of the delegative democracy argument, see Peruzzotti (2001). 
 3 
Analysts also argue that political parties — for instance, the “renovated” parties 
of Chile’s Concertación — are increasingly distant and insulated from their constituents, 
especially the popular sectors (Barrera 1999; Greaves 2001; Posner 1999; Roberts 1998; 
Segovia 1999).
5
  These observations tie into a broader debate surrounding the “decline” 
of the region’s representative and intermediary institutions (Hagopian 1998; see also 
Chalmers et al. 1997; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002).  State-society linkages have 
undergone a process of transformation and disarticulation, and scholars are uncertain as 
to whether new modes of representation are replacing the old.
6
  Corporatism, for 
example, is largely viewed as an arrangement from a bygone era that is incompatible with 
the neoliberal state’s diminished role in economic production, regulation, and distribution 
(e.g., Barrera 1999; Bickford 1999; Johnson 2001; Panfichi et al. n.d.; Robinson 1998).
7
   
In fact, Latin American specialists trace a number of political quandaries to the 
hegemony of neoliberalism.
8
  First among these is the prevalence of technocratic policy 
making:  when most parties and politicians serve merely as custodians of the neoliberal 
                                                 
5
 In recent years, the rightist UDI (Independent Democratic Union) has endeavored to become Chile’s new 
“people’s party” by reaching out to grassroots leaders and unionists.  Political parties historically have 
penetrated civil society and played an intermediary role between ruling elites and social groups in Chile 
(Oxhorn 1995). 
6
 Hagopian (1998) inquires as to whether such changes indicate a secular decline, a transformation, or 
merely a temporary “pause” in representation in democratizing polities. Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) 
explore the possibility of CSOs playing a representational role, while Chalmers et. al suggest that 
“associative networks,” discussed below, are emerging as a “new structure of representation for the popular 
sectors” (1997, 543).     
7
 In contrast, some scholars (e.g., Weyland 1997) use the concept of neo-corporatism to elucidate neoliberal 
economic reforms.  Beginning in the 1930s, corporatist arrangements became more common across Latin 
America.  In corporatist systems of interest articulation and representation, the state recognizes and grants a 
representational monopoly to certain private, corporate actors organized into hierarchical units (Schmitter 
1974).  The state includes these actors (e.g., business and labor) in policy making, often through institutions 
designed for consultation and bargaining.  
8
 Neoliberalism has become shorthand for various pro-market reforms, which usually entail state 
retrenchment from the economic and social realms — through privatization, deregulation, the reform of 
 4 
model, few political alternatives are available, and the preferences of certain segments of 
the populace must be ignored.
9
  Additionally, international financial institutions and other 
entities beyond the reach of citizens sometimes constrain (or impose) economic and 
social policies (e.g., Roxborough 1997; Vilas 1997).
10
  Moreover, as the public sector’s 
social welfare responsibilities and expenditures decrease, programs are contracted out to 
CSOs, prompting some to conclude that the state “harnesses” civil societal actors, placing 
their expertise and labor in the service of neoliberalism (Gideon 1998; see also Dagnino 
2003).
11
  Several scholars warn that organizations involved in policy implementation risk 
serving as “transmission belts” for government policies, “with a consequent loss of 
autonomy, initiative, and capacity for critical assessment” (Loveman 1995, 138; see also 
Cardelle 1998; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Foweraker 2001; Pearce 1997).
12
        
 Some analysts argue from a structuralist perspective that neoliberalism and 
socioeconomic marginalization have weakened vast segments of the citizenry.  For 
example, Roberts suggests that the demobilization of organized labor and grassroots 
                                                                                                                                                 
social welfare, social spending reductions, and a shift away from universal entitlements — trade 
liberalization and export promotion, labor market “flexibilization,” and currency adjustments.   
9
 Analysts of Chilean politics generally conclude that policy making is characterized by intra-elite 
bargaining, which privileges business interests (Bickford 1998; Cardelle 1998; Drake and Jaksic 1999).   
10
 Thus, citizens often view the political system as an irrelevant mechanism for solving socioeconomic 
problems and helping families meet their needs (Cavarozzi 2000; Powers 2001).   
11
 According to this new policy agenda, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are cost-effective, 
innovative, and “close” to the poor or other groups targeted for social programs in such areas as health, 
agriculture, and habitat.  These views are closely linked to the international donor community’s enthusiasm 
for civil society and its ostensible contributions to “good governance,” democracy, and development, which 
I discuss below.      
12
 Furthermore, groups bogged down with policy implementation are arguably less able to dedicate 
resources to advocacy (or trying to shape the actual content of policies).  However, some argue that this 
role does not preclude their ability to engage in advocacy and that groups gain technical expertise, contacts 
within the government, credibility, and visibility by performing this role effectively.  These resources 
position them well to influence policies (Interview in Cáritas Argentina, National Committee, 4/8/03, 
Buenos Aires; see also Najam 1999 and Taylor and Warburton 2003).    
 5 
actors, the suppression of their demands, the unequal distribution of economic and 
political power, and social atomization have accompanied neoliberal reforms and 
authoritarian experiments in “market individualism” (1998, 161; see also Barton 2002, 
Petras and Leiva 1994, Posner 2003).
13
  The model apparently necessitates the political 
exclusion of working class and other social movements.   
Other scholars posit the “demobilization” of civil society in a more general sense.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) contend that civil society “surges” during the initial 
transition to democracy and then “declines” as political society returns to center stage.
14 
 
According to Fitzsimmons (2000), many of the organizations that manage to survive this 
process subsequently retreat from conventional politics.  To illustrate, “remobilized” 
groups in Chile tend to be “depoliticized” and detached from policy making and 
government institutions.  Even if CSOs somehow retain an interest in engaging the 
political system, they are said to lack the organizational resources necessary to achieve 
influence.  Groups that resemble the National Rifle Association or American Association 
of Retired Persons, with their large, dues-paying memberships, are uncommon.  
Furthermore, philanthropy in developing areas is not on a par with support of non-profits 
in wealthier nations; consequently, Latin American civil societies generally comprise 
                                                 
13
 Posner likewise contends that “structural reforms have in many instances weakened collective actors and 
undermined incentives for collective action” (2003, 39).  Some scholars suggest further that neoliberalism 
threatens classic understandings of citizenship based on universal human rights and egalitarianism, which 
are being supplanted by market-based conceptions that view individuals as consumers or producers (e.g., 
Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Dagnino 2003; Nardacchione 2000; Schild 2000; Taylor 1998).  
14
 Social movement scholars also note this post-transition decline in mobilization, often attributing the 
pattern to elite-driven transitions, limited forms of democracy, authoritarian legacies, and the neoliberal 
model (e.g., De la Maza 1999; Hipsher 1998; Oxhorn 1995; Taylor 1998).  Some also detect “mobilization 
fatigue” among activists after years of struggle against dictatorship (Craske 1999).    
 6 
groups with less funding compared to the better-endowed non-profit sectors of more 
developed areas.   
Stated briefly, the received wisdom suggests that citizens generally enjoy limited 
opportunities to engage government institutions and officials, and civil societal actors 
lack the political resources and strength required for effective advocacy.  Scholars often 
describe the region’s  democracies as “socially disembedded:”  “nominally democratic 
rule rests on the absence — and even the active destruction — of political links both 
within civil society and between it and the state” (Chalmers et al. 1997, 552).  Observers 
use a wealth of other adjectives to modify democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997).  In 
Chile, for instance, democracy is “cupular” (Bickford 1999) and “restricted” (Barrera 
1999; Drake and Jaksic 1999); in Argentina, it is “anemic” (Munck 1997) and 
“autocratic” (Taylor 1998).  Thus, in broad terms, much of the scholarship leads us to 
expect that CSOs are unlikely to influence policy decision making in Latin American 
democracies.   
In some cases of policy making, civil society’s involvement has been scant.  
However, in other instances, groups have been able to exercise influence over the 
process.  The extent to which CSOs participate in policy making varies significantly both 
within and across nations.  The dissertation’s primary objective is to explain these 
different levels of involvement and influence in democratizing countries.  What factors 
affect the likelihood that CSOs will participate in the policy process during the agenda-
setting, formulation, and adoption phases?  Why do some groups exert more influence 
than others?  What accounts for policy influence in environments characterized by 
resource scarcity, “weak” civil societies, and/or unfavorable political institutions? 
 7 
In response to these questions, I identify two important “pathways” to 
participation:  the successful framing of issues and the formation of effective civil society 
alliances.  I argue that groups are more likely to be involved in policy decision making 
when they frame ideas in persuasive ways and join forces in alliances.  This theoretical 
approach helps solve the puzzle of seemingly resource-deficient organizations 
participating in policy making.  I suggest that civil societal actors can sometimes 
overcome their political “weakness” by engaging in strategic framing and combining 
their available resources in alliances.  Similarly, the theory explains how CSOs can 
influence policy even in relatively inhospitable contexts, where most citizens have 
limited access to institutions and elites.  I demonstrate that activists do not merely 
respond to existing “political opportunities;” they also try to create opportunities for 
participation.
15
   
In this dissertation, participation signifies that groups are able to exercise their 
political “voices” and influence policy debates and decisions.  The essential themes 
motivating my research are the exercise of citizenship and the political impact of civil 
society activism in democratizing countries.  Questions surrounding political 
participation, voice, and influence have implications for both the quality and the stability 
of democracy and are thus of great practical importance to citizens.
16
  They also speak to 
enduring theoretical debates within political science. 
                                                 
15
 In reference to transnational advocacy, Price contends that “activists not only try to make use of the 
political opportunity structures they are presented with” but also seek to “make those opportunity structures 
themselves” (2003, 595; see also Berry 1999; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002 and Tarrow 2001). I 
define political opportunity structures below. 
16
 In this study, I adhere to an “expanded” procedural definition of democracy entailing contestation, 
participation, civil liberties, and military acquiescence to civilians (Dahl 1971; Karl 1990).  Diamond 
 8 
Yet in spite of their significance for democratic theory and practice, the subjects 
of civil society advocacy and influence are strangely absent from the literature on “Third 
Wave” democracies.  Scholars of democratization have gravitated toward the study of 
elites, institutions, or civil society.  Moving in largely separate orbits, analysts tend to 
overlook linkages among citizen groups, governing elites, and the political institutions in 
which policy making unfolds.
17
  They commonly argue that one set of factors is most 
decisive for democratic consolidation. 
 For example, a number of scholars consider institutions to be the crucial factor 
for consolidating democracy (e.g., Mainwaring 1999).  Many institutionalist works 
scarcely mention civil society and lack any “serious consideration of the aspirations of 
citizens and the way in which they engage democratic institutions” (Hagopian 1998, 
101).  Meanwhile, of the numerous analysts who examine the relationship between 
associational life (and/or social capital) and democracy (e.g., Avritzer 2002 & 2000; 
Brysk 2000; Chalmers 1999; Putnam 1993), few exchange ideas with their institutionalist 
counterparts.
18
  Critics of the “neo-Tocquevilleans” therefore conclude that political 
                                                                                                                                                 
correctly points out that Dahl’s seminal work on polyarchy takes seriously the non-electoral aspects of 
democracy, including opportunities for citizens to organize and “have multiple, ongoing channels for 
expression and representation of their interests and values” (1999, 11). Schumpeterian definitions (e.g., 
Huntington 1991), which reduce democracy to electoral contestation, are too minimalist for an in-depth 
study of participation. 
17
 Noteworthy exceptions are works on Latin American state–civil society relations by Bickford (1999 & 
1998), Chalmers et al. (1997), and Friedman and Hochstetler (2002).  For a conceptual discussion of 
interactions between civil society and governments, see Manor (1999).   
18
 Existing works on social capital, largely stimulated by Putnam’s (1993) research on the topic, are too 
numerous to cite here.  For representative examples, see Armony (2004), Booth and Richard (1998), 
Edwards and Foley (1998), Edwards, Foley and Diani (2001), and Seligson (1999). 
 9 
institutions “appear to have been cast away from the debate” on consolidation 
(Encarnación 2001a, 77; see also Berman 1997).
19
  
In short, a theoretical and empirical lacuna characterizes existing scholarship.  
This gap contrasts dramatically with the frequent discussions of policy involvement and 
influence in the literature on longstanding democracies, such as the United States.  It also 
is surprising given the widespread interest in democratic consolidation and quality within 
the comparative politics field.
20
  I aim to bridge the gap by exploring interactions among 
CSOs, elites, and institutions and presenting an original theory of civil society 
participation and influence.  My first task in the present chapter is to elaborate these 
theoretical arguments.  In the following section, I critically assess rival explanations of 
the dependent variable.  Next, I outline the research methods that guided the collection 
and analysis of the dissertation’s empirical data.  Finally, I summarize some of the 
principal contributions of the project.  The central goal of this chapter is to lay the 
theoretical and methodological groundwork for subsequent chapters, in which I test the 
theory with evidence collected in Argentina and Chile.   Throughout the dissertation, I 
perform a comparative analysis of four cases of policy making drawn from three issue 
areas:  political transparency, the rights and well-being of children, and the environment. 
                                                 
19
 Encarnación asserts that although Tocqueville himself recognized the importance of such institutions, 
civil society enthusiasts view them as “colonizing pariahs” (2001a, 77).   
20
 In recent years, scholars have shifted their attention from democratic transitions to democratic 
consolidation, sustainability, and quality.  Because transitions typically entail elite negotiations and 
elections that catapult new leaders into power, works examining this phase of democratization often focus 
on political society.  For instance, rational choice and elite frameworks (e.g., Przeworski 1991; Higley and 
Gunther 1992, respectively), though different in several respects, share a similar focus on the actions of a 




My explanation of civil society participation centers on two main variables:  
successful framing and effective inter-organizational cooperation in alliances.  Figure 1 
summarizes how these factors affect policy involvement and influence.        
 
Figure 1:  Pathways to Participation 
Successful framing 
 
• Motivational elements 
Convey urgency, severity 
• Diagnostic elements 
De-emphasize blame 
• Prognostic elements 
  Provide feasible solution(s) 




• Solve scarcity problem by pooling 
resources  
• Solve coordination problem 
Create effective division of labor 
• Achieve strength in numbers 
Present united front 
Balance diversity and cohesion  









Both variables emphasize civil societal actors’ strategies and their ability to overcome 
some of the obstacles summarized above.  Indeed, this approach privileges agency over 
structure.  Even in difficult environments, activists can mobilize ideas and resources in 
strategic, innovative ways.  Although existing structural and institutional constraints are 




The power of ideas 
By using effective strategies for framing and politicizing issues, groups can create 
opportunities for policy involvement.  Successful framing thus represents a significant 
pathway to participation.  Civil societal actors often rely on the persuasiveness of their 
ideas and information to influence fellow citizens and governing elites endowed with 
more “authoritative” forms of power (Shepard 2003; Sikkink 2002; Keck and Sikkink 
1998a).
21
  Public interest groups in particular seek to become credible purveyors of ideas 
and interpreters of reality.  By devising creative ways of “spinning” the issues and 
disseminating their views, they endeavor to shape public discourse and the public agenda.  
Not surprisingly, some CSOs are more effective than others at performing this ideational 
work.  Understanding their varying degrees of success strengthens our grasp of policy 
influence.   
Although it is necessary to incorporate ideational variables into the study of 
activism, these generally do not hold as privileged a place in the field of political science 
as interests and institutions.  Nevertheless, recent years have seen a renaissance of inquiry 
into the role of ideas and norms in politics.  Scholars of comparative politics, 
international relations, and political economy have viewed ideas through different 
theoretical and methodological lenses, including constructivism, historical 
                                                 
21
 Scholars such as Dryzek and Habermas (cited in Sikkink 2002) have theorized about “communicative 
power” in reference to the persuasiveness of information or communication.  Analysts suggest that 
persuasive power and moral authority are relevant when accounting for the influence of international non-
state actors, including non-governmental organizations (e.g., Florini 2000).  This view is often predicated 
on the notion that such actors are “weak” relative to states, transnational capital, and other forces in the 
international political system.  However, Price (2003) warns against creating a dichotomy between ideas 
(or principles) and power, arguing instead that power is not only material, but ideational.   
 12 
institutionalism, and rational choice models.
22
  One of the questions inspiring these varied 
works is how ideational factors influence political outcomes (Berman 2001).   
An interest in the debate surrounding the usefulness of ideas as explanatory 
variables also motivates my research.  However, I avoid reifying ideas as “things” or 
conceptualizing them in an overly static fashion.  I opt instead for a more dynamic and 
agency-driven approach to ideational factors:  rather than examine ideas per se, I explore 
the ways in which civil societal actors use ideas strategically.  The concept of collective 
action framing is a promising tool for just such an examination:  frames are not 
synonymous with ideas but are ways of presenting ideas.
23
     
Frame analysis, while under-utilized in political science, has flourished in the 
interdisciplinary literature on social movements.  In fact, analysts identify collective 
action frames, political opportunities, and mobilizing structures as central components of 
an “emerging synthesis” in social movement theory (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 
1996).
24
  Scholars define framing as “strategic efforts” to fashion shared understandings 
that “legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996, 6; 
see also Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow et al. 
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 The fields of international relations and political economy stand out in this regard (e.g., Clark 2001; 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Florini 2000; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hall 1989; McNamara 1998; 
Sikkink 1991; Tannenwald 1999).  See Berman (2001) for a review of comparative politics works that 
incorporate ideational factors.    
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 Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002) credit Tarrow for making this distinction.       
24
 McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) conceptualize political opportunities as factors external to social 
movements that influence the timing and type of mobilization; these usually include elite instability and the 
presence of elite allies, increasing popular access to the political system, and decreasing state repression.  
Mobilizing structures are formal and informal vehicles — such as social networks — “through which 




   Frames help encode events, experiences, and actions with 
meaning (Benford 1997).  Activists use them to identify, interpret, and express 
grievances and to make demands (Reese and Newcombe 2003; Taylor 2000).  
Historically, they often have articulated perceived injustices and rights-based claims in 
their frames.  When frames strike a “responsive chord” by tapping into grievances in 
compelling ways and suggesting remedies to worrisome problems, they are said to 
achieve “resonance” (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). 
Activists also use frames to rally others to “take their side” (Khagram, Riker and 
Sikkink 2002, 12).  The targets of framing are multiple and can include prospective 
participants, constituents, opponents, and bystanders (Snow and Benford 1992).  Much of 
the existing scholarship emphasizes how activists and social movement organizations 
(SMOs) employ frames to mobilize would-be participants.  In other words, they analyze 
how frames draw individuals into the movement and facilitate the formation of collective 
identities.
26
  The literature is less clear with respect to the consequences of framing 
strategies for movement goal attainment or outcomes.
27
  As a result, our understanding of 
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 Zald defines frames as “specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues” to differentiate 
them from ideology and other concepts (1996, 262).  Social movement scholars are indebted to Goffman’s 
(1974) work, which identifies frames as schemata of interpretation at the level of the individual.  Framing 
also occurs at the collective and organizational levels (Croteau and Hicks 2003).  Related framing concepts 
can be found in sociology, cognitive psychology, and other fields (Benford and Snow 1992).   
26
 Recurring themes in the literature include frame construction and diffusion, intra-movement frame 
disputes, and frames shared across different movements.  Burstein, Einwohner and Hollander (1995) define 
social movements broadly as organized, collective efforts to achieve change.      
27
 Cress and Snow’s (2000) work is a noteworthy exception.  In their study of homeless movement 
organizations in cities in the United States, the authors present evidence of the importance of framing for 
obtaining relief, resources, and rights.  They also consider other variables, such as the use of disruptive 
tactics.  In general, the social movement literature has been more concerned with movement emergence 
than with movement outcomes (Burstein, Einwohner and Hollander 1995; Cress and Snow 2000; and 
Giugni, McAdam and Tilly 1998).   
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the interplay between framing and governing elites, political allies, and other targets 
“outside” of the movement is inadequate. 
  In addition, scholars usually limit the scope of frame analysis to SMOs and 
protest movements in spite of its relevance to other types of CSOs.  This is a predictable 
consequence of disciplinary boundaries and literatures neglecting to “talk” to one another 
(Andrews and Edwards 2004).
28
  Nevertheless, analogous processes occur within NGOs, 
base organizations, and other groups, even though they may not be connected to 
identifiable social movements or engaged in mass mobilizing activities.     
Moreover, few analysts have explored the significance of frame analysis for 
activism in Latin America.
29
  Fewer still have undertaken comparative studies of framing 
across different countries and issue areas.  Instead, works detailing a single case in a 
particular setting — such as the American civil rights movement — abound.  I try to 
overcome these limitations and demonstrate that framing is a concept with untapped 
theoretical reserves and broad empirical applicability.    
Indeed, framing turns out to be a crucial part of group efforts to mobilize ideas 
and politicize issues.  Through effective frames, CSOs are better poised to disseminate 
understandings of issues and interpretations of reality, to shape the public agenda, and to 
capture and retain the attention of decision makers and/or the citizenry.  In short, 
effective framing is a key factor explaining civil society participation in policy.  I 
therefore extend conventional frame analysis by offering a set of novel arguments 
                                                 
28
 In their review of literature on advocacy in the United States, Andrews and Edwards (2004) suggest that 
frames are a potentially important way organizations exert political influence but should be considered in 
tandem with other explanatory factors.    
29
  Exceptions include Baldez (2002), Friedman and Hochstetler (2002), and Noonan (1995). 
 15 
regarding the policy implications of framing.  The three main “tasks” of framing 
identified in the social movement scholarship serve as my point of departure.  These 
include motivational, diagnostic, and prognostic elements (e.g., Benford and Snow 2000).   
Motivation, which offers a rationale for collective action, is a major function of 
framing.  Frames often convey urgency, severity, and propriety.  Activists commonly use 
terms such as “crisis” or “emergency” and warn that the problem will persist (or worsen) 
over time if disregarded.  Additionally, frames tend to characterize continued neglect of 
the problem as morally reprehensible.  The salience of an issue lies at the heart of 
motivation, and this aspect has clear relevance for policy making.  For instance, CSOs 
that seek to influence the formal agenda and/or engage in advocacy try to convey at least 
three messages to policy makers and the public:  why “their” cause is important, why it is 
more urgent or worthwhile than other issues, and why it deserves the immediate attention 
of the government.   
Providing a dramatic “call to arms” is certainly a key objective of framing.  By 
itself, however, this motivational aspect is rarely sufficient for propelling groups into 
policy-making debates and processes.  CSOs also must attend to the diagnostic and 
prognostic tasks of framing.  Diagnostic framing “problematizes and focuses attention on 
an issue, helps shape how the issue is perceived, and identifies who or what is culpable” 
(Cress and Snow 2000, 1071).  Meanwhile, prognostic framing offers potential solutions 
to the problem.  In brief, frames identify a problem, a responsible actor or institution, and 
a remedy.   
I argue that successful or “policy-friendly” frames contain three strategic elements 
besides motivation.   Activists are better positioned when their diagnostic and prognostic 
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frames include a positive or constructive message, de-emphasize blame, and propose 
feasible solutions to pressing problems.  The more groups incorporate these 
characteristics into their framing, the more effective their strategies will be, thus 
improving their chances of policy involvement.   
First, an effective frame contains a positive message.  CSOs can take as critical or 
oppositional a stance on an issue as they deem necessary.  Nevertheless, it behooves them 
to include some constructive and/or hopeful element(s) in their frames.  To illustrate, 
even movements strongly opposed to “globalization” (increased trade, capital flows, and 
economic integration) within Europe, Latin America, and other regions have created a 
fairly upbeat slogan: “another world is possible.”  On the other hand, if groups engage 
mostly in the politics of negation or contradiction, forever arguing against something, 
policy makers may perceive them as having little to offer.  Hence, their role in decision 
making is likely to be limited.   
Second, the attribution of blame is an integral part of diagnostic framing 
according to existing scholarship.  However, with respect to policy making, frames that 
emphasize blame over other elements can be more of a hindrance than a help.  A dose of 
flexibility and caution are more politically expedient when articulating who (or what) 
bears responsibility for social and political ills.  For instance, assigning blame to certain 
powerful elites — as opposed to more “faceless” practices or policies — can threaten 
these individuals and provoke their active resistance.   
Third, organizations enjoy an advantage when their frames suggest feasible 
remedies for problems.  To be sure, CSOs often call for large-scale, ambitious change.  
Indeed, many public interest groups view such demand making as remaining loyal to 
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their principles, such as the sanctity of human rights or a more just and democratic 
society.  Nevertheless, when groups offer a pragmatic solution (even if they couch it in 
more grandiose rhetoric), demands appear more realistic and “reasonable.”  It is also 
conceivable that elites will integrate the groups’ ideas into the content of a policy during 
the formulation phase and eventually implement the resulting policy.  The policy process, 
usually incremental in nature, can accommodate such inputs.  CSOs thus present policy 
makers with a task within their power to perform.  In contrast, frames sometimes 
communicate that the only response to a structural or institutional problem is to dismantle 
or transform the entire “system.”  However justifiable their criticisms may be, groups that 
underscore the dysfunctional nature of the prevailing social or political order without 
offering workable proposals are more likely to be sidelined.
30
  Moreover, it is beneficial 
for activists to convince elites that change is not only possible, but desirable — that a 
new policy accords in some way with their own political agendas, platforms, or 
preferences.  In this sense, frames can appeal not only to altruism, but to self-interest and 
self-preservation. 
CSOs also fare better in the policy arena if they succeed in defending themselves 
against “counter frames,” should they arise.  Counter framing is an attempt to invalidate 
or undermine an interpretive framework or rendition of reality (Benford & Snow 2000).
31
  
It occurs when opposition forces — for example, other civil societal actors or members of 
political parties — publicly challenge one’s diagnostic and prognostic framing.  Groups 
                                                 
30 
This argument holds under ordinary political circumstances (as opposed to a regime change or other 
extraordinary circumstances).     
31
 For a case study of these dynamics as they pertain to abortion politics in the United States, see 
McCaffrey and Keys (2000).     
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may find themselves at a disadvantage if they face opponents who are actively producing 
competing sets of ideas and discourses.  Under such circumstances, it is possible that 
opposition forces will sway decision makers and the public to their side.  Furthermore, 
CSOs have to expend energy defending their frames and, at times, their credibility.   
In fact, a group’s perceived credibility can matter a great deal during the framing 
process.
32
  Its integrity as a “bearer” of ideas commonly rests on expertise, past 
experience, and proven credentials as a reliable monitor of the state.
33
  These 
characteristics give frames added legitimacy.  Civil societal actors in Latin America 
frequently wear their credentials as monitors of the state like a badge of honor.  Some 
groups emerged during periods of state-sponsored human rights violations and are 
experienced in holding leaders accountable for their actions.  CSOs created more recently 
likewise have established themselves as monitors and public defenders, building on this 
inheritance of previous activism.  The “watchdog” role, though not unique to the region, 
is widely respected in countries where abuses of power have occurred.  Groups can 
leverage this credibility and social recognition while engaging in framing (and advocacy 
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 Benford and Snow (2000) identify the perceived credibility of the frame “articulators” as one of the 
factors influencing the overall credibility of a frame. 
33
 The boundaries separating ideas from information, expertise, and analysis are empirically indistinct.  
CSOs — and professionalized NGOs in particular — often support their choice of frames with technical 




  Additionally, an organization’s ability to propagate frames and reach a 
broader audience depends largely on its ties to the mass media.
35
   
In summary, through motivational framing, groups can attract the attention and 
interest of governing elites and fellow citizens.  They can dramatize an issue, conveying a 
sense of urgency or severity and calling upon the government to “do the right thing.”  
Nevertheless, CSOs that seek to influence policy during the agenda-setting, formulation, 
and adoption phases are more likely to do so if their frames include the other elements of 
diagnostic and prognostic framing outlined here.       
Framing strategies account for variation in policy participation better than rival 
ideational explanations.  For example, an alternative approach would emphasize group 
ideology, defined as a set of beliefs used to interpret the political world and to justify or 
challenge the dominant order (Zald 1996).  Scholars sometimes argue that CSOs with 
“radical” ideologies or agendas are marginalized from decision making (e.g., Gideon 
1998).  However, the available evidence is more complex.  To begin with, groups may 
espouse so-called radical views on certain issues and more conciliatory views on others.  
Depending on a variety of circumstances, they sometimes accentuate the moderate 
aspects of issues while downplaying the more controversial aspects.  Moreover, deciding 
what constitutes a radical mode of thought across multiple contexts poses a 
methodological challenge of considerable magnitude.  Lastly, a substantial number of the 
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 Fox (2001), citing evidence from Mexico, argues similarly that CSOs can gain credibility from effective, 
independent monitoring activities (see also Avritzer 2002).  In addition, Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2002 & 
2001) discuss a form of vertical accountability called “social accountability,” which entails monitoring 
elites, combating corruption, and exposing wrongdoing through legal action, media coverage, and social 
mobilization.  CSOs often contribute to these processes. 
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CSOs included in this study are internally pluralistic:  although their members support the 
organizational mission, they subscribe to different political ideologies.  For these reasons, 
a focus on ideology per se can lead us down a blind alley.
36
   
We can draw a similar conclusion about the nature of the issue at stake.  Analysts 
occasionally suggest that the characteristics of a given issue or policy domain influence 
the dynamics between groups and governments.  Giugni and Passy (1998), who apply 
this reasoning to social movements, assert that cooperation with the government is less 
likely if SMOs work on threatening or contentious issues.  Determining which issues hold 
intrinsic appeal and which ones do not (and for whom) is arduous work.  To illustrate, the 
authors cite environmentalism as an example of a less threatening issue.
37
  In Chile and 
other developing nations, however, green issues are contested — sometimes vehemently.  
As I will demonstrate in later chapters, “it’s not easy being green” in such contexts. 
Furthermore, at first glance, the well-being of children seems to be a very 
appealing cause that taps into deeply ingrained cultural values shared around the world.  
Brown Thompson (1997) describes it as a “feel good” issue, noting that children are often 
seen as innocent and vulnerable and that a variety of states and non-governmental actors 
have championed the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Nevertheless, the degree to 
which children’s CSOs participate in policy varies within and across countries, and we 
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 On the relationship between framing and the media, see McCarthy, Smith and Zald (1996).  Manzetti 
(2000) and Payne (2000) also address the importance of media exposure for Latin American CSOs seeking 
political influence.  
36
 A group’s ideology is important insofar as it affects its framing strategies.  However, it is one of many 
such influences.       
37
 Price also notes, “It has long been suspected that activists’ efforts are apt to be most effective on issues 
like the environment” (2003, 598).       
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must account for this variation.  My findings suggest that the extent to which issues 
threaten the authorities depends more on framing strategies than on the issue itself. 
Frame analysis also allows for an emphasis on agency and the strategic 
mobilization of ideas.  A focus on the deliberate or purposive aspects of framing does not 
amount to an argument that frames are disingenuous or purely contrived.  Framing is 
seldom completely disconnected from the “true” beliefs or principles of the actors 
involved.  Rather, my central claim is that groups have significant room for maneuver 
while selecting frames, and their strategies for “spinning” ideas have policy implications. 
 
The power of partnerships 
In addition to mobilizing ideas, CSOs can combine and mobilize organizational 
resources in alliances.  If groups form and join effective partnerships, their chances of 
policy participation improve markedly.  Civil society alliances vary significantly with 
respect to their size, scope, internal organization, goals, and strategies.  While some 
partnerships are built on a large, diverse membership base, others involve a spattering of 
CSOs with similar characteristics, such as professionalized NGOs.
38
  Alliances also differ 
in terms of the structure of their leadership and the frequency and intensity of their 
activities.
39
  On one end of the spectrum, we find informal, temporary arrangements, such 
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 The alliances discussed here are not coterminous with social movements, which unite individuals as well 
as groups.  Domestic alliances can be local, regional, or national in scope, and some also have ties to 
transnational networks, which I discuss later in this chapter and in Chapter 5.  
39
  It is necessary to examine the frequency with which participating groups actually undertake joint 
endeavors, which can range from continuous to intermittent.  Alliances can either remain leaderless or 
select leaders to coordinate their efforts and speak on their behalf.  Moreover, their internal decision-
making processes range from vertical to more horizontal arrangements.   
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as ad hoc coalitions, which tend to be motivated by a set of concrete objectives.  Certain 
individuals or organizations may serve as coordinator, but coalitions sometimes lack 
nominal leaders.  More formal, permanent partnerships, which usually have their own 
legal status as second- or third-tier organizations (including federations and peak 
associations) are situated at the other end of the continuum.  
Networks (redes) generally fall somewhere between these two ends of the 
spectrum.
40
  They are more likely than coalitions to be formally constituted, with a name, 
charter, and identifiable membership.
41
  They frequently comprise larger numbers of 
groups and are meant to endure over time.  In addition, their aims and activities are 
manifold:  they often seek to “strengthen” their members by providing services, building 
group capacities, and facilitating the exchange of information, for instance.
42
  Networks 
commonly establish an explicit process for choosing leaders, though they also purport to 
use more “horizontal” forms of internal decision making than classic peak associations, 
characterized by vertical structures.
43
 
Alliances of varying types can help individual groups surmount the obstacles that 
most limit their political strength in Latin America:  insufficient resources, low visibility, 
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 The same can be said of “forums” (foros), consortia, and coordinating bodies.  The boundaries separating 
these different types of alliances are not rigid in practice.  For example, a network can serve as a “launching 
pad” for issue-specific coalitions (Shepard 2003); conversely, short-term coalitions can metamorphose into 
more formal bodies.  Throughout the dissertation, I discuss several types of alliances but focus more 
intensively on networks and ad hoc coalitions.  
41
  Umlas distinguishes a formally constituted network from a submerged network:  the first is a “higher-
profile named entity with identifiable members,” while the second is an amorphous set of relationships 
underlying collective action and thus explored in social movement theory (1998, 162).  Some (but not all) 
networks obtain legal recognition from the state.    
42
  An exclusive focus on policy-related activities is not a necessary condition for a network to become 
involved in policy processes.  Few existing networks identify policy influence as their sole raison d’être.    
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and high fragmentation.  In interviews, members of CSOs in both Argentina and Chile 
commonly cite all three limitations as major concerns.  With respect to visibility, they 
worry that their social, political, and policy contributions are under-valued.  Perceptions 
of low social and governmental recognition of their work have prompted a collective 
“loss of self-esteem” in post-transition Chile in particular.
44
  Representatives of CSOs 
also lament fragmentation, often a product of civil society’s heterogeneity and minimal 
inter-organizational communication.  Furthermore, a relationship exists between high 
fragmentation, resource scarcity, and low visibility:  groups competing against one 
another for funding and recognition tend to remain atomized.  In short, these are major 
issues facing CSOs in Argentina, Chile, and other developing and democratizing nations. 
The main advantages of building alliances are threefold.  First, groups pool their 
organizational resources, namely information, analysis, expertise, prior experience, 
credibility or name recognition, administrative capacity, and political and media contacts.  
By doing so, they marshal greater amounts of resources than any single CSO can muster 
and overcome the scarcity problem.  Second, through alliances, CSOs can coordinate 
their advocacy efforts and avoid redundancies in their activities, which conserves 
precious time and resources.  Third, they are better able to generate a critical mass, 
bolster their collective demands with greater numbers, and present a united front vis-à-vis 
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 Even more stable and elaborately structured networks lack authority over individual member groups, 
which have significant room for maneuver.  For a similar distinction concerning horizontal and vertical ties 
among organizations, see Chalmers and Piester (1995). 
44
 This observation was made during a number of conferences that I attended in Santiago (see also Aguila et 
al. 2001a & 2001b and a contribution by Ana María Medioli, President, ACCION, in Las últimas noticias, 
issue dated 1/20/01).       
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the authorities or other civil societal actors.  These combined benefits increase the 
likelihood that governing elites and the public will notice and/or listen to CSOs. 
My findings indicate that not all alliances are created equal.  Certain features 
increase their overall effectiveness and enhance their impact on the dependent variable.  
These are related to the advantages noted above and include:   
• An efficient division of labor.  Alliances function better when they take advantage 
of their members’ individual strengths and areas of expertise through the 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities. 
• A balance between internal cohesion and diversity.  It is beneficial for an alliance 
to comprise likeminded people who agree on both goals and strategies.  On the 
other hand, if participating groups exemplify a range of ideological proclivities, 
focus areas, and organizational missions and structures, the alliance will appear 
more representative of larger civil society constituencies.   
• A willingness to collaborate with other alliances or broader social movements in 
pursuit of common objectives.  Forging such ties achieves an effect similar to that 
of increasing internal diversity.  At the same time, alliances maintain their 
flexibility because they do not seek to absorb these other movements.  
 
No single category of alliance embodies these characteristics by definition.  In 
theory, coalitions, networks, and other arrangements are equally likely to have these 
attributes.  In practice, however, coalitions often enjoy more internal agreement on 
specific goals and tactics compared to networks.  Moreover, groups participating in 
coalitions appear to view their differences more as benefits than as risks that could 
jeopardize the alliance.  They tend to emphasize the benefits of combining their different 
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strengths in the short term to achieve a shared policy objective.
45
  In contrast, in alliances 
designed to last indefinitely, CSOs must negotiate internal differences on a continual 
basis.  Thus, issues surrounding the diversity of organizations — and potential 
disagreements among them — can be less problematic for coalitions.   
Inter-organizational cooperation increases the likelihood of civil society influence 
during each of the policy phases examined in the dissertation.  To begin with, the benefits 
of joining forces have important consequences for the involvement of CSOs in policy 
formulation.  It is more efficient and convenient for decision makers to consult 
representatives of an existing alliance than to meet with dozens of separate organizations.  
Government officials sometimes welcome the existence of such an entity, accepting it as 
“representative” of a wide range of civil societal actors and/or a legitimate 
“spokesperson” for a certain issue or policy domain.  NGO networks or other semi-
permanent alliances can be particularly relevant during this stage.  When the authorities 
seek the input of civil societal actors, networks seem a “logical choice because their 
membership includes many organizations” and they “can legitimately claim to represent a 
broader range of voices and experiences than any one organization” (Shepard 2003, 9; 
see also Bebbington et al. 1993).
46
    
Strength in numbers is also a boon to CSOs seeking to influence policy agenda 
setting and adoption.  Working collectively augments the capacity of groups to persuade 
decision makers that an issue deserves attention and to pressure them to enact a certain 
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 Some American politics analysts also note that interest groups in coalitions tend to emphasize their 
commonalities over their differences (Costain 1980; Jenkins 1987).         
46
 Clearly, the extent to which networks and other alliances can “legitimately” claim to speak for their 
members varies from case to case.  
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policy.  Ad hoc coalitions often play a significant role during both stages.  I therefore 
expect activists to create — or, in some cases, reactivate — these short-term alliances 
when a shared policy goal is at stake.  
The arguments that I present here build on the corporatist and pluralist traditions, 
which address different categories of alliances in longstanding democracies.  In synthetic 
terms, corporatism draws attention to encompassing associations (i.e., peak associations, 
umbrella groups, or federations).  In corporatist systems of interest representation, the 
state grants a representational monopoly to private interests organized into hierarchical 
units (Schmitter 1974).  Over time, analysts have broadened this conceptual category to 
include other actors besides labor and business, such as non-profits (Appleton 2003; 
Hunter 1993; Zimmer 1999).  This scholarship indicates that the formation of 
encompassing associations facilitates the involvement of social groups in policy making.  
Governments regularly consult their top echelons and treat them as “legitimate 
representative bodies” (Hunter 1993, 131).  Meanwhile, the American politics literature 
sometimes examines interest group coalitions (e.g., Berry 1997; Costain 1980; Gelb and 
Palley 1996; Hrebenar 1997; Hula 1999).
47
  For instance, scholars have proposed that 
coalitions help groups synthesize their demands, merge their constituencies and 
memberships, and present a “united political front and the image of broad-based political 
support” (Gelb and Palley 1996, 125).  Outside observers are less likely to perceive a 
group participating in a coalition as an “isolated maverick” (Berry 1997, 188).   
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 Hula’s (1999) analysis of interest group coalitions in Washington, D.C. is an unusually comprehensive 
study on the topic.  SMOs in the United States and Europe also have used coalitional strategies (Hathaway 
and Meyer 1997)     
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In short, these bodies of literature outline several benefits of alliances, which have 
informed my analysis.  However, corporatism and pluralism fail to accurately 
characterize contemporary state-society dynamics in Latin American countries.  CSOs 
tend to be more heterogeneous, dispersed, and self-organized than the corporatist model 
suggests.
48
  Existing alliances generally lack the vertical structure, national scope, and 
representational monopoly of the traditional encompassing association, and the 
equivalent of such an association is not a necessary condition for policy involvement.  
Additionally, according to the archetypal pluralist formulation, coalitions emerge in open, 
porous political systems with many access points, yet coalitions also can be important 
players in other institutional contexts.   
Thus, the logic of joining forces to increase one’s political strength motivates 
group strategies in a variety of political settings.  In fact, this logic may be even more 
compelling in countries where individual CSOs tend to lack material resources and/or 
access to institutions compared to their counterparts in other nations.  Furthermore, 
patterns of civil society organizing differ cross-nationally.  For these reasons, the time 
has come to re-assess and re-fashion our ideas about alliances in light of recent 
developments in democratizing areas.  A re-examination also is overdue given the 
shortage of works on partnerships within Latin America.
49
  To date, no one has 
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 For distinctions between historically corporatist forms of civil society mobilization in Latin America and 
more recent tendencies toward self-organization, independence, and pluralism, see Foweraker (1995), 
García Delgado (1994), Jelin (1987), Panfichi et al. (n.d), and Roitter and Bombal (2000).       
49
 Several Latin America specialists have contributed to this area of inquiry.  See, for example, Friedman’s 
(2000) discussion of a coalition of women’s groups in Venezuela, Shepard’s (2003) research on networks 
comprising women’s sexual and reproductive rights advocates, and Umlas’ (1998) case study of an 
environmental network in Mexico.  For an additional study of networks in Mexico, see Chalmers and 
Piester (1995).  For more technical, development-oriented analyses of networks, see Bebbington et al. 
(1993), Fisher (1993), and Fowler (1997).   
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formulated a more general set of theoretical arguments and tested them with comparative 
data from multiple issue areas and democratizing countries.   
This lack of attention to CSO partnerships in re-emergent democracies is puzzling 
for at least two reasons.  First, the conceptual and empirical leaps forward in the study of 
transnational advocacy networks make the neglect of domestic alliances even more 
conspicuous (e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998a; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002).
50
   
Second, the literature appears to be out of sync with empirical trends.  The global 
proliferation of NGOs since the Third Wave of democratization has resulted in changed 
dynamics within civil societies and, as a consequence, novel types of partnerships.
51
   
Scholars who have theorized networks in Latin America conceptualize the term 
quite broadly.  An “associative network,” for instance, can include government officials, 
members of political parties, business leaders, NGOs, popular movements, and other 
individual and collective actors (Chalmers et al. 1997).  It “should not be thought of as 
sitting in civil society, separate from the government, but rather as connecting segments 
of civil society with the state” (1997, 569).  The associative network approach provides a 
snapshot of the myriad people and groups involved in policy issues at a given point in 
time or in a specific issue area.
52
  However, lumping them together does not help us 
understand how CSOs form partnerships to achieve political strength in relation to other 
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  The alliances analyzed in Chapter 4 are domestic and (so far) have neither attracted nor spawned major 
transnational campaigns.  International actors are not the main drivers of these partnerships.  On the other 
hand, the alliances and the groups comprising them do maintain ties to international actors, as I discuss in 
Chapter 5. 
51
  The number of NGOs in Latin America has grown in recent decades, owing in part to the increase in the 
number of “sophisticated activists,” the “globalization” of policy issues, and the “complexity of problems 
and of the programs people devise to deal with them” (Chalmers 2000, 3). 
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actors — especially governing elites.
53
  The alliances examined in this dissertation can be 
thought of as “sitting in civil society.”  They are of, by, and for the CSOs that furnish 
their members, resources, and ideas.  A fresh analysis of these domestic-level 
partnerships is urgently needed.   
In addition to providing such an analysis, I pose a further question:  if forging 
effective partnerships increases the likelihood of participation, under what circumstances 
will CSOs manage to act collectively?  Groups do not always succeed in cooperating with 
one another; in fact, they often fail.  Building an alliance can be a Herculean task fraught 
with obstacles, including competition among individual groups, leadership rivalries, and 
perceived threats to organizational autonomy.
54
  Such challenges help explain the 
variation we observe across cases in levels of inter-organizational cooperation.  I propose 
that while all CSOs that endeavor to create, maintain, and participate in alliances face 
these and other obstacles, coalitions are better able to surmount them.  Coalitions usually 
operate with greater flexibility compared to more formal, enduring alliances with varied 
goals and larger memberships.  To illustrate, because coalitions seldom entail the creation 
of a more permanent alliance structure, participants are able to work in concert without 
relinquishing their independence.  Groups do not have to reach agreement on as wide a 
range of issues or over as long a period of time.  Other types of alliances are hardly 
                                                                                                                                                 
52
 Additionally, my findings lend little support to the notion that interactions among various private and 
public actors approximate the non-hierarchical character of associative networks.  On the contrary, power 
differentials and mutual distrust continue to complicate such relationships.     
53
 The propensity to lump together a multitude of actors, both societal and governmental, is also evident in 
the literature on policy making.  A labor “policy domain,” for instance, includes unions, trade associations, 
business interests, legislative committees, and government agencies (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Knoke 
1990). See also Heclo (1978) on “issue networks” and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) on advocacy 
coalition frameworks.     
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doomed to failure; however, they must be painstaking in their efforts to establish 
mechanisms for internal decision making and accountability. 
In summary, the theoretical approach I have outlined is agency-centered.  Both 
explanatory variables emphasize actions within the power of civil societal actors to 
perform, and even in difficult circumstances, groups enjoy some room for maneuver.  
This emphasis on actors’ strategies contrasts with other approaches to civil society.  For 
instance, Armony questions the utility of examining the “kinds of groups, movements, or 
networks” that one finds in civil society (2004, 205).  He argues instead that the political, 
social, and economic surround shapes the “nature, dispositions and orientations” of 
associational life, as well as its effects on democracy (2004, 3).  Civil society basically 
reproduces and reinforces the broader context in which it is embedded; and group efforts 
to re-shape their environment — by changing policies and politics more broadly — are 
less relevant.
55
  I offer an alternative perspective in the dissertation.  Nevertheless, 
because framing and alliance building do not occur in a vacuum, I also consider the 
broader cultural, social, and political milieu.  Analyzing contextual factors that constrain 
group choices is necessary to avoid an overly voluntaristic account of policy 
participation. 
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 I address these challenges to inter-organizational cooperation in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
55
 Armony (2004) emphasizes two contextual variables, the degree of inequality and the strength or 
weakness of the rule of law, though he explores additional factors in his case studies.  Among other civil 
societal actors, the author examines civil and human rights groups in Argentina that addressed such issues 
as discrimination, police brutality, and citizen safety during the 1990s.  He discusses the limited impact of 
groups who have tried to strengthen the rule of law through legislative and legal means, namely 
institutional reforms and convictions of police officers who abuse their authority.       
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Putting things in context 
  The dissertation explores several domestic and international factors that affect 
framing and alliances and thus have an indirect impact on the dependent variable.  These 
variables are shown below in Figure 2.  For instance, a domestic ideational factor that 
influences framing is the availability of a “master frame,” such as the human rights frame 
within Argentina (e.g., Snow & Benford 1992).  CSOs can build on the ideas and 
rhetorical strategies introduced by the activists who have preceded them.  Master frames 
affect groups’ understandings and interpretations of issues; they also can attract a broader 
audience and legitimate advocacy.    
 Meanwhile, a country’s political system can shape patterns of alliance building by 
encouraging certain types of partnerships over others.  For instance, formal alliances of 
national scope are well suited to Chile’s relatively centralized political institutions.  By 
contrast, informal coalitions are a reasonable choice in Argentina given its more 
dispersed policy-making authority.  
Because civil societies in democratizing countries are embedded in global 
relationships, I weave international variables into the fabric of my analysis.  I single out 
two modes of transnational influence on domestic activism:  flows of ideas and resources.  
Domestic advocates can incorporate global norms — shared standards for behavior that 
are sometimes codified in conventions — into their frames.  Additionally, resources (e.g., 
funding and technical assistance) help maintain and strengthen alliances and ease the 
creation of new partnerships.  This does not imply, however, that domestic actors are 
merely passive recipients of foreign “aid” and ideas.  Indeed, they often participate 
actively in international networks and events.  Furthermore, because the most effective 
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frames resonate with domestic realities, the more politically savvy groups do not simply 
“import” pre-packaged discourses from abroad.
56
   
By exploring these “entanglements” between comparative politics and 
international relations, I put my arguments into conversation with several burgeoning 
literatures (Putnam 1988).  For example, a large body of scholarship examines the 
international donor community and its fascination with civil society (e.g., Carothers and 
Ottaway 2000, Foweraker 2001, Grugel 2000, Howell and Pearce 2001, Hulme and 
Edwards 1997, Meyer 1999).
57
  Moreover, a growing sub-field is dedicated to the study 
of transnational advocacy networks, social movements, and NGOs (Boli and Thomas 
1999, Clark 2001, Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999, Florini 2000, Gordenker and 
Weiss 1995a & 1995b, Jordan and Van Tuijl 2000, Keck and Sikkink 1998a & 1998b, 
Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001, Smith 1997, and 
Wapner 1995).
58
  A number of works emphasize the role of transnational activists as 
promoters of “world culture” (Boli and Thomas 1999), principled ideas (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998a), and norms (Clark 2001; Florini 2000; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 
2002).  Many also propose that domestic activists can benefit from these ideational 
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 In fact, Latin American activists have been important contributors to the development and 
institutionalization of human rights norms at the international level.  These norms, in turn, have created 
political opportunities for other activists.  
57
 Examples of civil society enthusiasts include intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the 
Organization of American States (OAS), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF), foundations such as Avina, Ford, Tinker, OXFAM, and NOVIB, as well as the National 
Endowment for Democracy and United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID).  Foreign 
governments and multilateral banks (which I discuss below) also support CSOs.   
58
 Tarrow (2001) distinguishes between contentious, mass-based social movements and less contentious 
networks of activists and NGOs (for similar distinctions, see Keck and Sikkink 1998b and Khagram, Riker 
and Sikkink 2002). Keck and Sikkink’s transnational advocacy networks can include NGOs, social 
movements, intellectuals, and the media (1998a, 2).  More ambitious terms include “global civil society” 
and “world civic politics” (Lipshutz 1996; Wapner 1995).   
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resources and from international political support.
59
  However, more research linking 
global and domestic politics is needed (Tarrow 2001).  It is in this spirit that I examine 
the consequences of these factors on participation through their effects on the explanatory 
variables.   
 











ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION 
 
I noted at the outset of the chapter that the democratization literature has largely 
neglected civil society’s involvement in policy.  Accordingly, the scholarly debates that 
have predominated within that sub-field offer little theoretical traction for the 
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 See Keck and Sikkink (1998a) on the domestic impact of transnational advocacy networks and Smith 
(1997) on ties between national and transnational social movements.  Several case studies discuss similar 
global-domestic cooperation in Latin America on issues such as human rights (Brysk 1994 & 1993), 
women’s rights (Ewig 1999; Navarro and Bourque 1998), the environment (Hochstetler 2000), and 
indigenous communities (Brysk 1996).  





Transnational flows  




Framing strategies Alliance building 
Policy participation 
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dissertation’s research question.  It is therefore necessary to consult a wider range of 
literatures in search of contending perspectives on civil society participation.   In this 




For simplicity’s sake, I organize potential explanatory factors into two broad 
categories:  “from above” and “from below.”  Government practices and institutions can 
either encourage or discourage the inclusion of civil societal actors in policy making.  
Governing elites typically create and direct these institutions, which we can envision as 
variables affecting participation from above (or from the top-down).  In contrast, factors 
that influence the prospects for participation from below are not government-driven; 
rather, they include CSOs’ capacities, strategies, and demands to be included.
61
   
 
Explanatory factors from above 
  
With respect to top-down factors, the “new institutionalism” in political science is 
my theoretical point of departure.
62
  Such arguments are predicated on the idea that 
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 A dosage of theoretical pluralism and flexibility is warranted, given that few scholars have addressed my 
research question directly.   
61
 Bickford (1999) makes a similar distinction between the “push” (government-driven) and “pull” (society-
driven) factors that shape citizen participation but focuses mostly on the former category. 
62
 This ample body of scholarship includes theoretical works distinguishing among rational choice, 
historical, and sociological institutionalism (e.g., Hall and Taylor 1996) and more concrete analyses of 
constitutional design, presidentialism and parliamentarism, political parties, electoral systems, and other 
institutions.  Examples include Dix (1992 & 1989), Linz and Valenzuela (1994), Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), and Shugart and Carey (1992).  
Knight (1992) and North (1990) are examples of rational choice institutionalism; Collier and Collier (1991) 
and Thelen, Steinmo, and Longstreth (1992) are influential historical institutionalist works. 
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institutions structure political behavior and thus affect outcomes.
63
  Institutionalism is a 
useful approach for understanding the political and policy-making architecture that all 
citizens face in a given context.  As mentioned previously, analysts working in this 
tradition often paint a portrait of the limited access points available to citizen groups in 
Latin American countries.  However, their brush strokes are quite broad, and relatively 
few scholars have performed a more variegated analysis of Latin American democracies 
by investigating the decision-making processes occurring at different levels of 
government and within various government agencies.  Instead, they cast the debate at a 
general level, hovering above a simple empirical reality:  even in a seemingly 
inauspicious institutional context, CSOs can and do participate in policy.  This approach 
cannot account for their involvement or capture the variation on the dependent variable 
within a single nation.
64
   
An alternative institutionalist framework would focus on governmental bodies 
that generate opportunities for citizen participation.  Examples of government 
“invitations” to participate include advisory or consultative councils, committees, and 
task forces, as well as participatory budgeting and other forums for public debate and 
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 Institutionalism hardly constitutes a “unified” body of scholarship, and analysts have not often achieved 
clarity or consistency in defining or operationalizing institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996).  A common 
approach is to define institutions broadly as formal or informal procedures and routines “embedded in the 
organizational structure” of a polity (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938; see also Thelen, Steinmo, and Longstreth 
1992). 
64
 As noted above, the concept of “political opportunities” in the social movement literature is similarly 
general.  Political opportunities are factors external to social movements which influence the timing and 
type of mobilization (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).  These include elite instability and the presence 
of elite allies, increasing popular access to the political system, and decreasing state repression (McAdam 
1996).  A broad concept to begin with, political opportunity structure has been stretched further to include 
numerous elements of the environment in which collective action takes place (see, for instance, Friedman 
2000 and Friedman and Hochstetler 2002).  Gamson and Meyer thus warn that political opportunity 
structure is “in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement 




  Institutions of this type have become more common in Latin 
American and other Third Wave democracies.  They span countless issue areas, function 
at multiple levels of government, and often involve NGOs and other civil society 
groups.
66
  Consequently, when I embarked on my field research, I expected these 
institutional innovations to be an important pathway to CSO involvement in policy. 
However, echoing the familiar refrain, “institutions matter,” only takes us so far 
in this line of inquiry.  The institutions do not explain the variation on the dependent 
variable across issue areas or across Argentina and Chile.  For example, the 
environmental policy domain in Chile boasts a wealth of institutions designed to 
encourage citizen participation, yet levels of group involvement in decision making 
remain low.  More generally, Chile has surpassed Argentina in terms of participatory 
reforms:  the Lagos Administration has encouraged citizen participation in policy making 
during multiple phases partly through the creation of advisory councils and other 
institutions.
67
  In contrast, Argentine leaders have not embraced the discourse on citizen 
participation and policy collaboration between CSOs and the government with such 
enthusiasm.  No administration has implemented comprehensive reforms of this sort in 
the post-authoritarian period.  Advisory councils and other participatory venues exist but 
tend to be comparatively ad hoc and dependent on the discretion of elites (Friedman and 
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 Common terms in Spanish for such entities include consejos consultivos and consejos ciudadanos.  On 
participatory budgeting (mostly in Brazilian cities), see Abers (1998), Avritzer (2002), Baierle (1998), 
Nylen (2002), and Wampler (2004 & 2000).  Posner (2003) discusses these and other local institutions.  





 Invitations to participate also are extended to universities and research centers, religious denominations, 
industries and businesses, and other social and economic sectors.  
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Hochstetler 2002; Ryan 2001).  Based on these marked differences between the two 
countries, we would expect to find more robust evidence of policy participation in Chile.  
So far, available data do not support such a pattern.    
 A related set of top-down explanatory factors can be derived from a growing 
literature — distinct from the body of work discussed above — on international 
discourses and practices in favor of citizen participation in governance.
68
  At its most 
condensed, this scholarship indicates that participatory models are undergoing a process 
of international diffusion, principally through the efforts of powerful philanthropic, 
intergovernmental, and financial institutions.
69
  The Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and World Bank, for instance, require Latin American governments to consult 
citizens as a condition of financing.  We therefore should observe greater numbers of 
programs and policies that include civil society groups in Argentina, Chile, and other 
funded countries.  Over time, such patterns also could lead to the institutionalization of 
participation at the domestic level.   
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 In 2000, Lagos issued a Directive mandating participatory reforms across the entire executive branch 
(this and other related government documents are available at: http://www.participacionciudadana.cl).  I 
discuss these institutional changes in Chapter 5.    
68 Because institutionalist works rarely analyze the international dimensions of institution building, I 
discuss them separately from the literature focused on these global tendencies.  Relevant works on the latter 
include Acuña and Tuozzo (2000), Cardelle (1998), Chalmers et al. (1997), Edwards and Hulme (1996), 
Friedman and Hochstetler (2002), Howell and Pearce (2000), Kaimowitz (1993), Molenaers and Renard 
(2002), Rabotnikof (1999), Robinson (1998); Rutherford (1997), Schild (2000), Tussie (2000), and Tussie 
and Tuozzo (2001).    
69
 Various United Nations agencies, the Ford Foundation, and the Avina Foundation are examples of 
intergovernmental and philanthropic organizations that have funded such initiatives.  This discussion 
centers mostly on what Weyland (2004) refers to as the “external pressure” framework within the policy 
diffusion scholarship.  He distinguishes this approach (and its focus on international financial institutions’ 
incentives and sanctions) from others emphasizing rational choice, cognitive heuristics, and symbolic 
imitation.      
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 The international community has adopted the rhetoric of citizen participation and 
“alliances” between the state and civil society.  This increasingly hegemonic discourse is 
closely tied to donors’ unabashed enthusiasm for “civil society” and its purported 
contributions to development, democracy, and “good governance.”
70
  Although many 
conflicting meanings lurk under the surface of the shared vocabulary, a new global 
agenda is coalescing nonetheless.  An important aspect of the model is the integration of 
civil society in social policy formulation, implementation, and monitoring.  Donors claim 
that participation results in more sustainable, consensual policies.
71
   
 The multilateral banks have pursued the new agenda in Argentina and Chile by 
financing programs that stipulate citizen involvement of one variety or another.  
However, the preferred roles for CSOs are policy implementation and, to a lesser extent, 
monitoring.
72
  Not surprisingly, participation in decision making is less common, even 
though the model makes explicit reference to the design phase of policy (and donors 
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 International donors do not often acknowledge the complex relationships among civil society, 
development, and democracy and opt instead for a simplistic synergistic model (Molenaers and Renard 
2002; see also Armony 2004).  Citizen participation is one of several elements of the concept of 
governance, which usually entails transparency, a smooth-functioning bureaucracy, and the rule of law 
(e.g., Tussie 2000). 
71
  Policies are more consensual because stakeholdership increases and conflicts are “managed” (see the 
IDB’s “Resource Book on Participation, available at http://www.iadb.org, Rabotnikof 1999, and Tussie 
2000).  The IDB and World Bank also operate under the assumption that participation and social capital are 
positively related.  
72
 In Argentina, for instance, over 90% of social programs supported with external funding or credit involve 
NGOs, base organizations, faith-based groups, and other CSOs in their administration, compared to only 
about 42% of the nationally funded programs.  I base these figures on data collected by the national body 
that coordinates social policies (Consejo Nacional de Coordinación de Políticas Sociales).  Included are 
programs implemented in 2002 intended for infants, children, young adults, indigenous communities, and 
rural populations, among other groups, in the areas of social inclusion and community development, 
productive activities, housing and infrastructure, health, education, and nutrition (“Guía de Programas 
Sociales Nacionales”).   
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sometimes earmark funds for that purpose).
73
  Thus, international initiatives have not 
significantly affected the cases analyzed in the dissertation.    
 This lack of supporting evidence highlights two general problems with top-down 
explanations that center on global factors.  First, multiple and even competing goals often 
co-exist behind the façade of a “common” agenda, as illustrated by the ambiguity and 
myriad connotations of “citizen participation.”  Second, international influences are 
filtered through domestic institutions and translated into action in different ways (and to 
varying degrees) across countries.  Scholars should provide evidence linking global 
trends to domestic effects.
74
   
In short, although domestic political institutions and international trends shape the 
context in which policy making occurs, institutions and programs designed to “invite” 
participation do not appear to explain civil society involvement in policy.  Indeed, top-
down approaches generate a number of further questions.  Which groups are invited to 
participate?  Do CSOs usually await invitations, or do they instead demand to be 
included?  Who is able to stay involved in policy debates and decisions long after 
government-led opportunities cease?  To address these issues, we must examine the 
characteristics of civil societal actors and their efforts to participate from below.  Several 
literatures are relevant to this task, including comparative works on longstanding 
democracies, the American politics field within political science, and interdisciplinary 
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 The IDB was instrumental in the Lagos reforms discussed previously by funding a program to 
“strengthen alliances between civil society and the state” in the early 2000s.  The program’s goals were to 
strengthen civil society and volunteerism and to establish citizen participation as a criterion for policy 
making.   
74
  Hunter and Brown (2000) do this when they assess the influence of World Bank lending on government 
spending in the areas of education and health in Latin America.  They conclude that “policy change 
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scholarship on various collective actors, such as social movements, interest groups, and 
non-profits.   
 
Explanatory factors from below  
 
Alternative explanations of policy participation and influence tend to emphasize 
the attributes of individual groups.  A standard approach is to identify organizational 
resources that correlate with political clout.  The conventional wisdom on interest groups 
in the United States, for example, suggests that money, members, information and 
expertise, respected leadership, administrative capacity, and political allies are key assets 
(e.g., Berry 1999; Gais and Walker 1991; Gelb and Palley 1996; Greenwald 1977; 
Hrebenar 1997; Lehman, Schlozman, and Tierney 1986; Petracca 1992).
75
  Analysts of 
non-profit NGOs (e.g., Hudson 2002; Rees 1999; Taylor and Warburton 2003) and social 
movement organizations (e.g., Dalton 1994; Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
Oberschall 1973) in Europe and the United States discuss similar categories of 
resources.
76
  Studies of NGOs in other regions likewise cite the importance of expertise, 
legitimacy, and a membership base (Bratton 1994 & 1990; Fisher 1998).
77
   
                                                                                                                                                 
ultimately depends on the political dynamics that exist within borrowing countries” and that powerful 
domestic interests can override Bank recommendations (2000, 137).  
75
 The standard definition of an interest (or pressure) group is a voluntary association that communicates 
the interests of its members to government officials in an effort to influence policy (e.g., Dexter 1969; Key 
1964; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).   
76
 The resource mobilization school in particular emphasizes the resource needs of SMOs.     
77
 Bratton (1994 & 1990) underscores factors such as a domestic funding base (which provides legitimacy), 
a homogenous membership, and a federated structure.  Fisher (1998) argues that a diversified funding base, 
linkages to the grassroots, expertise, and other attributes correlate with organizational autonomy, which in 
turn is associated with influence. 
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My findings indicate that some resources are significant regardless of the political 
context in which groups operate.  As noted previously, certain organizational attributes 
— credibility and media contacts, for example — also help groups disseminate their 
frames.  Legal and other forms of expertise facilitate work on policy proposals:  activists 
are armed with an understanding of existing policies and able to design alternatives.    
Additionally, groups with connections to political leaders and/or government officials are 
likely to enjoy an edge over CSOs without friends in “high places.”  In fact, members of 
CSOs sometimes transition into government positions or party politics.  If they remain in 
contact with their former colleagues in civil society, this can prove advantageous to 
groups during policy making.  I refer to this movement of individuals between civil 
society and the government (or political society) as “leadership exchange.”
78
  Clearly, 
each of these resources can be useful to CSOs.
79
  
Nevertheless, because “there is no automatic equation by which group resources 
translate into political resources,” merely identifying resources as correlates of influence 
leaves out a large part of the political story (Greenwald 1977, 333).  More importantly, 
even CSOs that are relatively deficient in resources can participate in policy under some 
circumstances.  I therefore submit that CSOs’ efforts to combine and mobilize resources 
in alliances are more crucial than resources per se.  I argue further that CSOs mobilize 
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 This pattern also can occur during periods of non-democratic rule.  For instance, under authoritarian 
regimes, when political society ceases to function as such, individuals may migrate from leadership 
positions in parties (and/or government agencies) to CSOs.  Following the democratic transition, some 
return to their former positions, leading to “brain drain” from civil society (Loveman 1995). 
79
 In this study, I contemplate a broader set of resources than is usually found in existing scholarship, which 
is somewhat out of touch with the realities of democratizing and developing countries.  For instance, I 
incorporate transnational flows of resources, which can increase the political clout of CSOs, into the 
analysis.  I also discuss legacies of authoritarianism that endow certain organizational resources with 
special meaning, as suggested above. 
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ideas, and their ideational strategies enable them to overcome shortages of material 
resources to an extent.   
Stated briefly, the rival approaches discussed here fall short of elucidating civil 
society participation and influence.  Contrary to initial expectations, participatory 
institutions and the new global agenda encouraging citizen involvement in governance 
have failed to explain the observed variation on the dependent variable.  Throughout the 
dissertation, I offer an alternative perspective that privileges factors from below.  
However, although my approach is driven mostly by civil societal factors, I move well 
beyond resource-based explanations of influence.  Much of the remainder of the 
dissertation is devoted to evaluating the theory I have proposed and determining whether 
it holds across multiple issue areas and both Argentina and Chile.  I have used several 
methods of data collection and analysis during this process, which I summarize in the 
following section. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD OF INQUIRY 
 
Civil society is a ubiquitous and contested concept.  Academics, activists, 
government officials, and donors across the globe have incorporated civil society into 
their respective vocabularies, though they differ in their understandings and usages of the 
term.  Various conceptualizations exist within the field of political science, as well.  
Scholars have envisioned civil society as an arena of consolidated democracy (Linz and 
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Stepan 1996), a “civic community” steeped in social capital (Putnam 1993), and a 
“neutral multiplier” that reflects the broader political environment (Berman 1997).
80
    
Rather than propose an alternative vision of civil society, I embrace the standard 
definition:  an arena of self-organized, voluntary, associational life distinguishable from 
the state and from political society, which includes political parties and leaders (Diamond 
1999; Linz and Stepan 1996).
81
  Included under the rubric of civil society are formal 
organizations, such as labor unions, professional associations, and an endless variety of 
cultural, social, identity-based, issue-oriented, territorial, self-help, development, 
recreational, and other citizen groups.  The sphere also comprises less formal social and 
interpersonal networks.      
Due to the sheer abundance and diversity of civil societal actors, it is necessary to 
narrow the scope of my research to a subset of CSOs.  Hence, I focus on non-profit, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) motivated by some notion of the “public interest.”  
Such groups seek a “collective good” that will not selectively and materially benefit their 
own membership or activists (Berry 1977).  By investigating the behavior of groups, I 
base my research on a disaggregated view of civil society.  In this sense, my project 
contrasts with other works, which seek to measure the overall strength or vitality of 
associational life.
82
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 Dozens of works review the different philosophical traditions associated with civil society and discuss 
the conceptual haze surrounding the term.  Overviews can be found in Cohen and Arato (1992), Diamond 
(1999), Foley and Edwards (1996), Hall (1995), Hyden (1997), Keane (1998), Manor (1999), Seligman 
(1992), and White (1996).  For typologies of CSOs, see Fitzsimmons (2000) and Manor (1999). 
81
 In reality, the boundaries separating these spheres are fluid.  See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the “gray 
area” between civil society and political society and civil society and the state. 
82
 Utterances about a “strong” civil society or “vigorous” associational life are commonly heard both inside 
and outside of academe, as if the sphere were an undifferentiated whole. 
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I discuss the dimensions of the dependent variable in greater depth in Chapter 2.  
However, it bears noting that in this study, participation is operationalized as groups 
exerting some influence over policy debates and decisions.  Although CSO involvement 
in policy making does not necessarily lead to the attainment of desired outcomes, groups 
do have a “say” in the process.   
CSOs use myriad strategies while engaging in advocacy.  They can participate in 
policy making during multiple phases, including the agenda-setting, formulation, and 
adoption stages.
83
  When the policy agenda is being determined, CSOs endeavor to 
capture the attention of elites and convince them that an issue or problem requires 
government action.  They often disseminate their views in the mass media, share research 
findings and analysis, and organize events to raise public awareness and gain the ear of 
policy makers.  Civil societal actors also try to shape the content of policy during the 
formulation phase by conducting research, presenting information to elites, and authoring 
legislation or other proposals.  Additionally, groups seek to persuade and pressure 
decision makers to adopt the preferred policy.  They resort to a variety of tactics aimed at 
conveying their demands to the authorities and galvanizing the broader public.  During all 
three phases, CSOs can engage in direct or indirect advocacy:  the first mode of influence 
entails interacting directly with legislators and executive branch officials; the second 
mode involves pressuring them indirectly by mobilizing certain constituencies and/or the 
public.   
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 Because the policy implementation and monitoring phases do not correspond well with this 
operationalization of participation, I exclude them from the dependent variable, as discussed in Chapter 2.   
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As mentioned at the outset, the dissertation’s main cases of policy making are 
drawn from three issue areas:  political transparency, the rights and well-being of 
children, and the environment.  For each case, I gauge the frequency and diversity of the 
group activities outlined here and judge overall levels of policy participation to be low, 
intermediate, or high.  The cases are instances of national policy making and thus 
represent a difficult test of the theory.  Political analysts tend to conclude that the local 
level of government is the more propitious environment for citizen involvement in 
politics, often discounting the possibility that groups will influence decision making at 
the national level (e.g., Posner 2003; Reilly 1995).
84
   
A further rationale behind the selection of cases is that the groups involved in 
each issue area vary with respect to their resources, characteristics, strategies, and 
attitudes toward advocacy.  This diversity provides for a richer investigation of civil 
societal actors and behaviors.  In addition, the multiplicity of CSOs signifies that inter-
organizational cooperation is possible.
85
   
Argentina and Chile, both examples of democratizing polities, are interesting 
contexts for research.  I examine the post-transition period of each nation, with an 
emphasis on political and policy events that occurred between 1997 and 2004.  While the 
countries share certain similarities — for instance, their experiences with military 
dictatorship and democratization — they differ on several key dimensions, ranging from 
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 Investigating policy participation at other levels of government is beyond the scope of this project.  
Moreover, Argentina’s provincial governments and federal system differ considerably from Chile’s 
regional governments.  
85
  Notwithstanding this diversity, the groups are representative of the broader category of CSOs that 
interests me in this study:  public interest NGOs.  Due to the relative lack of a “critical mass” of organized 
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political institutions and patterns of state-society linkages to political culture, existing 
repertoires of collective action, and master frames.
86
  These differences lend themselves 
to a cross-national examination of how the domestic context influences the independent 
variables (and indirectly affects the dependent variable).  In short, a two-country study 
provides opportunities to analyze how the political surround constrains and shapes the 
strategies of CSOs and to determine whether the dissertation’s arguments hold across 
polities.   
Owing to the paucity of scholarship that directly and systematically addresses 
civil society participation in policy, there is no existing data set with “many well-
recorded cases” (Van Evera 1997, 55).  I therefore conducted field research during 2002-
2003 to collect new evidence pertaining to the frequency and forms of participation, the 
organizations involved, and their strategies.  The sites of this research were Buenos Aires 
and Santiago and their environs, where national policies are made and executive branch 
institutions are concentrated.
87
  The primary sources of data were more than 60 semi-
structured interviews with representatives of government agencies, civil society alliances, 
NGOs, community organizations, and other CSOs.  I chose interview subjects from 
available directories and supplemented this strategy with a modified snowball procedure, 
requesting the names of other government officials and/or activists working within a 
                                                                                                                                                 
CSOs, particularly at the national level, it was not feasible to research environmental organizations in 
Argentina and transparency groups in Chile.       
86
  A military junta presided over the National Reorganization Process in Argentina from 1976 to 1983, and 
Pinochet’s regime lasted from 1973 to 1989 in Chile.  Argentina and Chile also are similar with respect to 
their overall levels of socioeconomic development and implementation of neoliberal reforms.       
87 
There is also a preponderance of CSOs and archival resources in these capital cities.    
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certain policy domain during each interview.
88
  Throughout the dissertation, I use 
interview data to shed light on both political events and the subjective views of the actors 
involved.   
Additional research methods included participant-observation of meetings and 
events and the examination of a variety of archival materials, including reports, position 
papers, press releases, and other documents published by organizations and government 
agencies.
89
  Moreover, through an analysis of print and on-line sources of news, I 
uncovered information related to multiple phases of policy making and ascertained the 
extent to which the media covered individual groups, alliances, their activities, and their 
causes (an indication of political visibility).
90
  These activities also helped me discern 
civil societal actors’ framing strategies.  
I have analyzed these data using qualitative methods, most notably process tracing 
and structured comparisons.  Process tracing is a helpful tool for establishing causal 
linkages between the independent and dependent variables (George and McKeown 1985).  
By reconstructing the sequence of events for each case, I examine the policy process, the 
various dimensions and phases of participation, and the range of behaviors of both civil 
societal and governmental actors. The dissertation entails various modes of comparison.  
                                                 
88
 The Guía Silber in Chile is a useful directory.  Umbrella organizations, such as ACCION and ASONG in 
Chile and the Social Sector Forum in Argentina, also provided listings of their members.  Documentation 
centers devoted to civil society issues, such as GADIS (Grupo de Análisis y Desarrollo Institucional y 
Social) in Buenos Aires, offered additional resources (e.g., GADIS 2000).     
89
 In addition, I visited private and public documentation centers and libraries, attended conferences and 
seminars, examined pertinent governmental and civil societal web sites, and consulted members of political 
parties and party documents mentioning citizen participation.  The project also builds on over thirty 
interviews that I conducted during a pilot study in Argentina in 2001.   
90
 This type of analysis is particularly helpful for investigating both public and formal agenda setting and 
the role of civil societal actors therein.  However, a generic limitation of news analysis stems from the fact 
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First, I compare cases of policy making within Argentina and Chile.  The variation on the 
independent variables across the cases permits an analysis of their effects on the 
dependent variable.  Second, I evaluate children’s advocacy across Argentina and Chile 
to show the different strategies that groups use to mobilize resources and ideas in a given 
issue area.  Third, I perform the country-level comparisons outlined previously to gauge 
the influence of contextual factors.   
In brief, tracing causal relationships between variables and undertaking 
comparative analysis are both necessary to advance our understanding of advocacy.  This 
research design facilitates comparison between Argentina and Chile and across the 
different policy domains, an approach which yields more generalizable results than would 
a study of a single case in one polity.  The results also are more robust due to the multiple 
dimensions of the dependent variable outlined earlier; each case actually entails a large 
number of “observations” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994).  
This method of inquiry has allowed me to investigate causality more closely than 
some quantitative methods, which “tell us more about whether hypotheses hold than why 
they hold” (Van Evera 1997, 55).  Ideally, large-n studies would complement qualitative 
work in this area of research.  However, given the current lack of relevant quantitative 
data, such studies are not yet feasible.
91
  In fact, gathering a sufficient number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the media often cover civil society activities considered to be more dramatic (such as large 
mobilizations or protests), while more mundane activities go unnoticed (Dalton 1994).   
91
 The World Values Survey and other data sets provide information about individual participation in 
voluntary associations, which is not directly related to the research question.  Quantitative analysis is 
probably better suited to research on the correlates of policy influence at the organizational level, such as 
groups’ financial resources and other attributes.  Nevertheless, selection bias could pose a significant 
challenge to such a study in Latin America.  For instance, one could draw a random sample of groups from 
existing registries of CSOs, but these are often outdated, incomplete, skewed toward more formally 
constituted organizations, and/or based on a self-selected subset of groups that chose to submit their 
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observations, designing appropriate measures for variables, and assigning accurate values 
would likely necessitate a team of investigators to carry out the requisite field research.   
The values of the dependent and independent variables for each case are 
summarized in Table 1, which presents the central empirical findings.  As indicated by 
Table 1, the proposed theory holds across Argentina and Chile and all three issue areas. 
 
 
Table 1:  Summary of the Evidence 
 
Issue area: 












Bío Bío River dam 
project 





















among green NGOs 
Level of policy 
participation 
High Intermediate Intermediate Low 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The dissertation is organized into six chapters.  In Chapter 2, I provide an 
overview of the dependent variable and the cases of policy making selected for 
investigation.  I tell the political “story” of each case, emphasizing the extent to which 
civil societal actors participate in the policy process.  In Chapter 3, I elaborate the 
relationship between effective framing, the first explanatory variable, and policy 
involvement.  Chapter 4 examines successful alliances, the second explanatory variable.  
                                                                                                                                                 
information to the agency in charge of the registry.  Many other complications arise from the large number 
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In Chapter 5, I consider framing and alliance building in their broader international and 
domestic contexts and discuss several factors that affect both independent variables.  In 
essence, I look at the advocacy efforts of civil societal actors through a wider-angle lens.  
Finally, Chapter 6 explores the implications of my research for democracy, both in 
theory and in practice.  I also propose an agenda for future research and summarize the 
dissertation’s main theoretical, methodological, and other contributions.  What follows is 
an abbreviated version of that summary.     
Policy involvement in democratizing nations is poorly understood; a major lacuna 
exists within comparative politics and especially within the democratization literature.  In 
fact, scholars have neglected the political effects of civil society activism more generally.  
By examining civil society’s engagement with political institutions and decision-making 
processes, I take a step toward remedying these shortcomings.  I contribute to the study 
of comparative politics by advancing an original theory of influence.  This framework 
includes novel explanatory variables that are underdeveloped in the field.  First, scholars 
rarely extend frame analysis to the policy-making realm or even to civil societal actors in 
democratizing countries.  There is a dearth of comparative work on group strategies for 
politicizing and framing issues and the policy implications of these choices.  This stems 
in part from some political scientists’ misgivings about ideational variables.  However, 
the political “power” of ideas is significant and merits close attention.  Second, work on 
the creation, evolution, and political impact of civil society alliances has been scant, and 
scholars have not embraced alliances within democratizing countries as enthusiastically 
                                                                                                                                                 
of defunct, unreachable, or unlisted CSOs.    
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as transnational advocacy networks.  The dissertation seeks to redress the paucity of 
research in these areas. 
Although I emphasize domestic politics, I also examine international exchanges 
of funding, ideas, and norms, thus taking into account several bodies of literature on 
global trends.  It has become increasingly necessary to explore the nexus between 
comparative politics and international relations and the “internationalization of many 
policy spheres and political arenas” (Chalmers et al. 1997, 555).  Indeed, analysts of 




Additionally, I connect my ideas to existing scholarship on pluralism, 
corporatism, and different types of collective actors, building on these literatures while 
introducing new arguments.  The strategy of simply transferring theories developed in 
particular social, economic, and political contexts — especially the United States and 
Western Europe — to other areas has serious drawbacks.  It is imperative that we 
question the assumption that civil societies in newer democracies can (or ought to) 
resemble civil societies in other environments.
92 
  It is also essential to undertake more 
comparative, systematic examinations of civil society organizing.  I try to fulfill this need 
by offering the first analysis of alliances and framing that spans three different issue areas 
and two countries.  The dissertation’s research design therefore expands the existing 
                                                 
92
  For instance, it is important to avoid a simple rehashing of classic pluralism.  Language reminiscent of 
this tradition already has crept into studies of associational life in democratizing countries.  Diamond 
(1999), for example, suggests that democracy rests on a dense and pluralistic — as opposed to a “totalistic” 
— civil society.  He argues that democratic survival is contingent on cross-cutting cleavages and multiple 
solidarities, which produce a more moderate and less polarized constellation of political interests. 
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repertoire of empirical research on civil society, which often includes descriptive and/or 
non-comparative case studies.   
Furthermore, much is at stake for Argentines and Chileans with respect to the 
issue areas analyzed in the dissertation.  Deforestation, over-fished waters, hazardous 
waste, air pollution, the loss of biodiversity, and the depletion of the ozone layer are 
problems that affect the health, safety, and economic livelihood of vast numbers of 
Chileans.  Indeed, all societies struggle to define the proper balance between economic 
growth and development and environmental quality.  The well-being of children is 
similarly related to economic and social development:  experts have concluded that a 
country that fails to meet the basic needs of its children has no “imaginable future.”
93
  
Child welfare and environmental health both speak to the success and sustainability of 
the neoliberal model, themes of utmost importance in Latin America and other regions.  
Meanwhile, proponents of political reform consider freedom of information to be crucial 
for strengthening democracy; transparency is a major concern in nations with high levels 
of corruption and citizen disillusionment with political elites.  In short, these policy 
domains have significant implications for both democracy and development.  
Lastly, the extent to which CSOs are involved in policy has practical relevance for 
citizens in democratizing countries.  In addition to experiencing firsthand the effects of 
civil society activism in terms of policy outputs, they have a vested interest in the 
questions examined here:  how is democratic citizenship exercised, who participates in 
                                                 
93
 “Pacto social por la niñez,” dated 5/01 and issued by Argentina’s Social Development Ministry.  Few 
works have addressed children’s rights in Latin America; exceptions include Guidry’s (2000) work on 
Brazil and Maclure and Sotelo’s (2004) research on Nicaragua. 
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decision making, and who governs (Dahl 1961)?  Moreover, as stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, these queries are vital to the study of democratic quality and stability.     
Of course, advocacy is one of several political roles that CSOs play in a 
democratic regime.
94
  They also can influence politics by monitoring the state and 
governing elites (Avritzer 2002; Fox 2001; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2002 & 2001), 
generating social capital (e.g., Putnam 1993), initiating broader social and cultural 
changes (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Wapner 1995), and redefining the 
boundaries of the “political.”  My focus on the policy-related activities of CSOs should 
not be interpreted as a normative preference for this role over any other.  I do not favor a 
scenario in which most CSOs pursue narrowly-defined “interest group” activities at the 
expense of their efforts to achieve additional goals.
95
  Still, research on policy influence is 
long overdue, especially given its status as a “bread and butter” theme in the discipline.  
In conclusion, the literature generally leads us to expect the policy engagement 
and influence of CSOs to be relatively limited within democratizing countries.  I do not 
dispute the magnitude of the challenges facing groups that seek political influence.  The 
obstacles to successful advocacy summarized earlier — civil society’s many 
“discontents” — should not be underestimated.  Nevertheless, the search for meaningful 
forms of participation does not represent a chimerical quest.  I therefore propose that we 
examine advocacy from a different vantage point, which emphasizes the strategies that 
civil societal actors use to overcome obstacles, thus allowing for more agency.  Such an 
                                                 
94
 Diamond (1999) summarizes several of these roles in a chapter devoted to civil society.     
95
 Baker (2002), for instance, would label such an approach as an “instrumental” view of civil society, 
which gauges the significance of the sphere only in relation to the state.   
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approach will help us solve the puzzle of civil society influence in environments where 
we expect to find “low-intensity” citizenship (O’Donnell 1993). 
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Chapter 2:  Civil Society Participation in Policy Making 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A stronger grasp of political participation, voice, and influence is vital to our 
understanding of democratic quality and stability in Latin America.  Nevertheless, given 
the paucity of works that directly address civil society advocacy, our knowledge of these 
themes remains limited.  What strategies do CSOs use while engaging in advocacy?  
What specific activities are associated with their efforts to influence policy debates and 
decisions?  How do civil societal actors endeavor to create opportunities for participation 
in democratizing nations? 
In this chapter, I elaborate the dependent variable, civil society participation in 
policy making.   I first establish which categories of civil societal actors I have targeted 
for analysis and what “participation” signifies in this dissertation.  After specifying and 
operationalizing the dependent variable, I turn to the project’s main cases of policy, 
drawn from the issue areas of transparency, the environment, and the rights and well-
being of children.  I summarize the politics of each case, highlighting the different levels 
of civil society involvement and influence therein.   
A further aim of this chapter is to describe the broader political context in which 
advocacy and policy participation occur in Argentina and Chile.  Specifically, I discuss 
the public disillusionment with political elites and institutions that has become 
widespread in Latin American democracies.  I analyze citizens’ diminishing confidence 
in conventional politics and the political behaviors that have accompanied these attitudes.  
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Although civil societal actors are not immune to these trends, my findings suggest that 
many continue to engage the political system in spite of its perceived failings.  
Examining the contemporary political landscape of both countries places the 
dissertation’s empirical data in their proper perspective. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS:  NARROWING THE FIELD 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, for the purposes of this study, civil society is defined as 
an arena of voluntary associational life distinguishable from the state and political 
society.  Of the myriad actors included in this category, I focus on public interest groups 
rather than professional associations, unions, and other organizations that usually pursue 
more particularistic aims (e.g., benefits for their members and/or a narrowly defined 
group).
1
  Members of public interest CSOs commonly see their work as part of a larger 
struggle to extend and deepen citizenship rights.  My emphasis on these public-minded 
and seemingly altruistic groups should not be interpreted as a rose-tinted view of 
associational life.  This study discards romantic assumptions that CSOs embody all that is 
good, noble, or democratic.  In fact, plenty of questionable, corrupt, and un-civic 
organizations dot the civil societal landscape.
2
  Moreover, in practice, the extent to which 
groups benefit an identifiable “public” varies immensely.
3
  Still, regardless of their actual 
                                                 
1
 Berry defines a public interest group as one that “seeks a collective good, the achievement of which will 
not selectively and materially benefit the membership or activists of the organization” (1977, 7).   
2
 See Carothers (1999) for an example of the numerous critiques of “benevolent” visions of civil society 
and Armony (2004) and Payne (2000) for analyses of some markedly un-democratic civil society groups. 
3
 For example, the elite composition of some NGOs raises questions as to whether they “represent” broader 
segments of society.  I address this issue, a source of preoccupation for scholars (e.g., Alvarez 1999; 
Dagnino 2003), in Chapter 6.   
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track records, public interest CSOs differ from other groups in terms of their objectives; 
focusing on them helps limit the scope of my project.     
The CSOs examined in the dissertation share a further characteristic.  They tend 
to consciously identify themselves as part of civil society, which exists as a sort of 
“imagined community” (Anderson 1983).  Thus, an allegiance to the non-governmental 
sector — or the “third sector,” a sphere distinct from the state and the market — connects 
otherwise disparate individuals and groups.  These self-perceptions are important because 
they often signal a commitment to maintaining organizational autonomy from the state, 
political parties, and private (for-profit) sector.  Empirically, the boundaries separating 
those realms are fluid.
4
  For instance, a considerable gray area exists between civil society 
and political society:  individual politicians and parties establish think tanks that perform 
policy research and analysis and/or foundations that operate as partisan vehicles or even 
“black boxes” for financial transactions (Manzetti 2000).
5
  The separation between the 
state and certain CSOs is similarly indistinct.  When groups receive the lion’s share of 
their funding from the state and administer its policies, their independence is uncertain.  I 
revisit these questions surrounding autonomy and co-optation at various points in the 
dissertation.  However, it bears noting that the organizations studied here are driven 
primarily by a cause or set of issues rather than partisan interests or the state’s bidding.  
                                                 
4
 This is an analytic distinction that facilitates theory building and helps achieve clarity.  It is not my intent 
to maintain rigid boundaries between civil society and political society or civil society and the state.  
Rather, such distinctions serve as a starting point for research.  As mentioned in Chapter 1, people often 
move in and out of positions in the government, political society, and civil society.  Furthermore, 
individuals can have “dual militancy,” or loyalties to both parties and CSOs. 
5
 For instance, Bickford (1999) observes that some center-left think tanks in Chile have functioned as a 
“research arm” of the Concertación government.  Levy (1996) provides an overview of private research 
centers in the region. 
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Additionally, most of the groups are legally constituted as non-profit civil 
associations or foundations, and the majority self-identify as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).
6
  This term often evokes the image of entities with reasonably 
formal organizational structures staffed by professionals.  For example, NGOs typically 
are distinguished from social movement organizations (SMOs) because of their more 
developed “infrastructures,” greater numbers of paid professionals, and lower levels of 
commitment to mass mobilizing activities (Sikkink 1996).
7
  In Latin America, some self-
described NGOs resemble this image, while others do not.  NGOs in the region engage in 
both conventional political activities, such as lobbying and litigation, and disruptive 
behaviors, including demonstrations.  A single organization may be involved 
simultaneously in research, public education, grassroots organizing, and advocacy.
8
  The 
NGO category therefore is an inclusive one that does not indicate a particular set of 
tactics or a certain amount of resources, which vary across groups.   
Indeed, the CSOs analyzed here vary significantly with respect to their 
memberships, focus areas, political inclinations, administrative capacities, and past 
                                                 
6
 The private, non-profit category in Argentina and Chile usually comprises these two types of 
organizations.  Civil associations (or “corporations” in Chile) are groups of people, whereas foundations 
are usually created from an individual’s estate.  Examples of other legal categories are community 
organizations (territorial and functional), professional associations, unions, indigenous communities and 
associations, and cooperatives and mutual aid societies.  Although civil society should not be equated with 
formal associations, these are largely the focus of the present study. 
7
 The literature on advanced democracies maintains that compared to interest groups, SMOs have more 
fluid organizational structures and open membership criteria and focus more often on social and lifestyle 
changes (Norris 2002). 
8
 Moreover, the balance of activities shifts over time in response to external changes, such as funding 
opportunities and constraints, and internal changes in leadership or mission.  Instead of creating a priori 
categories of groups based on these and other attributes, it is preferable to treat them as variables (Andrews 
and Edwards 2004).  To further complicate matters, some groups in Latin America considered to be SMOs 
due to their involvement in a broader movement (such as the struggle for human or women’s rights) refer to 
themselves as NGOs. 
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histories.  For instance, some are relatively new, whereas others trace their origins to 
authoritarianism in Argentina and Chile.  The Argentine armed forces’ National 
“Reorganization” Process (1976-83) epitomized state repression of associational life and 
the closure of traditional avenues of participation and representation.  The so-called 
“Dirty War” was notorious for its high levels of arrests, torture, and disappearances.  The 
extreme nature of the repression gave rise to new social movements — most famously the 
human rights movement — that opposed the dictatorship (e.g., Brysk 1994; Jelin 1987 & 
1985; Mainwaring and Viola 1984).  The Pinochet regime in Chile (1973-89) also used 
torture, disappearances, and executions to quell political mobilization and militancy.
9
 
Nevertheless, over time, the regime grudgingly tolerated the existence of development, 
human rights, women’s, and other NGOs supported by international donors and/or 
protected by the Catholic Church, as well as organizations that met subsistence needs at 
the grassroots.
10
  Many of these CSOs were active during the campaign against Pinochet’s 
continued rule and the 1988 plebiscite, in which the general was defeated.  Civil societal 
actors in Argentina likewise had played an important role during that country’s 
democratic transition.
11
  The present study includes CSOs that predate the re-emergence 
of democracy in both polities and groups created more recently. 
                                                 
9
 During the first two years following the 1973 coup that ousted the Allende government, security forces 
detained approximately fifty thousand people and executed over two thousand; in such an environment, few 
organizations could survive (Schneider 1995). 
10
 In fact, technocrats within the Pinochet government valued the expertise of a handful of research 
institutes and NGOs, which assisted in the development of social policies (Levy 1996; Loveman 1995).  
Economic crisis triggered a different form of civil society organizing during this period:  an explosive cycle 
of protest (1983-86) concentrated in the shantytowns of Santiago (Oxhorn 1995; Schneider 1995).  
11
 Human rights activists, for instance, enjoyed a large audience for their “eloquent” critique of the 
authoritarian regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 56).  
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In short, while the CSOs scrutinized throughout the dissertation differ 
considerably from one another, they share several general characteristics.  Sketching the 
contours of the groups to be analyzed is necessary given the proliferation of terms in 
existing scholarship.  Although the conceptual categories of public interest groups, social 
movement organizations, and non-profit advocacy organizations overlap, scholars 
focusing on the respective categories rarely engage in dialogue (Andrews and Edwards 
2004).  Consequently, different literatures address parallel themes — namely, the origins 
and consequences of collective action — in isolation from one another.  In the next 
section, I elucidate the political behaviors of civil societal actors that are relevant to my 





SPECIFYING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
In this dissertation, participation signifies that CSOs are contributing to policy 
debates and exerting some degree of influence over policy decision making.
13
  
Understood in this way, participation entails a number of activities, such as conveying 
demands, offering information, analysis, and ideas, organizing campaigns and mobilizing 
                                                 
12
 Fox (2001) notes that because the origins of the word “advocacy” are legal, it has connotations of 
lawyers defending their clients.  However, the contemporary usage refers more broadly to interventions that 
target the government on behalf of a third party (often an excluded group), usually in pursuit of citizenship 
rights, the public interest, or justice (see Jenkins 1987 for a similar definition).      
13
 Anderson (1984) defines a public policy as a purposive governmental course of action to address a 
problem or matter of concern.  Policies can assume the form of laws, rules, orders, court rulings, and 
administrative guidelines. The types of participation and state-society linkages that interest me differ from 
classic understandings of clientelism and the co-optation of civil societal actors.  However, because these 
patterns persist in Latin American politics, I briefly address them in Chapter 6.       
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the public, and collaborating with and/or putting political pressure on policy makers.  
Groups pursue different combinations of these and other activities during the agenda-
setting, formulation, and adoption phases of policy making.   
Scholars typically distinguish the public agenda, which comprises highly visible 
issues, from the formal agenda, the smaller list of items that government officials have 
selected for “serious consideration” (Cobb, Ross and Ross 1976; see also Kingdon 1995).  
Although groups aspire to influence both agendas, I focus mainly on the formal agenda-
setting phase of policy making, when CSOs endeavor to capture the attention of elites 
and convince them that an issue or problem requires government action.  They often 
disseminate their views in the mass media, share research findings, and organize events 
to raise public awareness and gain the ear of policy makers.  Groups frequently criticize 
existing policies or the lack thereof. 
Alternative proposals sometimes emerge from these critiques.  In fact, during the 
formulation or design phase, policy makers may embrace proposals that have originated 
within CSOs.  Groups also try to shape the content of policy by presenting information, 
ideas, and analysis to governing elites and assisting in the drafting of legislation (or other 
proposed reforms).  Once a policy has been formulated, civil societal actors try to ensure 
its adoption —assuming they approve of its content.
14
  CSOs seek to persuade decision 
makers to choose the preferred policy, especially when they are considering a number of 
competing proposals.  Pertinent strategies range from the contentious (protests) to the 
more mundane (meetings and negotiations).  The objective is to convey demands to the 
                                                 
14
 If groups are not favorably disposed toward a policy proposal, they may oppose it and/or offer 
alternatives during this phase.     
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authorities while building public interest in and support for the policy through a 
continuous presence in the media, for instance (Najam 1999).  These activities thus 
parallel the behaviors associated with the agenda-setting phase; the key difference is the 
increasing emphasis on a specific policy rather than on a general issue or problem. 
Throughout the policy process, CSOs engage in advocacy through direct or 
indirect means.
15
   On the one hand, members of groups come into contact with executive 
branch officials, legislators, and other decision makers, depending on where the policy is 
being created or its fate decided.
16
  On the other hand, they pursue strategies that do not 
involve linking up directly with governing elites but nevertheless pressure them indirectly 
by mobilizing certain constituencies and/or the broader public.  Groups commonly resort 
to both modes of influence.    
Table 2, which summarizes the dimensions of the dependent variable as I have 
operationalized it, combines these two modes with the three policy phases.  I measure 
participation in terms of the frequency of the activities included in Table 2 and the 
multiplicity or diversity of activities in a given case of policy making.
17
  The variable is 
trichotomous, with values of high, intermediate, or low. 
 
                                                 
15
 Scholars of American politics have made a similar distinction between direct and indirect lobbying (e.g., 
Berry 1997; Hrebenar 1997).     
16
 In this study, the government refers to actors — politicians and administrators, for example — who 
occupy “dominant positions” within a regime at a given point in time (Karl 1997, 14).  Although my 
project emphasizes advocacy directed toward the executive and legislative branches, many CSOs also 
target the judiciary.  
17
 In practice, these phases sometimes overlap chronologically; thus, Table 2 should not be interpreted in 
too rigid a manner.  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) and other policy analysts have critiqued Anderson’s 
(1984) and Jones’ (1977) “stages heuristic,” which differentiates among agenda setting, adoption, 
implementation, and evaluation.  Despite the purported limitations of this approach, government officials 
and activists commonly use similar distinctions, and ignoring the phases altogether can lead to ambiguity.  
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Table 2:  Civil Society Participation in Policy 
 
Policy phase Indirect Direct
Agenda-setting
research issues
raise public awareness 





meet with officials to:
raise their awareness
share information, ideas 
criticize existing policies 






organize public events on issues
author proposals
meet with officials to:






mobilize public around policy  
use mass media
meet with officials to:
lobby 





Policy participation clearly involves a variety of activities.  At its most distilled, 
however, participation signifies that groups are able to engage in policy debates and 
exercise some influence over decision making, possibly altering the content or direction 
of a policy.  While investigating these processes, I take into account participants’ 
subjective assessments of the “quality” of their experiences.  Do groups involved in 
policy making describe their encounters with government officials as satisfying or futile?  
Are they under the impression that the authorities heed their suggestions?
18
   
                                                 
18
 I exclude this subjective aspect from Table 2.  Burdening the dependent variable and the concept of 
participation with a host of additional “defining attributes” would limit the number of cases to which it 
applies (Collier and Levitsky 1997).  I instead propose a more general category in order to capture a greater 
number of observations. 
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It bears mentioning that influence over the policy process is not equivalent to 
influence over outcomes.  Civil society involvement in policy making does not 
necessarily lead to the attainment of desired results.  Advocacy “is a question of 
articulating positions or sets of demands, not necessarily securing them” (Jenkins 1987, 
297; see also Taylor and Warburton 2003).  Because many causal factors govern policy 
outcomes, discerning group influence can be challenging.  In addition, although it is 
possible to uncover evidence of CSOs changing the hearts and minds of policy makers, 
the political process necessarily entails bargaining and compromise; civil societal 
“inputs” are seldom automatically translated into policy “outputs.”
19
  Furthermore, even if 
a preferred policy is eventually approved, activists cannot be certain that it will be 
enacted.  In Latin American countries, for example, policies sometimes lack the 
regulatory framework or funding needed for timely implementation.  For all of these 
reasons, I avoid exaggerating the importance of outcomes and focus more diligently on 
the decision-making process and the role of civil society therein.   
 Because I understand participation as groups exercising their policy voices during 
this process, I exclude the implementation and monitoring phases from the dependent 
variable.  Implementing policies — especially programs designed with little or no 
consultation of citizens — is not an appropriate indicator for policy influence.
20
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 A process of reciprocal influence between governmental and civil societal actors also can occur:  
according to Dahl, “leaders do not merely respond to demands; they also help to generate them” (1961, 
155).  
20
 Strasser (2002) argues similarly that the administration of government policies by CSOs should not be 
construed as a form of “democratic” participation.      
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Meanwhile, supervising the administration of policies should be understood as a form of 
citizen control over government rather than participation in policy decisions.
21
   
In brief, as indicated in Table 2, the dependent variable captures an array of 
political behaviors that are essential to advocacy.  Having specified these components, I 
now turn to the task of summarizing the dissertation’s empirical evidence and 
demonstrating how levels of civil society participation and influence vary across cases of 
policy making.    
 
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY:  THE EVIDENCE 
 
In this section, I discuss the dissertation’s four main cases of policy making.  I 
begin each summary with an overview of the types of CSOs involved in the policy 
domain, the particular issues in which they are engaged, and their focus areas and 
activities.  I then examine the role of civil societal actors in the specific case of policy 
making selected for analysis.  As I recount the details of each case, I emphasize the extent 
to which CSOs participated in the policy process and how they did so.  The values on the 
dependent variable are as follows:  high levels of policy participation in the case of 
freedom of information legislation in Argentina; intermediate levels in the cases of 
comprehensive child protection policies in Argentina and Chile; and low levels of 
involvement in the case of the Bío Bío River dam project in Chile. 
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 CSOs involved in this phase concern themselves with the efficiency, transparency, and effectiveness of 
the policy’s administration; they attempt to keep the program “honest,” blow the whistle on any 
irregularities, and perform other tasks to keep government officials in check (Najam 1999).    
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Advocating for freedom of information in Argentina  
In May 2003, Argentina’s lower house of congress, the Chamber of Deputies, 
passed legislation promoting access to public information.  Members of the multiple 
CSOs that favored the bill viewed its approval as the result of their steadfast advocacy 
efforts.  Activists also identified the campaign as an important “test case” for both citizen 
participation in policy making and serious political reform in Argentina.
22
   
The basis for this transparency-enhancing reform is every citizen’s right to solicit 
and receive information from all branches and levels of government.  Information related 
to governmental actions and outputs is public by definition.  It encompasses laws, acts, 
and data on existing and proposed policies, public facilities (such as hospitals or schools), 
public spending in general, and the voting records of elected officials.  The right to 
information is already codified in three articles in the constitution, as well as in the 
international human rights conventions that were incorporated into the text in 1994; 
advocates nevertheless have clamored for national legislation.
23  Supporters agree that a 
concrete, legal framework is required to ensure that these norms are put into practice.  
Access to information traditionally has depended on the discretion of public officials, 
who often reject or ignore requests.   In many cases, legal action and a judge’s order are 
needed to obligate public servants to release documents.  The proposed law thus 
                                                 
22
 Interview in the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies promoting Equity and Growth 
(CIPPEC), Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos Aires.  I am grateful to María Poli, who first drew my 
attention to this case.   
23
 Articles 38, 41, and 42 address the right to information as it pertains to political parties, the environment, 
and consumers, respectively.  Examples of relevant international conventions include the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, or San José Pact (Salvioli 
1995; Travieso 1996).   
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establishes deadlines for furnishing requests, penalties in cases of non-compliance, and 
other provisions detailing its implementation and enforcement.    
The main proponents of the reform are NGOs involved in defending citizenship 
rights, encouraging citizen participation in governance, and/or supporting institutional 
transparency and other political reforms.
24
  Many organizations serve as monitors of the 
state, political institutions, and elites; some also are experienced in public interest law 
and legal advocacy.  For instance, both the Civil Rights Association (ADC) and the 
Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN) have engaged in legal and 
policy advocacy.  ADC is a pioneer in public interest law and the defense of 
constitutional rights.
25
  Since the late 1990s, its legal experts have pursued cases 
pertaining to gender-related and other forms of discrimination.  FARN is active in the 
struggle for increased citizen participation in decision making and transparency, 
especially in the area of sustainable development. 
Citizen Power is another important foundation that has promoted citizen 
participation and control since 1989.  The group takes civil society’s watchdog role 
seriously and has gained prominence through its efforts to hold political elites 
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 Examples of groups in favor of the law include: ADC (Civil Rights Association), CELS (Center for 
Legal and Social Studies), Center for Social Responsibility, CIPPEC (Center for the Implementation of 
Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth), Citizen Commitment, Citizens for Change, Citizen Power, 
FARN (Environment and Natural Resources Foundation), Democratic Change Foundation, Government 
and Society Foundation, INECIP (Institute of Comparative Studies in Penal and Social Sciences), Innova, 
and Sophia Group Foundation.  Civil society networks, such as the Social Sector Forum and Social Forum 
for Transparency, also participated.   
25
 Interview in the Civil Rights Association (ADC), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires.  In addition, ADC, FARN, 
Citizen Power, CELS, and other NGOs have supported reforms of Argentina’s Supreme Court and other 
changes in the judicial branch.  The Argentine constitution provides citizens with tools that facilitate their 
monitoring of government institutions and officials.  Examples include the ombudsman (defensor del 
pueblo), who protects citizens’ rights, and legal instruments which allow citizens to clamor for their rights 
when public authorities or private actors threaten or abuse them (acciones de amparo). 
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accountable.  In particular, Citizen Power has scrutinized legislators, their campaign 
finance practices, and their compliance (or lack thereof) with extant public ethics laws.
26
   
 The Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and 
Growth (CIPPEC) shares Citizen Power’s interest in making information about elected 
officials, institutions, and policy processes available to the public.
27
  Several staff 
members are dedicated to transparency issues, and CIPPEC’s overall mission is to work 
toward a “more just, democratic, and efficient state that can improve people’s lives.”
28
  
The organization is routinely involved in various phases of policy, including formulation, 
implementation, evaluation, and monitoring.  Founded in 2000, CIPPEC is a relatively 
new NGO on the block. 
In contrast, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) is a veteran human 
rights organization that emerged during the dictatorship.  CELS has become a leader in 
monitoring police brutality and the use of excessive force.
29
  Since the democratic 
transition, participants in the NGO have documented hundreds of cases of police officers 
with itchy trigger fingers or who mistreat individuals in their custody.  In addition to 
                                                 
26
 Manzetti (2000) suggests that Citizen Power has influenced campaign finance practices by raising public 
awareness and obligating politicians to abide by existing laws.   
27
 One of the ways CIPPEC has done so is by publishing a legislative directory with information on elected 
officials’ activities, earnings, and basic personal data (Interview in Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos 
Aires). 
28
 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires. The NGO seeks to improve the 
quality of policies and public administration and has focused on the areas of health, education, and fiscal 
policy (along with transparency).  Similarly, the Sophia Group Foundation and Innova endeavor to make 
public administration more effective. 
29
 CELS also works on issues related to discrimination, economic, social, and cultural rights, and the human 
rights abuses committed during the dictatorship.  CELS (2002) estimates that in Greater Buenos Aires, 261 
civilians died in violent episodes involving the police in 2001 alone; its figures for 1998, 1999, and 2000 
are 163, 257, and 232, respectively.  The term in Spanish for such violence is gatillo fácil, which translates 
loosely as “trigger-happy.” See Armony (2004) and Brinks (2003) for analyses of police brutality and the 
rule of law in Argentina. 
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specializing in the rule of law, CELS uses legal means to advocate on behalf of 
Argentines whose rights are systematically violated, such as immigrants and the 
economically marginalized.  
These NGOs and other groups that support the information access law differ in 
terms of their specific areas of emphasis, political and ideological proclivities, and 
historical trajectories.  Two attributes shared by the majority of the organizations are 
reasonably well-developed administrative infrastructures and socially “elite” members.  
Their personnel tend to be educated professionals, and most lack an extensive 
membership base and ties to grassroots groups.
30
  Notwithstanding their more elite 
character, a number of the NGOs enjoy high levels of recognition and credibility among 
fellow CSOs and the broader public.   
Thus, various civil societal actors have championed freedom of information.  
While their interest in transparency reforms may come as no surprise, their extensive 
involvement in the policy process is more remarkable — especially in light of the 
scholarship summarized in Chapter 1.  In this case, CSOs participated in policy agenda 
setting, design, and adoption.    
 For several years before the legislation made its way onto the formal agenda at the 
national level, groups had been researching and publishing on freedom of information.
31
  
Additionally, CELS invoked the right to public information in a court case related to 
                                                 
30
 There are exceptions.  FARN, for example, involves base organizations in its annual colloquia, and ADC 
is trying to broaden its membership, which mostly comprises lawyers.  In addition, some of the CSOs 
pursuing political reform are small, informal groups of concerned citizens.   
31
 FARN stands out as an early contributor (e.g., FARN 1997); see also Abramovich and Courtis (2000) 
and “Principios fundamentales para la promoción de leyes de acceso a la información,” by CELS, ADC, 
and the Inter-American Dialogue. 
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police brutality.  The suit served to call attention to the norm and pushed advocacy in 
“positive directions,” according to one activist.
32
  Reforms were being debated at the 
provincial level of government, as well.  In 1998, the Legislature of the Autonomous City 
of Buenos Aires passed an information access bill supported by Marta Oyhanarte, a 
deputy and founding member of Citizen Power.  Roberto Saba, presently a lawyer with 
the Civil Rights Association, had authored the legislation.
33 
  This law later served as a 
model for the national bill.  In this sense, the reform bore a civil societal imprint from the 
very beginning.     
A preliminary version of the legislation was drafted in the Anticorruption Office 
in 2001.
34
  This government agency, housed in the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, 
investigates cases of corruption and designs policies to increase transparency in public 
administration.  During the formulation stage, the staff of the Anticorruption Office 
invited suggestions from various non-governmental actors largely through a process of 
negotiated rulemaking.
35
  Representatives from the media, universities, businesses, and 
CSOs participated in a series of workshops, and some of their recommendations were 
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 Interview in CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires.   
33
 Interview in ADC, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires.  Similar laws are on the books in other Argentine provinces 
(including Chubut, Jujuy, and Río Negro).  Saba modeled the legislation on the United States’ 1966 
Freedom of Information Act.   
34
 The bill, known as Proyecto de Ley Nacional de Libre Acceso a la Información Pública, is available at:  
http://www.anticorrupcion.jus.gov.ar (Accessed 8/2/03).  The Anticorruption Office’s jurisdiction includes 
executive branch ministries and secretariats, national agencies, public corporations, and public or private 
institutions receiving federal funding (and excludes the judicial and legislative branches and provincial and 
municipal governments). 
35
 Negotiated rulemaking has been enacted in the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of 
Education and Agriculture, and other government bodies in the United States.  Proponents of “reg-neg” 
argue that the process decreases costly litigation, because interested parties refrain from challenging the 
agreed-upon rules in court (Harter 1982).  In the U.S., the phrase commonly refers to the preparation of the 
rules that implement policies or statutes.  The term in Spanish is procedimiento de elaboración participada 
de normas. 
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incorporated into the bill.
36
  Not surprisingly, most of the participants evaluated the 
sessions favorably.
37 
    
The rulemaking process created an opportunity for citizen involvement and was 
therefore a welcome development.  However, personal ties between NGO members and 
the Anticorruption Office staff were more significant than this institutional innovation.  
Individual-level relationships — which predated the rulemaking sessions for the most 
part — proved advantageous for the groups.
38
  Stated differently, had the Anticorruption 
Office failed to extend a broader “invitation” to civil societal actors, certain NGO 
members probably would have been consulted nonetheless.  
Moreover, several key players within the Anticorruption Office were themselves 
former civil societal actors.  For example, Roberto de Michele, director of the 
Department of Transparency Policies from its founding in 1999 to 2002, previously had 
served on Citizen Power’s administrative board.  Other personnel had similar histories in 
the NGO world and shared common views and policy goals with some of the activists.  
These factors help explain the Office’s distinctively inclusive style of policy 
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 Interview in the Anticorruption Office, Department of Transparency Policies, 3/20/03, Buenos Aires.  
The Anticorruption Office’s Department of Transparency Policies, which carried out the negotiated 
rulemaking process, also made the draft publicly available — for instance, via the Internet and major 
newspapers — and encouraged feedback.  Transcripts of the rulemaking sessions reveal that participants 
had the opportunity to comment on both the broad contours of the policy and its specific provisions, 
although the consultations were non-binding.  The transcripts are included in the document, “Procedimiento 
de elaboración participada de normas. Anteproyecto:  Ley de acceso a la información (Talleres de trabajo y 
opiniones recibidas por escrito),” published by the Anticorruption Office in 2001. 
37
 Evaluations of the workshops indicate that 74% found them to be a “very useful” way to increase 
transparency; for 22%, they were “somewhat useful.”  100% concluded that the process should continue in 
the future (Oficina Anticorrupción, Dirección de Planificación de Políticas de Transparencia. 2001. 
“Procedimiento de elaboración participada de normas. Anteproyecto:  Ley de acceso a la información”).   
38
 This was pointed out in several interviews with participants.  I am also grateful to Manuel Balan for his 




  It is no wonder that participants in NGOs have described the agency as an 
“oasis” within the government.
40 
  
Thus, participatory practices per se do not account for civil society influence in 
this case.  Nor is the presence of sympathetic elites in the Anticorruption Office a 
sufficient explanation.  Although this benefited CSOs during the design stage, it cannot 
explain their involvement during other phases of policy making.  As a matter of fact, 
during the adoption phase, the Office was no longer the locus of decision making, and 
groups sought to influence a variety of other government officials.  According to a staff 
member, civil society “pressure and follow-through” were vital for the bill’s 
advancement.
41
   
In March 2002, the executive branch approved the freedom of information bill 
and presented it to the Chamber of Deputies.  CSOs mounted a campaign to ensure that 
the legislation did not lose momentum.  One participant noted that continued political 
engagement was essential:  “Some activists mistakenly assumed that reform would be 
easier due to the strong support of the Anticorruption Office and civil society.  Instead, it 
was necessary to go from legislator to legislator, from committee to committee, and to 
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 In Chapter 1, I refer to this flow of individuals between civil society and the government as leadership 
exchange.  Staff members of the Office describe their relationship with CSOs as “positive” and the 
inclusion of groups as “necessary” (Interview in Department of Transparency Policies, 3/20/03, Buenos 
Aires).  In addition, their publications criticize the limited contact between governing elites and the 
governed during policy making (“Seminario de Filantropía,” dated 5/10/02; see also “Informe Anual de 
Gestión 2002. Resumen Ejecutivo”).   
40
 Interviews in ADC, 3/11/03, and CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires.    
41
 Interview in the Anticorruption Office, Department of Transparency Policies, 3/20/03, Buenos Aires.  I 
am indebted to María Baron, Director, Transparency Area, CIPPEC, for providing me with a timeline 
tracking the bill’s progress. 
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build an enormous network of volunteers.”
42
  As the bill’s future was being decided, 
advocates used diverse strategies to influence the process.  They organized public events, 
circulated research, and disseminated their views in the mass media to pressure governing 
elites and raise public awareness.  They also met with legislators in both chambers, 
including high-ranking members of congress.
43 
  
 To illustrate, CSOs lobbied policy makers to approve the bill in the relevant 
legislative committees.  For instance, several groups submitted a joint publication to the 
committee that attends to constitutional issues while its members were reviewing 
different versions of the reform.
44
  The document recommended various provisions 
considered essential for an effective freedom of information law.  In July 2002, activists 
received assurances from the president of the free speech committee that the bill would 
pass.  By August, both committees had approved the proposal.  However, owing to 
repeated failures to achieve quorum and other delays, the bill did not reach the floor of 
the Chamber of Deputies for several months.   
In the meantime, the CSOs pressured the executive branch to exercise its agenda-
setting prerogative and include the bill on the agenda for extraordinary legislative 
sessions.  Group members met with President Duhalde’s staff as well as officials in the 
Ministry of Justice on a number of occasions and were promised that the bill would be 
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 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.   
43
 Some of the activities summarized here involved two dozen or more groups, whereas other events were 
organized by fewer organizations.  According to some estimates, approximately two hundred groups 
participated in the campaign at one time or another.   
44
 The document, authored by ADC, CELS, Citizen Power, FARN, and INECIP, is entitled “Requisitos 




  Much to the activists’ chagrin, the executive branch officials did not follow 
through.
46
  Nevertheless, legislative actors took the next crucial step by calling for a 
special session, partly in response to the groups’ efforts.   
Subsequently, in the early months of 2003, the groups tried to persuade legislators 
to vote for the bill.  One advocate remarked that the organizations had “dozens” of 
meetings with lawmakers.
47
  According to another participant, “not a day went by without 
the deputies arriving at their offices to find ten calls from citizens asking that they lend 
their support”
48
  They also collected more than 160 signatures of deputies who endorsed 
the legislation — almost two-thirds of the lower chamber.
49 
  
 In addition to linking up with policy makers, the CSOs sought a wider audience 
for their views on freedom of information.  During the campaign, they continued to 
disseminate their ideas by sponsoring conferences and other events, holding press 
conferences, and targeting both the mainstream and alternative media.  A member of 
CIPPEC, for example, regularly contributed editorials to La Nación, Argentina’s most 
important daily.  Meanwhile, Citizen Power published related articles on Infocívica, an 
                                                 
45
 Members of CSOs also leveraged other political contacts:  in a meeting with a Peronist senator close to 
Duhalde, they requested that she personally urge him to advance the legislation (Interview in FARN, 
1/31/03, Buenos Aires).   
46 
In December 2002, for the second time in two months, Duhalde did not include the bill on the legislative 
agenda.  However, the Minister of Justice did convene a meeting with some of the CSOs to reiterate his 
commitment to cooperating with them.   
47
 Interview in CIPPEC, Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos Aires.  The groups sometimes targeted those 
lawmakers in a position to hasten the bill’s progress, including the president of the lower house.   
48
 Norberto Borzese, of the Social Forum for Transparency, quoted in an Infocívica article, dated 3/24/03 
(http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 6/1/03).      
49
 This figure appears on CIPPEC’s website at:  http://www.cippec.org.  (Accessed 7/10/03).  The 
advocates also planned a press conference in which they would commend those who supported the 
legislation and expose its detractors. 
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online medium dedicated to news about (and from) civil society.
50
  These strategies 
helped generate interest in transparency, expand their base of public support, and put 
further pressure on policy makers.  The CSOs also achieved these goals by reaching out 
to broader constituencies, such as other civic organizations and civil society alliances that 
were promoting various types of political reforms.  In fact, a key point, developed at 
length in Chapter 4, is that civil societal actors worked in concert during this phase.   
The Chamber of Deputies passed the bill in May 2003.  Advocates promptly 
announced their plans to lobby the Senate until it adopted the legislation.  Some had 
begun to secure commitments from senators as early as September 2002.
51
  The Peronist 
majority finally approved a version of the reform in December 2004; however, the 
legislation had been modified substantially in committee.
52
  Critics charge that the non-
trivial changes effectively limit the right to information and thus violate the spirit of the 
law.  According to one of the provisions, an individual who requests information from the 
government must provide a reason for doing so under oath.  Members of NGOs have 
insisted that such information by its very nature belongs to the public:  citizens should not 
have to offer a rationale for claiming what is rightfully theirs.
53
  In response to the new 
requirements, a Radical Party (UCR) senator scoffed, “they practically ask for a blood 
                                                 
50
 A goal of the “Civic Information” news service, located at http://www.infocivica.org, is to help CSOs 
develop media strategies (Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires).  Citizen Power also enjoys 
substantial coverage in the mainstream press.   
51
 Timeline provided by Transparency Area, CIPPEC.  For instance, ADC, CIPPEC, FARN, and the Social 
Forum for Transparency were involved in these efforts.  
52
 Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (currently Argentina’s First Lady) presides over the committee, 
which deals with constitutional issues.  
53




  Additionally, the category of potentially classified (or restricted) information has 
expanded:  the previous version limited access to information pertaining to national 
security, for example; in contrast, under the current version, financial, commercial, 
industrial, scientific, and other types of data also could be placed off limits.
55 
 The fate of 
the modified text now rests with the lower chamber. 
This turn of events was hardly the happy ending that activists had sought.
56
  
Nevertheless, it does not diminish the fact that CSOs were active participants during 
multiple phases of the policy process.  To a considerable extent, they succeeded in 
influencing the original bill and pushing it forward.  Civil society pressure on both 
branches of government was crucial for the bill’s passage in the Chamber of Deputies.  
Looking ahead, the unwelcome changes to the legislation are bound to complicate the 
groups’ advocacy efforts, though they will likely remain engaged in the issue.  Moreover, 
assuming the law is eventually passed, we can expect CSOs to monitor its 
implementation and enforcement.  Proponents of increased transparency insist that 
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 Senator Gerardo Morales is quoted in La Nación, issue dated 12/2/04.  Some Peronist legislators likewise 
criticized the changes to the bill. 
55
 Critics also note that when the law itself fails to establish how far confidentiality extends (and under what 
circumstances), bureaucrats exercise significant discretion (ADC editorial published in La Nación, issue 
dated 11/30/04). 
56
 Because these events occurred many months after I concluded my field work, more research is needed to 
ascertain what happened between the passage of the bill in the lower chamber and its approval in the Senate 
(and to gauge the reactions of activists). 
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Children’s advocacy in Argentina  
Argentine CSOs that advocate on behalf of children vary significantly.  Their 
particular focus areas can include intra-family violence, neglect, abandonment, health and 
nutrition, substance abuse, education and school retention, and discrimination.  Other 
common concerns are social and economic indicators as they pertain to children and 
conditions in private and state-run shelters, orphanages, and other institutions that house 
young people.  To a lesser extent, groups take up the issue of law enforcement, 
investigating episodes of violence perpetrated against teens and other youth during run-
ins with the authorities.
58
  Because a wide variety of CSOs are involved in children’s 
issues, it is hardly the exclusive domain of professionalized NGOs.  At the same time, 
individuals with advanced degrees in relevant fields — pediatrics, child psychology, 
social work, education, and the law, for instance — are often active in such causes. 
Some groups are committed to promoting children’s rights in accordance with 
international norms and conventions, which I discuss below.  Others are dedicated to 
helping families meet their basic necessities by providing services (namely, communal 
kitchens and gardens, shelter, or a safe haven).  They address these needs by 
implementing social policies or other programs that rely extensively on public funding 
and through their own independent initiatives.
59
  The Children’s Rights Association 
                                                                                                                                                 
57
 The 1999 Public Ethics Law is one example of legislation that thus far has lacked teeth.  A document 
authored in CIPPEC’s Transparency Area notes delays in the creation of a national committee to exercise 
oversight vis-à-vis the legislative branch (“Educación de los representantes y funcionarios públicos”). 
58
 In 2000, CELS estimated that 42% of those killed during such encounters in Greater Buenos Aires were 
under the age of 21.  The group also monitors the treatment of youth in police stations. 
59
 According to some estimates, in the early 2000s, close to one-half of government funds channeled to 
CSOs were destined for nutritional programs and policies that targeted children or youth in poverty and/or 
“at risk” (CENOC bulletin, issue dated September/October 2001). 
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(ADI) and similar groups wear multiple hats:  they conduct research, educate the public 
about children’s rights, and provide direct assistance to communities.
60
  While such 
advocates approach their work from a rights-based perspective, others are inspired by 
their religious faiths.  The Emmanuel Foundation, whose specialties include foster 
parenting and related family issues, is an example of a faith-based CSO. 
The Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, who participated in the human rights 
movement under authoritarian rule, have brought added legitimacy and symbolism to 
children’s advocacy.  During the dictatorship, security forces sometimes sequestered 
children along with their parents, and pregnant woman occasionally gave birth in 
clandestine detention centers.  After disappearing the parent(s), the authorities arranged 
illicit adoptions.  The Grandmothers dedicated themselves to the identification and 
restitution of the children of the disappeared.  Hundreds of these children (now young 
adults) have sought to recover their biological and familial identities.
61
  Since the 
democratic transition, the Grandmothers have become involved in other aspects of 
children’s rights.  They are joined by the Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ) and the 
                                                 
60
 A rights-based perspective also motivates the work of the Civil Association for the Equality of Rights.  
Examples of additional CSOs involved in children’s issues include: the Argentine Pediatrics Society, 
Anahí, El Arca, Center for Legal Studies of Children and Youth (CELIJ), Center for Political and Social 
Studies for Human Development (CESPEDH), Christian Youth Association (YMCA), Hacer Lugar, 
Integrated Center for Social Rehabilitation (CIRSA), Pelota de Trapo, and Surcos. 
61
 The Grandmothers have located over 70 sons and daughters of disappeared persons and helped create the 
National Bank of Genetic Data, which stores their blood for identification purposes.  The Grandmothers 
emphasize the children’s right to their own identity, the truth about their family backgrounds, and the love 
of their surviving kin (Interview in Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 6/30/97, Buenos Aires; see also 
Arditti 1999).  In 1995, some of the children of the disappeared, imprisoned, and exiled organized HIJOS 
(Children for Identity and Justice and Against Forgetting and Silence).  Members of this human rights 
group underscore the importance of discovering the truth about their parents and the “missing pieces of the 
puzzle” of their own identities (Interview in HIJOS, 7/31/97, Buenos Aires). 
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Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), human rights organizations that 
likewise existed during the authoritarian period.   
The legacy of state-sponsored human rights abuses is evident not only in the types 
of groups active in children’s issues, but in their behaviors, as well.  For instance, like 
their colleagues in the area of transparency, children’s advocates serve as watchdogs of 
the state.  Groups scrutinize the policies of the National Council of Childhood, 
Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF), the main executive agency devoted to child 
welfare and the Social Development Ministry’s health, nutrition, and other programs, 
which frequently target children and pregnant women.  A number of CSOs coincide in 
their evaluations of current programs toward children as poorly developed and under-
funded; they also criticize the lack of policy coordination across different government 
agencies.  In addition, they monitor the treatment of young people in the aforementioned 
institutions for children “at risk” and the criminal justice system.
62
   
A centerpiece of the groups’ monitoring activities is the preparation of non-
governmental reports for the United Nations.  CSOs have generated these reports on a 
regular basis since Argentina ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990 
following its adoption by the General Assembly.
63
  The documents usually conclude that 
Argentina falls short of complying with the Convention and call attention to rights 
violations.  They provide “alternative” assessments of the extent to which the state has 
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 To illustrate, CONAF has authorized the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH) to inspect 
some of the institutions that it directs (Interview in the APDH, Judicial Committee, 4/15/03, Buenos Aires). 
63
 In addition to becoming a national law, the Convention was incorporated into the 1994 Constitution, 
along with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and other 
international norms.  States are obligated to report their progress toward complying with the Convention to 
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conformed to international norms to challenge the official (government-authored) 
accounts.
64
  The Convention, which marks an important shift in understandings of child 
welfare, establishes that all children are entitled to certain rights “guaranteeing their care 
and protection” (Maclure and Sotelo 2004, 86).
65 
 Examples include the right to health, 
education, and recreation, protection from discrimination, abuse, and exploitation, 
freedom of expression and the right to participate in the broader community, the right to 
an identity (e.g., a name and a nationality), and the chance to live with one’s own family.   
Thus, the CSOs enjoy an international audience for their observations regarding 
the status of Argentine youth.  Nevertheless, children’s advocates have not been content 
to limit their activities to monitoring the state and underscoring the deficiencies of 
existing policies.  Rather, they have sought to influence the direction of policy, pushing 
for wide-ranging reforms at different levels of government.
66
  At the national level, 
groups have been involved in the policy process with the goal of achieving 
comprehensive child protection legislation.
67
  From the mid-1990s to the present, CSOs 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva within two years of ratification and every five years 
thereafter (Brown Thompson 1997).  
64
 In their response to Argentina’s official report, members of the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, like members of children’s CSOs, have noted the lack of inter-agency policy coordination and the 
absence of a national plan of action with respect to the rights and well-being of children (“Consideración de 
los Informes Presentados por los Estados Partes,” dated 10/4/00).    
65
 The Convention signals a global change in perceptions of children, who are regarded as rights-bearing 
subjects in need of special protection rather than as “objects solely dependent on adult authority” (Maclure 
and Sotelo 2004, 86; see also Brown Thompson 1997).    
66
 Children’s groups have influenced policy at the provincial level and were especially instrumental in the 
creation and passage of Law 114 in the Legislature of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires in the late 
1990s.  The legislation (Ley de Protección Integral de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes), which 
purports to protect the rights of children, is guided by the international norms discussed above (Interview in 
ADI, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires; for details on the legislation, see the 2002 publication, “Una joven ley para los 
más jóvenes de la ciudad,” by ADI, UNICEF, and the Council on the Rights of Girls, Boys, and 
Adolescents).    
67
 This type of legislation is referred to as ley de protección integral.  Governments and civil societal actors 
elsewhere in Latin America have pursued reforms in this policy domain:  examples include Brazil’s 1990 
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have participated in the agenda-setting, formulation, and adoption phases.  However, 
compared to the freedom of information case, their involvement has been more limited 
with respect to the number of organizations that have mobilized, their levels of activity, 
and their access to policy makers in both branches of government.  Furthermore, their 
presence in policy debates and interactions with elites so far have resulted in few clear 
“victories.”  This case is therefore an example of intermediate levels of participation.    
 CSOs’ efforts to influence the public and formal agendas have borne fruit.  In 
particular, their ability to attract media coverage of issues pertaining to the rights and 
well-being of children has helped them raise awareness of the cause.
68
  Additionally, 
children’s advocates are adamant that the U.N. reports discussed previously serve as tools 
for educating the public and pressuring government officials.  One of their goals in 
preparing the 2002 document, for instance, was to create a “space” from which they 
could propose alternative policies.
69
  Group members also have organized conferences to 
facilitate discussions of policy issues, the exchange of information and ideas, and 
consensus building among diverse bureaucratic, governmental, and civil societal actors.
70
    
During the formulation stage, children’s advocates have entered into dialogue 
with lawmakers, offered proposals, and voiced their opinions, though government-civil 
society interactions tend to be intermittent and ad hoc.  CONAF does have an advisory 
                                                                                                                                                 
Statute on Children and Adolescents (Guidry 2000) and Nicaragua’s 1998 Code of Childhood and 
Adolescence (Maclure and Sotelo 2004). 
68
 Interview in the Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CASACIDN), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires; see also Bombal and Garay (2000). 
69
 Interview in the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. 
70
 One such event occurred in Mendoza in 1997 (Encuentro Federal de Políticas de Infancia y 
Adolescencia).  In addition to bringing together a variety of actors involved in children’s issues, the 
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council designed to facilitate the involvement of non-governmental actors in the agency’s 
operations.  However, the majority of the activists whom I interviewed expressed little 
interest in (or knowledge of) the council’s activities and participants.  The institution 
appears to play a limited role in incorporating CSOs’ policy contributions.  
 A number of advocates have tried consistently to pressure decision makers to pass 
child protection legislation.  ADI and other CSOs, for instance, have petitioned and 
lobbied members of congress.  They also have published opinion pieces and disseminated 
analyses that compare and contrast competing policy proposals.  Notwithstanding these 
endeavors, the groups have encountered several challenges during the adoption phase.  
First, their levels of engagement with — and influence over — the policy process do not 
rival the intensity of the freedom of information supporters.  Second, their policy 
involvement seems to have declined since the late 1990s.  Third, the actual content of 
some of the proposals currently pending in the legislature does not reflect the inputs of 
activists, especially those who promote children’s rights.  Since the early 2000s, groups 
have continued to engage in dialogue with policy makers; however, they hesitate to 
support bills they deem to be “problematic” owing to unwelcome provisions or changes.  
As discussed in reference to the freedom of information campaign, this complicates 
CSOs’ advocacy efforts and occasionally puts them in the position of opposing proposed 
reforms.
71
  Children’s advocates found themselves in a similar predicament in the late 
1990s:  after collaborating with policy makers during the formulation phase, they were 
                                                                                                                                                 
conference is thought to have helped stimulate policy reforms in the provinces (Interview in CASACIDN, 
3/11/03, Buenos Aires). 
71
 Interviews in ADI, 4/4/03, CASACIDN, 3/11/03, and the Collective of NGOs for Children and 
Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. 
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dismayed to learn that the version that the Chamber of Deputies actually approved lacked 





Children’s advocacy in Chile 
Children’s advocates in Chile resemble their Argentine counterparts in their 
diversity.  A number of the CSOs active in this domain identify themselves principally as 
development, human rights, and/or religious organizations.  They intervene in children’s 
lives in a variety of areas, such as intra-family violence, mistreatment, education, health, 
substance abuse, disabilities, crime, and sexual exploitation.  The socioeconomic status of 
children — and the relationship between social indicators and the issues listed above — 
is a major theme of interest.  Many organizations pursue a mixture of research, rights 
education, and community-based projects intended to help families meet their needs.
73
  
  As in Argentina, an array of small, grassroots groups are committed to the well-
being of children.  Several prominent, stable, and relatively large NGOs exist, as well.  
To illustrate, the Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU) comprises numerous 
professionals and multiple divisions, including policy and legal areas.  OPCION 
(“option” or “alternative”) is another sizeable, well-known NGO.  The Foundation to 
Overcome Poverty is a further example of an important organization involved in 
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 The lower chamber passed a bill in 2001, but its future remains uncertain at present. 
73
 Like some of the Argentine groups, a number of CSOs are involved in implementing the government’s 
social policies and programs, but many also attend to these needs through their own independent initiatives. 
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children’s issues, and the social ministry vicariate of the Catholic Church in Santiago has 
a committed Children and Youth Area.
74
   
CSOs have taken on the responsibility of monitoring state policies and practices.  
They tend to focus their attention on the government agencies that directly address 
children’s issues, such as the National Service for Minors (SENAME), housed in the 
Ministry of Justice.  SENAME assists children and teens “at risk” who have committed 
crimes, are undergoing rehabilitation, and/or find themselves in other circumstances of 
“vulnerability.”
75
  Additional targets include the Planning and Cooperation, Education, 
and Health Ministries, and other agencies that design and implement social policies that 
affect the welfare of children.
76
 
Children’s advocates voice several concerns regarding existing policies.
77
  First, 
they describe extant laws as inadequate and contradictory.  Second, they point to the 
insufficient degree of coordination among different ministries and agencies within the 
executive branch.  Some note the absence of a governmental body that could better 
synchronize policies and thus call for institutional reform in this area.   Third, groups 
evaluate the government’s progress on a number of specific fronts, including access to 
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 The vicariate’s Children and Youth Area organizes school retention, recreation, and other programs.   
75
 Like Argentina’s CONAF, SENAME is involved with private and state-run shelters, orphanages, and 
other institutions for children and teens.  During (and subsequent to) my stay in Chile, reforms within the 
agency were being discussed, and ACHNU, OPCION, and other organizations served in an advisory 
capacity during this process.    
76
 Other government entities are likewise involved in issues pertaining to young people.  For example, 
Chile’s social investment fund (FOSIS) supports local programs that sometimes target children and youth 
(e.g., school retention initiatives).  Separate funds are earmarked for projects designed to improve 
assistance for children (PMI) and to educate students about drug abuse.    
77
 This section draws on interview data and the alternative report that CSOs submitted to the U.N. in 2002, 
entitled, “Comentarios al Segundo Informe del Estado Chileno Acerca de las Medidas Adoptadas para Dar 
Efectividad al Cumplimiento de la Convención Internacional de los Derechos del Niño (Informe 
Alternativo).”  I discuss the preparation of this report below.    
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health care and education, and the legal and penal codes that apply to children and teens.  
In more general terms, advocates often conclude that the rights of children are not 
observed regularly in practice.
78
   
Like their Argentine colleagues, the CSOs communicate these findings and 
concrete recommendations to both domestic and international audiences.  The main 
vehicles for disseminating their views are the non-governmental reports that ascertain the 
extent to which Chile has complied with the Convention on the Rights of the Child since 
its ratification in 1990.  Groups that contribute to the preparation of these documents 
have become progressively more committed to advocating for institutional and policy 
reforms that are compatible with global norms.
79
  They therefore envision other roles for 
themselves besides that of the watchdog. 
 Children’s advocates have been moderately successful at leveraging their 
monitoring activities into other forms of political and policy engagement.  They have 
increased the visibility of the rights-based perspective and contributed to public and 
policy debates.  Civil societal and governmental actors alike tend to perceive children’s 
organizations as political players of growing relevance.  For example, participants in 
other CSOs have noticed a “buzz” of excitement surrounding this issue area in recent 
years.
80
  Meanwhile, officials in the Planning and Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN) 
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 This observation was made during interviews in ACHNU, 11/4/02, NGO “Roots,” 11/4/02, and Children 
and Youth Area, Social Ministry Vicariate, Catholic Church, 11/4/02, Santiago.   
79
 Examples of CSOs that participated in the preparation of the 2002 report include:  ACHNU, La Caleta 
Norte, Aldeas SOS, Amnesty International, ASPAUT, CEMURI, CEPPAC, CERSO, FORJA (Juridical 
Training for Action),  FUNCASE, Fundación Tierra de Esperanza, GENESIS, Hogar de Cristo, KAIROS, 
MOANI, OPCION, PIDEE, SERPAJ (the Peace and Justice Service), SEDEJ, and SEPADE.   
80
 Interviews in ACCION, 9/16/02, and Participa, 10/14/02, Santiago.  I am grateful to the staff at 
ACCION, who first brought the children’s organizations to my attention.  
 86 
characterize the groups as capable, organized, and proactive:  in short, promising 
“counterparts” for the government.
81
  Staff members regularly maintain contact — and 
exchange information and analysis — with CSOs, especially the more technical, 
professional NGOs.
82
  They seldom plan events without first “inviting” the participation 
of such actors, according to one official.
83
 
Not surprisingly, CSOs were involved in the formulation of the National Policy 
and Integrated Plan of Action in Favor of Children and Adolescents, which the Lagos 
Administration introduced in 2001.  The official document detailing this executive branch 
initiative identifies several areas for policy intervention on behalf of children 
(MIDEPLAN 2001).  Examples include:  guaranteeing their survival and a suitable 
standard of living (measured in terms of education, safety, health, and other indicators); 
providing services to children with special needs (such as disabled individuals or 
members of minority groups); preventing domestic abuse and drug use; and encouraging 
youth participation in matters that directly involve or interest them.
84
  The policy 
embraces children as “strategic” actors who will contribute to Chile’s future 
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 Two separate interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago.  Officials describe their 
relationship with CSOs in positive terms overall.  
82
 These linkages enhance MIDEPLAN’s ability to develop and coordinate social policies (Interviews in 
MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/10/02 & 10/18/02, Santiago).  On the other hand, children’s advocates 
regret the apparent decline in interest in this issue area within the legislative branch.  The dedication of 
members of Chile’s parliament and political parties to children’s issues decreased following the 1997 
elections, according to the 2002 U.N. report (“Comentarios al Segundo Informe del Estado Chileno Acerca 
de las Medidas Adoptadas para Dar Efectividad al Cumplimiento de la Convención Internacional de los 
Derechos del Niño”).  
83
 Interview in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago.  
84
 The document also addresses family life, access to social welfare, and other themes.  It bears noting that 
separate laws guide the government’s response to intra-family violence, abandonment, adoptions, and 
juvenile crime.  Implementing the plan requires the combined efforts of the different government bureaus 
mentioned above. 
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development; President Lagos himself states that ensuring their welfare is the “best 
investment” for the country (MIDEPLAN 2001, 9).   
In this case, we observe intermediate levels of CSO participation.  The fact that 
policy collaboration occurred primarily during the design phase differentiates this case 
from those discussed earlier, in which groups targeted legislators during the adoption 
phase.  Executive branch officials conferred with a good number of children’s advocates 
through a series of meetings and workshops.
85 
 This consultation process was officially 
sanctioned but not formalized into a large advisory board comprised of civil societal and 
governmental actors.  Thus, participatory institutions per se do not explain CSO 
involvement.  However, the National Policy and Integrated Plan of Action did order the 
establishment of a new council, which was to include representatives from CSOs, 
schools, the Chilean branch of UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), and the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches (MIDEPLAN 2001).
86
  
Although groups enjoyed moderately high access to policy makers, they appeared 
to lack attitudes of ownership toward the resulting policy.  One participant characterized 
the policy as “very much the government’s.”
87
  Others candidly described their 
interactions with government officials as “unsatisfactory.”
88
  Such sentiments contrast 
sharply with the perceptions of many transparency activists in Argentina, who believed 
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 Interview in ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago (see also the NGO’s annual report for 2001).  ACHNU’s leader 
noted that the number of groups that participated was quite high, though the precise figure was not known.  
See MIDEPLAN (2001) for the government’s own description of the consultation process. 
86
 This “Extended Consultative Council” had not yet been organized at the time of my field research in 
2002.   
87
 Interview in Children and Youth Area, Social Ministry Vicariate, Catholic Church, 11/4/02, Santiago.   
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that their participation influenced the content of the freedom of information legislation 
early in the process.  They experienced a large degree of stakeholdership during the bill’s 
formulation and its subsequent adoption by the lower chamber.  
 These specific reactions to the creation of the National Policy echo a more general 
set of observations concerning the role of children’s CSOs in policy making.  For 
instance, some advocates suggest that the government is “not very receptive” to proposals 
that have originated within civil society.
89 
 Others remark that policy makers have already 
made key decisions by the time they consult CSOs.
90
  Interestingly, MIDEPLAN staff 
members acknowledge the government’s tendency to “hand down” decisions and 
“provide answers to social problems;” hence, NGOs and other groups are “not 
necessarily seated at the table” with officials during every stage of the decision-making 
process.
91
  At the same time, they insist that governmental actors genuinely value the 
groups’ opinions and regard these as welcome contributions.
92
 
The child protection policy therefore demonstrates more of a top-down, 
government-led dynamic relative to the other cases examined so far.  We find less 
evidence of civil society pressure from below:  petitioning, holding press conferences, 
and using other tactics aimed at rallying the public and other civil societal actors to the 
cause.  Such pressure often accompanies the more collaborative, direct advocacy 
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 This description appears in the 2002 U.N. report discussed above (“Comentarios al Segundo Informe del 
Estado Chileno Acerca de las Medidas Adoptadas para Dar Efectividad al Cumplimiento de la Convención 
Internacional de los Derechos del Niño”).   
89
 Interview in NGO “Roots,” 11/4/02, Santiago. 
90
 Interview in ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago. 
91
 Two separate interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago.  
92
 Interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/10/02 & 10/18/02, Santiago.  
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strategies included in Table 2 (e.g., meeting face-to-face with governing elites).  
Moreover, because the provisions of the policy were decided largely on the government’s 
terms, CSO influence remained limited.  Thus, this case is an example of middling levels 
of involvement.    
Nevertheless, these conclusions are not grounds for dismissing the political 
potential of children’s groups.  A greater role in policy decision making is possible, and 
advocacy on behalf of children in both Argentina and Chile may meet with more success 
in the future.  To keep matters in perspective, we should bear in mind that children’s 
rights activism in particular is a relatively “young” movement at both the domestic and 
international levels. 
 
Environmental advocacy in Chile  
Like children’s advocacy, the rubric of environmental activism captures a vast 
array of actors, issues, and behaviors.  A multiplicity of Chilean organizations are 
involved in such causes, including ecology clubs, research centers in universities, and 
“green” NGOs, which are my focus.  Scientists, lawyers, and other educated people 
frequently have gravitated toward environmentalism in various nations, and Chile is no 
exception.  In fact, activists identify a recent trend in the direction of further 
professionalization in this policy domain.  Terram, a foundation that promotes sustainable 




  At the same time, some of the NGOs maintain ties to grassroots 
groups, and the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF) and 
Greenpeace Chile have over 4,000 and 3,000 members, respectively.
94
 
It has become increasingly common for groups to carve out an organizational 
“niche” by specializing in a certain constellation of issues within the broader categories 
of environmentalism and sustainable development.
95
  To illustrate, Ecoceanos focuses on 
marine wildlife and pollution, as well as fishing-related industries, whereas the Defenders 
of the Chilean Forest concentrates on protecting Chile’s native woodlands.  In contrast, 




Green NGOs also differentiate themselves in terms of their overall approach to 
this issue area.  Both activists and outside observers typically categorize the groups as 
conservationist, ecological, or environmental (Carruthers 2001; Claude 1999).
97
  
CODEFF and other conservationist organizations emphasize the preservation and 
protection of natural resources, habitats, and wildlife.  The Political Ecology Institute and 
similar ecological groups clamor for a fundamental shift away from Chile’s existing 
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 Interview in Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago.  See also Claude (1999), which provides an overview of green 
NGOs in Chile.  Two additional groups, which predate the NGOs mentioned here, are the Environmental 
Research and Planning Center (CIPMA) and the Chilean Ecology Institute.   
94
 Interviews in CODEFF, 10/14/02, and Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago.   
95
 Interview in House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago.  Hudson (2002) notes a similar tendency among NGOs 
in the United Kingdom that seek to differentiate themselves from one another. According to the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, sustainable development is defined as meeting the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.    
96
 Other issues of concern for green NGOs include hazardous wastes, pollution, smog and other air quality 
issues, and the depletion of the ozone layer.     
97
 These categories also were proposed during an interview in the Political Ecology Institute, 9/16/02, 
Santiago.   
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model of development, which they regard as unsustainable.
98
  Environmentalist NGOs, 
including House of Peace, promote sustainable development and respect for the limits of 
nature but usually approach these from a more reformist perspective compared to 
ecologists. 
The groups’ activities range from research, legal advocacy, and environmental 
conflict resolution to public education and consciousness-raising.
99
  Through such efforts, 
the NGOs have managed to influence the public agenda and contribute to political 
debates.  To illustrate, newspaper content analysis indicates that some organizations have 
achieved a considerable media presence.  This is no small feat:  compared to the 
Argentine press, Chile’s mainstream media provide limited coverage of civil society 
activities and tend to focus instead on governing elites and party leaders.
100
  During the 
1990s, the press consistently provided a venue for the opinions of members of CODEFF, 
the Political Ecology Institute, and other groups.  Terram also gained exposure due in part 
to its regular columns in La Tercera and La Nación and its especially vocal director.
101
  
Additionally, the NGOs are adept monitors of public officials and institutions, 
politicians, and private industry.  They keep a watchful eye on the National 
Environmental Commission (CONAMA) and other governmental entities, report on cases 
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 For instance, a member of the Political Ecology Institute explained that participants in the NGO share a 
critical, politicized view of current development policies (Interview, 9/16/02, Santiago).  An eco-centric 
view of society motivates the work of such groups. 
99
 Because single NGOs can pursue different strategies simultaneously, they often defy categories based on 
tactics (for instance, “contentious” versus more “conventional” approaches).  Hochstetler (1997) argues 
similarly that environmental groups in Brazil use a variety of tactics, including lobbying, offering expert 
testimony, and protesting, among others. 
100
 CSOs of all types try to counter this tendency by posting their own news on websites such as 
http://www.sociedadcivil.cl.   
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of alleged corruption, reveal deficiencies in public access to environmental information, 
and research the health of the environment.
102
  Members of Ecoceanos, for instance, 
accuse powerful business elites of using government and legislative posts to pursue 
private interests rather than the common good.
103
  Moreover, FIMA, an NGO dedicated to 
public interest environmental law, monitors the state’s compliance with existing laws and 
adherence to the rights enshrined in the constitution.
104
 
The majority of the groups are critical of the government’s environmental policies 
but willing to engage in dialogue with elites.  None maintains a rigidly oppositional 
posture vis-à-vis the authorities.  One activist remarks that because a major policy shift 
toward sustainable development appears unlikely, they prefer to work within the “realm 
of possibility.”
105
  Another advocate describes her approach as critical yet cooperative in 
areas of common interest with the government.
106
  
 Notwithstanding their willingness to cooperate, the NGOs generally have been 
less involved in policy making compared to the CSOs discussed previously.  
Accordingly, we observe lower levels of participation and influence in the case of the Bío 
                                                                                                                                                 
101
 I refer here to economist Marcel Claude, who has since left Terram to direct a different NGO.  Manuel 
Baquedano, of the Political Ecology Institute, and Adriana Hoffman, of Defenders of the Chilean Forest, 
also are widely recognized. 
102
 Terram is a further example of an NGO that takes this monitoring role seriously (Interview, 10/10/02, 
Santiago).      
103
 Group members claim that in some cases of corruption, officials enjoy impunity; in addition to avoiding 
responsibility for their actions, they often land superior positions within the government (“caer hacia 
arriba”).  The activists also maintain that citizens lack mechanisms for accountability and participation 
owing to the paucity of available information about campaign finance and public administration (Interview 
in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02; see also the bulletin published by Parlamento del Mar, issue dated 9/02).      
104
 Interview in FIMA, 10/2/02, Santiago.  Members of FIMA and other lawyers have undertaken legal 
actions to thwart development and industrial projects that they consider to be harmful to the environment.     
105
 Interview in Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago. 
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Bío River dam project relative to the three preceding cases.  Since the mid-1990s, the 
government has embarked on the process of planning and building a series of dams and 
hydroelectric power plants in Southern Chile.  The Ralco dam, currently under 
construction, is being financed by Endesa, a multinational corporation.  Ralco will entail 
the flooding of approximately 3,500 hectares of land and forest (Aylwin 2002).
107
  Much 
of the territory in question belongs (or belonged) to the Pehuenche, one of Chile’s 
Mapuche communities.
108 
 The investment project has caused the displacement of more 
than 500 individuals, who signed their land over to Endesa and were resettled.
109
  Critics 
have questioned some of the company’s tactics for acquiring these lands, citing cases of 
pressure, manipulation, and/or “divide and conquer” strategies (Aylwin 2002, 12).  The 
project has therefore disrupted indigenous people’s customs and economic livelihoods, 
based largely on pastoral activities and access to the renewable resources of the forest 
(Aylwin 2002).  The dam also threatens an estimated 50 animal and aquatic species.    
In spite of the investment project’s anticipated consequences — which many 
perceived as harmful to both indigenous communities and the environment — it was 
authorized by the relevant government agencies.  CONAMA gave the go-ahead, 
prompting charges that it was approving Ralco without the proper analysis of its 
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 Interview in Sustainable Chile, 10/4/02, Santiago.  Additionally, the 2001 annual report of House of 
Peace describes its “reformist environmentalist” approach as radical in its mode of thought but conciliatory 
in its methods. 
107
 Together, the dams reportedly would have the capacity to generate some 2,680 megawatts of power; 
Ralco by itself would generate 570 megawatts (Aylwin 2002).  Construction of the first dam, Pangue, was 
completed in 1994. 
108





  CONADI, the state agency created to address the needs of 
indigenous communities, lent its approval, as well.
111 
 This was a controversial move 
given the land ownership provisions of Chile’s 1993 Indigenous Law, which some 
interpret as limiting the sale of indigenous lands to members of the same ethnic group 
(Aylwin 2002).
112
  In short, the Bío Bío River dams are a paradigmatic “mega” 
investment project, which involves the large-scale appropriation of land, water, native 
forest, and other natural resources and enjoys the support of both the government and big 
business (Aylwin 2002).
113
    
 A variety of individuals and collective actors — indigenous, human rights, and 
other civil society groups, academics, and others — mobilized to oppose the dam.  
Activists disseminated technical studies of the project’s environmental and ethno-cultural 
impacts, organized demonstrations, and took legal action on behalf of affected parties.  
They also maintained contact with sympathetic international NGOs, such as Friends of 
the Earth and the International Federation on Human Rights, and sought the counsel of 
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 Aylwin (2002) estimates that the project has directly affected 674 people.  Endesa was a state-owned 
company until its privatization during the Pinochet regime; since 1998, it has been under the ownership of a 
Spanish corporation. 
110
 The official report evaluating the environmental impact was later questioned in court. 
111
 CONADI (the National Indigenous Development Corporation) is charged with the protection and 
development of indigenous peoples, as well as the coordination of policies that affect the communities.  
Mallon (1999) and Muñoz (2002) discuss the departure of two CONADI leaders who were reticent to 
authorize the project; these personnel changes helped facilitate its eventual approval. 
112
 The Indigenous Law has come into conflict with a Pinochet-era law that seeks to promote energy-
generating projects. 
113
 Such initiatives are referred to as mega proyectos.  Similar events have transpired in other countries.  
Khagram (2002), for instance, analyzes the political mobilization that occurred at the local, national, and 
international levels in response to dam projects in India’s Narmada Valley.  Transnational coalitions, 
comprised mainly of NGOs, stalled the project’s implementation and influenced international norms and 
practices concerning environmental and indigenous rights. 
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the United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
114
  Their efforts slowed 
the project but did not bring it to a halt:  by late 2002, 65% of Ralco had been built; and 
by early 2004, the dam was close to being operational.
115
 
 Most of the green NGOs did not contribute to the above campaign.  Their 
participation in this case was limited with respect to overall numbers of groups involved 
and their engagement with the government.  They were relatively unsuccessful at gaining 
an audience for their concerns and grievances during the policy-making process and 
rallying the public to their cause.  Government officials apparently did not view them as 
legitimate actors to be consulted.  Additionally, I found little evidence to suggest that 
groups played a role in mediating the conflict between the government and the families 
affected by the dam’s construction.  In short, we observe low levels of involvement and 
influence. 
To be sure, powerful forces conspired against civil society influence in this case.  
A large-scale investment project, backed by both the government and private interests, 
was at stake.  Such policies have an air of inevitability about them:  it seems as though no 
amount of civil society mobilization or access to elites can change the outcome.  
However, the Bío Bío River case, though dramatic, is by no means unique.  It is 
representative of other instances of policy making in this issue area, which show similar 
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 Opponents, convinced that the construction of Ralco violates World Bank directives on environmental 
and indigenous issues, took their case to that institution.  Meanwhile, some indigenous groups engaged in 
direct actions, such as road blocks and land occupations.  For summaries of these and other events, see 
Aylwin (2002) and Claude (1999). 
115
 El Mercurio, issue dated 2/15/04, and La Nación, issue dated 10/14/02.  Construction had gone forward 
in spite of ongoing controversy and the refusal of some landowners to sell.  
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signs of government–corporate alliances.
116
   In other cases of environmental policy 
making, green NGOs have exercised limited influence over the formal agenda and policy 
formulation (Claude 1999).  For example, Ecoceanos described the 2003 National 
Aquaculture Policy as catering — and offering concessions — to the large national and 
multinational companies involved in Chile’s salmon industry and criticized the relatively 
closed debate that preceded the initiative.  Moreover, environmental advocacy in Chile 
(and elsewhere) is sometimes more defensive than proactive.  Activists find themselves 
in the position of opposing policies already selected by the government instead of 
participating in the actual decision-making process.
117 
  
Not surprisingly, NGO members offer mainly negative assessments of their policy 
role.  A leader in Terram, for instance, observes that the majority of the groups lack 
access to government officials and are situated “on the margins of politics.”
118
  Several 
advocates note that these officials rarely think of civil societal actors as welcome 
counterparts to be included in the design phase.
119
  Rather, elites are more prone to 
“inform” CSOs of decisions already made than to incorporate their views and analyses 
into policies, according to a member of CODEFF.
120
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 El mostrador, issue dated 8/1/03; see also Ecoceanos News, issue dated 7/31/03.  In more general terms, 
Silva (1997) suggests that a “two-tier” arrangement exists in Chile:  business interests enjoy the inside track 
to governing elites, while environmental groups have a more conflictive relationship to the government. 
117
 This type of activism can take the form of NIMBY (“Not in My Backyard”), or opposition to proposed 
highways, gas pipelines, waste facilities, cellular towers, etc.  However, this defensive posturing does not 
necessarily preclude CSOs from pursuing a more proactive, forward-looking agenda.  
118
 Interview in Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago. 
119 
Interviews in House of Peace, 9/17/02, the Political Ecology Institute, 9/16/02, and Terram, 10/10/02, 
Santiago. 
120
 Interview in CODEFF, 10/14/02, Santiago.  A veteran conservationist likewise remarks that most 
decisions are made without consulting NGOs, which are “invited but rarely listened to” (La Tercera, issue 
dated 6/19/94).  Children’s rights advocates in Chile describe a similar dynamic, as mentioned previously.  
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 The creation of participatory institutions and programs in this policy domain has 
not altered these perceptions.  CONAMA has organized advisory councils at the national 
and regional levels with representatives from NGOs, universities and research centers, 
business, and labor.
121
  In addition, varied civil societal actors contribute to the much 
larger Sustainable Development Council, which makes recommendations on 
environmental issues to President Lagos.
122
  CONAMA has instigated a number of other 
participatory programs, as well.
123
  Civil society involvement in decision making has been 
lacking in spite of the proliferation of such initiatives.
124
  
Thus, some of the patterns found in the Bío Bío River example are discernible in 
other cases of environmental policy making.  NGOs that aspire to greater policy influence 
therefore must negotiate difficult political terrain.  It is possible, however, that the groups 
will one day achieve more success.  As suggested earlier, they have been effective in 
their efforts to thrust issues onto the public agenda, contribute to environmental debates, 
and monitor elites and institutions.  Looking ahead, we can expect their continued 
political engagement.   
In the following sections, I leave the particulars of each case behind to consider 
the broader context in which these events occurred.  My focus is the widespread public 
                                                 
121
 Records of former and current participants in CONAMA’s advisory councils are available at: 
http://www.conama.cl.    
122
 The Council has over 90 members, including (but not limited to) representatives from indigenous 
communities, religious denominations, women’s organizations, green NGOs, and universities, and 
government officials from the executive and legislative branches and the armed forces.  Among its 
objectives are building consensus on environmental issues and guiding policy formulation.   
123
 See the working document, “Mesa Gubernamental ‘Participación Ciudadana en Políticas y Programas 
Públicos’:  Panorama General,” authored in 2000 in the Division of Social Organizations (DOS).   
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dissatisfaction with political elites and institutions in Argentina and Chile.  In addition to 
reviewing relevant survey data, I briefly discuss the political behaviors associated with 
negative attitudes toward “politics as usual.”  As stated at the outset of this chapter, civil 
societal actors are hardly impervious to these trends.  Consequently, we would expect 
them to mostly refrain from linking up with elites and institutions.  However, my findings 
indicate that many CSOs seek to engage the political system and the policy process in 
spite of such perceptions.   
 
DISTANT GOVERNMENTS AND DISENCHANTED DEMOCRATS  
 
Observers of democracy in Argentina and Chile and other Latin American 
countries often note pervasive disenchantment (desencanto) with politicians and political 
institutions.  According to such analyses, ties between citizens and governments are 
fragile at best and severed at worst.  To illustrate, from the perspective of many Chileans, 
politics appears “distant from the people’s demands and aspirations;” rather than a means 
to pursue the common good, it is largely a “self-referential activity” for politicians vying 
for power (PNUD 2000, 245; see also Siavelis 1999).  Attitudes of indifference are 
captured in the phrase, “I’m not at all into politics” (“no estoy ni ahí con la política”), a 
particularly ubiquitous sentiment among the country’s youth (Barton 2002; Fitzsimmons 
2000; Segovia 1999).
125
  Many citizens also feel politically impotent, as illustrated by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
124
 Some of these initiatives originated with the 1994 Environmental Framework Law, which also 
established a system for evaluating the environmental impact of development projects by creating 
opportunities for non-governmental actors to provide information and analysis.   
125
 According to Segovia (1999), a 1997 national survey of Chilean youth found that some 80% opined that 
politicians were not interested in young people. 
 99 
65% of survey respondents who agreed with the statement, “the opinions of people like 
me don’t count for much” (PNUD 2002).  Furthermore, confidence in elected officials 
and political parties has decreased.
126
   
In Argentina, disillusionment with political elites and institutions is even more 
pronounced.  Throughout the 1990s, the public generally regarded politicians as corrupt, 
obsessed with their own status, and unwilling or unable to represent the citizenry (Taylor 
1998; see also Powers 2001).
127
  The “crisis of legitimacy” and “crisis of representation” 
have long been part of the country’s political lingo (Inter-American Democracy Network 
1998).  The socioeconomic crisis of the early 2000s obviously compounded these 
political woes.  In December 2001, the country verged on the brink of economic, 
financial, and political collapse:  a volatile combination of massive protests, spontaneous 
uprisings, and a repressive state response left 33 dead and over 300 wounded (Bonasso 
2002).  By the end of the month, De la Rúa and his team had resigned, and a presidential 
game of musical chairs ensued.
128
  Unemployment had tripled between 1991 and 2001, 
enveloping almost one-quarter of Argentines by the middle of 2002; more than one-half 
of the population was enduring poverty.
129
  By 2002, a mere seven and eight percent of 
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 Some scholars offer institutionalist explanations of these attitudes, pointing to technocratic policy 
making, limited access to institutions, and the other factors discussed in Chapter 1.  They argue that 
Chileans are aware of the elitist, “cupular,” and “protected” nature of democracy there (Bickford 1998; 
Garretón 1999; Hite 2000; Portales 2000; Segovia 1999; see also PNUD 2002).  Observers within Chile 
also cite limited government transparency as a source of these attitudes (e.g., interview in Ecoceanos, 
9/13/02, Santiago; La Tercera, issue dated 9/12/02).   
127
 Manzetti (1993) notes that by the late 1980s, “only union leaders and military officers were evaluated 
more negatively” than politicians (1993, 137; see also Munck 1997). 
128
 De la Rúa, of the Radical Party (UCR) and Alianza coalition comprising the UCR and Frepaso parties 
(the Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education), had taken office in 1999. 
129
 Unemployment reached 21.5% in May 2002, and poverty climbed to 57.5% by January 2003.  These 
figures suggest that approximately 21.3 million Argentines were living below the poverty line.  The sources 
of these data are INDEC and Cáritas. 
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the populace still had faith in congress and political parties, respectively.
130
  Many young 
people came to associate the formal political sphere with “failure, disillusionment and 
betrayal.”
131
     
Political discontent has manifested itself in different behaviors within both 
countries.  For instance, scholars link attitudinal shifts in Chile to electoral trends, 
including a decline in voter registration and an increase in abstention and null and blank 
ballots (Barton 2002; Posner 1999; Segovia 1999; Siavelis 1999).
132
  Argentines likewise 
have shown signs of rejecting existing political alternatives by casting null and blank 
ballots in elections and abstaining from voting (Peruzzotti 2003).
133
  However, 
disaffection is even more apparent in non-electoral behavior and, more specifically, 
protest politics.
134
  Disgust with the political class is captured in the damning slogan 
chanted at countless anti-government street protests, which peaked in late 2001 and early 
2002: “que se vayan todos; que no quede ni uno solo,” translated literally as “they all 
must go; not a single one should stay” or, more figuratively, “to hell with all of the 
politicians” (Trigona 2002).  Que se vayan was not only incorporated into the lexicon of 
protest and social movements; it also reverberated across vast segments of the population, 
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 Survey conducted by Gallup Argentina and reported in La Nación, issue dated 8/6/02.    
131
 Clarín, issue dated 3/17/03. 
132
 For instance, in Chile’s 1997 legislative elections the sum of non-registered votes, abstentions, and 
blank votes totaled over 40% of total eligible voters (Segovia 1999).   
133
 In Argentina’s midterm elections in 2001 abstentions and blank and null votes increased and totaled 
43% of the electorate (Peruzzotti 2003). 
134
 Other Latin American specialists have discussed the relationship between protest and the failure of 
representative institutions (e.g., López-Maya 2002; Vilas 1997).  Although protest movements in 
contemporary Chile do not approach the scale of the Argentine movements, indigenous communities, “anti-
globalization” groups, and professional associations of teachers and medical workers regularly engage in 
contentious activities (see Espinoza 2000 for an in-depth analysis of the professional associations). 
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as illustrated by the two-thirds of survey respondents who agreed with the slogan in late 
2002.
135
   
 The combination of disruptive politics, grassroots mobilization, and organizing 
outside of traditional institutions prompted some observers to conclude that citizens were 
“abandoning traditional political structures and inventing alternatives” (Trigona 2002, 1; 
see also Dinerstein 2003).  For example, hundreds of neighborhood assemblies 
(asambleas barriales) emerged spontaneously from the street protests mentioned above.  
Some first convened as an act of civil disobedience during the state of emergency that De 
la Rúa had declared (Bielsa 2002).  They quickly became forums in which neighbors 
gathered to discuss and criticize the political and economic situation and to conduct an 
experiment in “direct democracy.”
136
  The movement generally has declined since that 
time.   
One of the more significant — and less ephemeral — movements to have 
emerged in recent years is organized by unemployed workers known as piqueteros 
(picketers), who block roads and stage other protests to draw attention to their plight and 
to demand jobs and social assistance.   Different piquetero groups, which espouse 
varying political goals, motivations, and ideologies, have mobilized considerable 
numbers of jobless individuals.  Since 1997, they have blocked major arteries in multiple 
                                                 
135
 Survey conducted by Nueva Mayoría and reported in La Nación, issue dated 11/26/02. Dinerstein 
suggests that in addition to its literal call for the renewal of all elected posts, the slogan embodies a 
symbolic critique of the prevailing economic system and the “parody of democracy” supporting it (2003, 
193).  
136
 According to La Nación, issue dated 12/16/02, between March and August 2002, the total number of 
assemblies in Argentina increased from 272 to 329.  Well over 100 were operating within the city of 
Buenos Aires alone.  Dinerstein (2003) argues that they contributed to the reinvention of politics by 
refusing to conform to traditional modes of participation and re-appropriating public space for deliberation. 
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regions on thousands of occasions, including a record-shattering 2,154 times in 2002.
137
  
Additionally, worker-controlled factories (empresas recuperadas/fábricas tomadas) have 
become sites for collective action.   Workers have seized an estimated 160 businesses — 
usually closed and abandoned by their owners — to generate income.
138
  Although the 
authorities sometimes tolerate the workers’ occupations and the piqueteros’ 
demonstrations, episodes of violence have recurred since the emergence of both 
movements.
139
   
In summary, a near-consensus exists in the literature that citizen disillusionment 
with politics as usual is widespread in Latin American democracies.  Analysts point to 
indifferent or negative attitudes toward the political system, waning confidence in elites 
and institutions, and the “crisis” of political representation.  The crisis that has dominated 
Argentine politics is an especially dramatic case of this representational void and the 
ever-growing gulf between citizens and governing elites.  The perceived distance 
separating most citizens from political elites and institutions is yet another feature of a 
relatively inauspicious context with respect to civil society participation.  We would 
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 La Nación, issue dated 12/9/02 (figures are through the end of November).  There were 140 protests 
involving roadblocks in 1997, 51 in 1998, 252 in 1999, 514 in 2000, and 1,383 in 2001.  Some of the 
groups tend to negotiate with the government, while others, deemed as hardliners (or duros) by the 
Argentine media, keep their distance.  
138
 The New York Times, issue dated 7/6/03, estimates that the factories employ over 10,000 people.  Two 
examples of worker-controlled factories are the Brukman textile factory in Buenos Aires and the Zanon 
ceramics plant in Neuquén. Human rights advocates, piqueteros, and workers have participated in joint 
demonstrations and tried to prevent the eviction of workers from occupied factories.  For example, the 
Association of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo has created a “support committee” in solidarity with the 
worker-controlled factories, with the participation of several piquetero groups, university students, and 
alternative media.  Other human rights organizations have provided legal support. 
139
 Hundreds of participants have been wounded and a smaller number killed in clashes with security forces 
during attempts to break up protests and eject workers from factories.  One protest that ended in violence 
occurred on the outskirts of the capital in June 2002.  Two piqueteros were shot and killed, and ninety were 
wounded (La Nación, issue dated 6/26/02).   
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expect many non-governmental actors facing such an environment to have little interest 
in engaging the political system and little hope of exercising any influence.  Indeed, 
members of CSOs are hardly immune to these general trends.  The following section 
addresses some of the challenges that groups face when deciding whether to link up with 
elites and institutions. 
 
LINKING UP IS HARD TO DO 
  
The NGOs and community organizations included in this study differ from other 
civil societal actors in Argentina and Chile, who are more prone to abandon traditional 
politics altogether in favor of less conventional alternatives.  However, their members are 
not impervious to the disenchantment described above:  feelings of estrangement from 
politics as usual are fairly common.  They sometimes regard politics as a sphere in which 
individuals and groups compete for power and privilege instead of working for the 
greater good.  The term “lobbying” in particular carries negative connotations of 
corruption, bribery, and the exchange of political favors:  questionable activities that 
occur behind closed doors and largely advance personal agendas.
140
  In short, they 
conclude that it is probably best to avoid sullying one’s reputation by getting mixed up in 
politics.  
The mutual distrust that often characterizes relations between governments and 
civil societies poses additional challenges.  Some government officials portray 
organizations as mere vehicles for partisan interests or cults of personality; meanwhile, 
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civil societal actors frequently view government institutions as opaque, bureaucratic 
mazes full of public servants with antiquated views on policy issues.  CSO members also 
worry that public officials or politicians will take advantage of an organization’s “good 
name” to lend legitimacy to their actions.  According to one NGO leader, “the biggest 
risk is that the government will use us to legitimate its own initiatives.”
141
  Co-optation 
and other threats to organizational autonomy are perennial concerns.  
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for civil societal actors to view the state in 
adversarial terms, essentializing it as the enemy.  In fact, many participants in social 
movements that emerged during authoritarian rule in Argentina and Chile operated under 
such assumptions.  Even today, some Argentine activists continue to regard the state as 
“inherently authoritarian and corrupt” (Armony 2004, 149).  Owing to their monolithic 
understanding of the state, they are less prone to seek dialogue and cooperation.  Other 
analysts note that nearly all CSOs in democratizing nations are forced to reevaluate this 
oppositional stance vis-à-vis the government following the transition (e.g., Rutherford 
1997; Reilly 1995).
142
   
My own research suggests that many groups have embraced a flexible approach 
toward collaboration in the post-authoritarian era.  Their members seem aware of two 
basic facts:  the state remains a primary target for citizen demands, and the policy realm 
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 Interview in Cáritas Argentina, National Committee, 4/8/03, Buenos Aires.   
141
 The president of the Social Forum for Transparency, quoted in Clarín, issue dated 1/20/2003.      
142
 It is useful to highlight these very general patterns under different regime types; however, it must be 
noted that one can find evidence of confrontation and collaboration between governmental and civil 
societal actors during periods of both democratic and authoritarian rule in Latin American countries.   
 105 
continues to be an important site for political change.
143
  During interviews with activists, 
I detect varying degrees of resignation, pragmatism, realism, and optimism that change 
can be effected through conventional political channels.  Many seem to advocate 
“idealism of principle” and “realism of action” (Mignone 1991).  To illustrate, some 
participants in the human rights movement engage the political system on a regular 
basis.
144
  A member of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo explains, “It’s the only 
system we’ve got.  We have to work with it or else we won’t achieve anything.”  One of 
her colleagues underscores their desire to “get things done” and pursue change through 
institutional as well as other means.
145
  Accordingly, a majority of the human rights 
organizations maintain contact with government agencies, such as the Subsecretariat of 
Human and Social Rights in the Ministry of the Interior; some also have worked with 
elected officials to pass legislation.
146
  This more pragmatic approach is surprising in light 
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 According to Foweraker, “since no form of politics, however popular, can occur in a political and 
institutional vacuum, social movements have little choice about setting out across this terrain” (1995, 62). 
144
 The main organizations that emerged during the 1976-83 dictatorship include: the Grandmothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
(who later split into two distinct groups), the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), Relatives of the 
Disappeared and Detained for Political Reasons, the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights (MEDH), 
and the Service for Peace and Justice (SERPAJ).  Examples of groups that have formed since the transition 
are:  the Association of Ex-Detained and Disappeared, and Children for Identity and Justice and Against 
Forgetting and Silence (HIJOS).  See Brysk (1994) for an analysis of the movement’s emergence and 
subsequent evolution. 
145
 Interviews in Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 6/30/97 and 5/20/01, Buenos Aires.  A smaller 
number of human rights groups remain more intransigent in their views.  For example, the longtime leader 
of the Association of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, the more radicalized of the two groups of Mothers, 
calls the state an agent of terror and urges Argentines to “combat and resist it.” (An interview transcript, 
dated 2/12/02, available at: http://www.madres.org/entrevistas/contenido/020212hebeafondo.htm.  
Accessed 8/23/02). 
146
 For example, reparation laws (leyes de indemnización) that have benefited victims of human rights 
abuses resulted from such efforts.  Legislation passed in 1992 and 1994 offers compensation to ex-
detainees and family members or spouses of the disappeared. 
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of the received wisdom on the movement, which is described as uncompromising and 
unable to adapt to democratic politics (Brysk 1994).
147
  
Numerous participants in “young” Argentine NGOs (founded after the transition) 
likewise are amenable to the idea of cooperation.  One civil society leader expressed 
interest in “building bridges between political leaders and civil society,” finding “honest 
and capable” public officials with whom to collaborate, and avoiding the most “corrupt 
and inept” individuals.
148
  Another NGO member commented that because “all politicians 
are suspect,” one of their goals is to “produce proposals, changes, and reforms that are 
sustainable over time, independently of who is [in office].”
149
  An additional participant 
remarked that CSOs would benefit from sharing their ideas and specific proposals with 
government officials instead of “merely exchanging them with other groups.”
150
  
Evidence that civil societal actors in Argentina are willing to collaborate is all the more 
remarkable considering that I conducted most of these interviews in the aftermath of the 
country’s political and economic crises.  Moreover, interest in advocacy has grown in 
recent years.  According to a 2001 survey of some 300 organizations, for example, over 
90% aspired to influence policies.
151
   
                                                 
147
 Scholars note that politics in democratic regimes rewards “the logic of bargaining,” whereas human 
rights activists often make non-negotiable, ethical demands related to their pursuit of justice for the victims 
of dictatorship-era abuses (Brysk 1994, 20). 
148
 Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. 
149
 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.  Similar comments were made 
during interviews in FARN, 1/31/03, and Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires.   
150
 Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 2/4/03, Buenos Aires.   
151
 La Nación, issue dated 6/11/01. It is possible that activists are using the language of advocacy and 
influence in a more self-conscious manner.  This could indicate a change from previous patterns of CSOs in 
Latin America “doing advocacy” but failing to recognize it as such (Bombal and Garay 2000, 33). 
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Similarly, a survey of Chilean NGOs conducted by an umbrella association sheds 
light on the main factors motivating groups to engage governing elites (Morgan 2001).  
52% of the NGOs seek greater influence, particularly over policy making, while 44% 
want access to information, funding, and other resources.  In addition, 27% view 
articulation as a means to improve their organizational capacity.
152
  The survey also 
indicates the perceived benefits of past cooperation with government officials:  28% of 
the respondents note that the government has adopted their proposals (or cite other 
“tangible” results); 33% perceive changes in bureaucrats’ attitudes and understandings of 
issues; and 28% cite increased recognition of their work. 
Attitudes such as these help us understand why many groups try to link up with 
institutions, elites, and the policy process.  Although CSOs often have misgivings, they 
weigh both the costs and the benefits of collaboration.  Certain organizations act 
primarily out of necessity or expediency, but others harbor some hope that their 
participation in conventional politics can yield positive results. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The principal goals of this chapter were to elaborate what civil society 
participation signifies in the dissertation and to provide empirical evidence of varying 
levels of policy involvement.  After first outlining the characteristics shared by the CSOs 
targeted for analysis, I summarized the different strategies they can use to engage in 
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 19% express interest in obtaining more validation of their work.  The survey results also illuminate 
perceived problems characterizing state-NGO relations.  Some of the principal challenges (also mentioned 
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advocacy and exercise influence during policy agenda setting, formulation, and adoption.  
I then presented an in-depth, comparative analysis of the study’s main cases of policy 
making, emphasizing the role of civil societal actors therein.  I argued that CSO 
involvement and influence reached high levels in the case of freedom of information 
legislation and intermediate levels in both cases of child protection policies, while 
remaining low with respect to the dam project. 
Next, I discussed the larger political context in which these events unfolded.  I 
emphasized the proliferation of negative views toward politics as usual and the electoral 
and non-electoral behaviors that these attitudes have bred in both countries.  Argentina 
clearly provides dramatic examples of disruptive politics and attempts to organize outside 
of traditional institutions.  In such environments, we would expect non-governmental 
actors to show little interest in collaborating with elites and institutions.  Yet in spite of 
these impediments, many groups are open to collaboration and aware that the policy-
making arena is an important site for pursuing their interests.  This finding challenges 
some of the received wisdom on the subject, which focuses on the costs rather than the 
benefits of this strategy. 
Indeed, as suggested in Chapter 1, much of the scholarship emphasizes the myriad 
obstacles that hinder civil society participation in Latin America.  Commonly cited 
challenges include: a weakened, atomized, and/or politically dormant civil society in 
post-transition contexts; the “harnessing” of CSOs for the sake of the neoliberal project 
and their diminished capacity for an autonomous, critical, and proactive agenda; 
                                                                                                                                                 
earlier) include mutual mistrust and a limited understanding between the two sectors, state bureaucracy and 
lack of transparency, and divergent approaches to (or understandings of) issues. 
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restricted institutional opportunities for participation and technocratic policy making; and 
tenuous state-society linkages and uncertain arrangements for political representation.  
When these works alone guide our research, we anticipate low levels of involvement and 
little variation on the dependent variable.  However, the data presented here demonstrate 
that the extent to which civil societal actors participate in (and influence) policy making 
varies significantly.  The evidence therefore calls into question too hasty a dismissal of 
the political potential of civil society in democratizing areas.   
 Instead of discounting the possibility of effective advocacy, scholars must explain 
the varying degrees of success and failure that we observe.  I perform this task in the next 
two chapters, which elaborate the explanatory variables proposed in Chapter 1:  civil 
society alliances and strategic framing.  These theoretical tools help solve the puzzle of 
CSOs influencing policy even in relatively inhospitable environments. 
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Chapter 3:  The Power of Persuasion 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of the 2001-2002 political crisis, numerous Argentines demanded the 
immediate removal of all governing elites from power (que se vayan todos).  As noted in 
Chapter 2, citizens got considerable mileage out of the slogan during demonstrations, 
street protests, leftist political party rallies, and other public events.  However, some civil 
societal actors were conveying a political message that contrasted significantly with the 
discourse of que se vayan.  Proponents of freedom of information, for example, 
emphasized the need for political and institutional renewal, which could be achieved by 
improving government transparency and accountability.  Advocates linked such reforms 
to the strengthening of democracy and made the following proclamation: “To deny the 
right to information is to deny the right to democracy.”
1
  They thus offered more 
constructive ideas in an environment where the politics of negation and anger had 
reached a fever pitch. 
In the present chapter, I analyze the myriad ways in which these and other civil 
societal actors politicize issues, articulate demands, and “frame” ideas.  I argue 
principally that CSOs that mobilize ideas successfully are more likely to influence policy 
making.  Thus, effective framing is a significant pathway to participation.  
                                                 
1
 This phrase appears in the CSOs’ declaration of principles (Infocívica article dated 12/17/02, available at: 
http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03).      
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In essence, this chapter is about the exercise of “persuasive” power.  CSOs 
frequently rely on the persuasiveness of their ideas and information to influence 
governing elites — who enjoy more “authoritative” forms of power — and the broader 
public (Shepard 2003; Sikkink 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  The ideational realm is a 
site of creativity and innovation, especially for the types of groups analyzed in the 
dissertation, which seek to defend (and define) the public interest.  Such CSOs endeavor 
to become credible purveyors of ideas and interpreters of reality.  By disseminating their 
views widely, they struggle to shape the public discourse and agenda, to affect how 
people think and talk about a given issue.       
Of course, some CSOs are more efficacious than others at performing these tasks.  
Understanding their varying degrees of success is vital to our grasp of civil society’s 
involvement in policy making.  Indeed, any thorough examination of civil society entails 
an inquiry into the role of ideas.  Despite the importance of ideas, however, the ideational 
realm is one where some political scientists fear to tread.  We have not explored this 
unfamiliar terrain as much as one would expect in light of the recent revitalization of 
interest in ideas and norms.  Accordingly, there is a dearth of comparative work on group 
strategies for politicizing and framing issues and the policy implications of these choices.  
In the analysis that follows, I take a step toward remedying this shortage.     
The chapter is divided into three main sections.  First, I briefly summarize the 
arguments presented in Chapter 1, which propose that CSOs’ predominant framing 
strategies affect their chances for policy participation.  Next, I support this claim with 
evidence drawn from each of the dissertation’s issue areas.  I conclude with a discussion 
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of the importance of researching civil societal actors’ inventive approaches to mobilizing 
ideas.  
THE ARGUMENT 
Framing is a key aspect of organizational efforts to disseminate understandings of 
issues and interpretations of reality, influence public discourse, and gain an audience 
among policy makers and the citizenry.
2
  My argument builds on the motivational, 
diagnostic, and prognostic aspects of framing (e.g., Benford and Snow 2000).  
Motivational framing offers a rationale for collective action and frequently conveys 
urgency, severity, and/or injustice; diagnostic framing identifies a problem and a locus of 
responsibility for the problem; and prognostic framing proposes a remedy.   
How do CSOs’ framing strategies affect the dependent variable?  I argue that 
effective frames contain positive messages, offer feasible solutions to problems, and de-
emphasize blame.  To begin with, activists are better positioned when they communicate 
a constructive and/or hopeful set of ideas — even if they are critical of existing practices 
and policies.  Alternatively, if they focus their energies on arguing against a position 
rather than crafting their own, policy makers may discount their views.  In addition, 
frames are more successful when they suggest a pragmatic remedy for a pressing 
problem, a realistic solution that elites can conceivably incorporate into policies and, 
down the road, implement.  Groups can couch these remedies in terms of a more 
ambitious set of reforms.  However, if they only call for major transformations that are 
                                                 
2
 As outlined in Chapter 1, framing is defined in the social movement literature as “strategic efforts” to 
fashion shared understandings that “legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy and 
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out of sync with the incremental nature of policy making, their demands will seem 
impractical.  Activists must persuade power holders that change is both possible and 
desirable (i.e., in keeping with their own political goals and agenda).  Lastly, CSOs are 
wise to exercise caution while attributing blame for problems.  After all, targeting 
powerful elites as culpable agents may create political enemies.   
When groups integrate these elements into their frames, they increase their 
likelihood of policy involvement during various phases.  Throughout the process, they 
usually have to defend their frames against the competing discourses of opposition forces 
seeking to influence elites and the public.  If they succeed in doing so, and if they use 
effective framing strategies, CSOs can create opportunities for participation.  In the next 
section, I provide evidence to support this claim.  Specifically, I analyze the framing 
strategies employed by CSOs working on transparency, children’s, and environmental 
issues, as well as the policy consequences of their choices. 
 
THE EVIDENCE  
Comparative evidence suggests that the theoretical arguments hold for all three 
issue areas and in both Argentina and Chile.  The main findings are summarized as 
follows:  transparency activists used effective or “policy-friendly” framing strategies; 
environmentalists enjoyed less success; and children’s advocates in the two countries had 
                                                                                                                                                 
Zald 1996, 6; see also Benford 1997; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow et al. 1986; 
Tarrow 1994).   
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mixed success.  For each case, I discuss the predominant approaches to framing and trace 




Advocating for freedom of information in Argentina  
The access to information campaign nicely illustrates the benefits of effective 
framing.  To a considerable extent, transparency advocates succeeded in persuading 
lawmakers that supporting the bill was a necessary step in the direction of overcoming 
Argentina’s political crisis of representation and restoring some semblance of credibility 
to political elites.  Instead of echoing civil society’s resounding cry to “throw the bums 
out,” proponents suggested ways in which those “bums” could do their part to strengthen 
democracy.    
With respect to the motivational aspects of framing, activists chose to emphasize 
the ongoing political crisis.  As outlined in Chapter 2, the country was experiencing 
unparalleled levels of disenchantment and disgust with the “political class.”
4
  In such an 
environment, members of NGOs could make a strong case for the salience of the 
transparency issue.
5
  The perception of rampant corruption was one of the main factors 
contributing to the outrage directed at elected officials and parties.  Corruption is a 
                                                 
3
 Although the framing strategies of CSOs engaged in a particular issue area often vary considerably, it is 
possible to discern framing patterns.  Focusing on dominant frames makes the scope of this chapter more 
manageable. 
4
 To illustrate, a Gallup Argentina poll conducted in 2002 revealed that the percentage of Argentines who 
still had faith in congress and political parties had plunged into the single digits (seven and eight percent, 
respectively) (La Nación, issue dated 8/6/02).  
5
 In fact, public discontent was fueling a variety of political reform movements besides the transparency 
initiative.  These movements have called for changes in electoral systems, the institutions of the legislative 
and judicial branches, and other reforms targeting multiple levels of government. 
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problem of broad concern to Argentines.  Survey data collected in the 1990s indicated 
that citizens consistently ranked corruption among the most worrisome problems 
plaguing society, including unemployment and poverty (March 2001).  In 2002, 
Transparency International reported that an extraordinary 93% of survey respondents 
concluded that corruption affected Argentine political life “very significantly;” 64% 
thought that it affected their personal and family lives “very significantly.”
6
  In a different 
survey conducted prior to the 2003 presidential elections, 17% of those polled hoped that 
corruption would be eliminated under Argentina’s new executive, while 20% wished that 
poverty and hunger would be eradicated.  It is striking that corruption would cause nearly 
as much alarm as poverty in a context of increasing deprivation.
7
  
Argentina’s recent political history has solidified such attitudes.  When the 
Alianza presidential candidate, De la Rúa, took office in 1999 after campaigning on an 
anticorruption platform, expectations for change were high.  The 2001 bribery scandal in 
the Senate and other questionable activities on the part of the country’s leadership dashed 
these hopes.  It seemed as though “the problem of legal unaccountability was not 
circumscribed to the Menem government but was a problem that affected all of political 
society” (Peruzzotti 2003, 15).  Stated briefly, vast segments of society have expressed 
their preoccupation with corruption.  Transparency activists were able to seize upon these 
popular sentiments by consistently noting the gravity of the political situation. 
                                                 
6
 The results of the survey are discussed in “The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer: 
A 2002 Pilot Survey of International Attitudes, Expectations and Priorities on Corruption,” available at 
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/barometer/dnld/barometer2003.en.pdf (Accessed 2/12/04). 
7 
Survey conducted by Graciela Römer and Associates and reported in Página 12, issue dated 3/19/03. 
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Moreover, proponents of freedom of information increased the salience of the 
issue by incorporating Argentina’s social and economic crisis into their framing.  
Advocates suggested that improved access to information meant increased awareness of 
public spending, existing social programs, and public facilities (such as hospitals).  
Discussing the categories of information that people required to meet their nutritional, 
health, and other basic needs further reinforced the importance of the issue.  It also 
underscored the fact that access to information could be a matter of life or death; it was 
not merely an abstract subject for legal scholars to debate.  
By calling attention to the persistent political and social crises and communicating 
their urgency and severity, civil societal actors largely succeeded in the motivational 
aspect of framing.  They sent a clear message that these problems deserved the attention 
of policy makers.  Nevertheless, several other elements besides this crisis-laden discourse 
account for the groups’ relative success.  To begin with, the organizations tried to 
persuade their audiences that meaningful reforms could emerge from the crisis, that this 
political cloud might have a silver lining.  Their frames contained two positive themes.  
First, the NGOs framed the legislation as an opportunity for policy makers to ameliorate 
the political crisis.  The second strategy, related to the first, was discursively linking the 
reform to building institutions and, more generally, to strengthening democracy.   
The groups presented officials in both the executive and legislative branches with 
an opportunity to do their part to rectify the situation.  They framed the reform as a 
chance for politicians to slow their dramatic descent in the polls and to improve their 
public image.  For example, to persuade lawmakers to support the bill, activists described 




  This rhetoric proved effective during the campaign to collect signatures of 
deputies who backed the legislation:  nearly two-thirds of the lower chamber endorsed 
the reform, and it eventually was passed.  Afterwards, a legislator trumpeted the law as a 
“very important mechanism of control … that will allow transparency to become an 
effective weapon against corruption.”
9
   
The NGOs’ constructive, “face-saving” approach contrasted dramatically with the 
popular slogan demanding the swift exit from power of all governing elites.  As 
mentioned at the outset of the chapter, que se vayan todos was the more ubiquitous 
message emanating from civil society during this period.  Nevertheless, criticisms of the 
que se vayan approach arose in numerous interviews with proponents of freedom of 
information.  A leader in Citizen Power, for instance, deemed it a “useless” message.
10
  In 
addition, the president of the Social Forum for Transparency emphasized the need for 
more “constructive” proposals and alternatives to the politics of negation.
11
  
The groups also shifted the locus of the discussion away from politicians and their 
foibles to political institutions.  In accordance with their missions, a number of NGOs 
viewed freedom of information as one of many desirable political reforms that would 
strengthen Argentina’s institutions and public administration.  I noted in Chapter 2 that 
                                                 
8
 Infocívica article dated 3/6/03 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03).  Similar language can be 
found in “Educación de los representantes y funcionarios públicos,” authored by the Center for the 
Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), Transparency Area.        
9
 Marcela Rodríguez, ARI (the Affirmation for an Egalitarian Republic Party), quoted in La Nación, issue 
dated 5/9/03.   
10
 Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. Some of the foundation’s literature suggests that 
occupying “public space” is not synonymous with protesting in the streets; there are more “constructive” 
ways in which citizens can become involved in political life (see its undated publication entitled, 
“Monitoreo Cívico del Consejo de la Magistratura”). 
11
 Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires. 
 118 
groups such as Citizen Power tend to emphasize the implications of these reforms for 
citizen participation and control.  Meanwhile, the Center for the Implementation of Public 
Policies Promoting Equity and Growth (CIPPEC), the Sophia Group Foundation, Innova, 
and other NGOs generally call for higher quality policies and more effective and 
transparent public administration at all levels of government.  Even though the 
organizations approach these themes from different angles, they coincide in the 
importance they assign to strong, well-functioning institutions.  Indeed, according to one 
group, “the most institutionally advanced countries” of the world have decent freedom of 
information laws; and if Argentina had one, its “institutional quality” would improve 
beyond a shadow of a doubt.
12
  The inclusion of these eminently constructive elements in 
their framing helped their cause. 
Activists also tied freedom of information to the positive message of 
strengthening Argentine democracy.  In publications, groups asserted that “to deny the 
right to information is to deny the right to democracy,” as mentioned earlier.
13
  Thus, a 
pro-democracy frame dominated their discursive strategies.
14
  The rationales that they 
have provided for the legislation penetrate to the very essence of democracy in both its 
representative and participatory forms.  Supporters argue that access to information is 
necessary for the functioning of representative democracy by facilitating the scrutiny and 
                                                 
12
 These remarks were made by members of ADEPA (Association of Entidades Periodísticas Argentinas), 
published in La Nación, issue dated 12/1/04.   
13
 Infocívica article dated 12/17/02, available at: http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03.      
14
 This discussion draws on various interviews and documents that argue in favor of the legislation.  See, 
for instance, Abramovich and Courtis (2000), FARN (2002 & 1997), and “Principios fundamentales para la 
promoción de leyes de acceso a la información,” by CELS, ADC, and the Inter-American Dialogue.  A 
succinct summary of such arguments is found in “Ley de Acceso a la Información:  Fundamentos del 
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control of government actions.  A member of the Civil Rights Association, for example, 
contends that without a mechanism that allows Argentines to know “what governing 
elites do in our name and with our resources,” real citizen control will never be 
achieved.
15
  Citizens require information to select and monitor the public servants to 
whom they delegate power.  How else can they know whether governing elites and 
bureaucrats are safeguarding their rights and fulfilling the obligations of the state?   
In addition to emphasizing the role of information in fostering accountability and 
responsive government, proponents of reform discuss more participatory elements of 
democratic practice.  Most consider the right to information as a prerequisite for effective 
citizen participation in public debates and decisions.  Freedom of information thus has 
important implications for the ability of citizens to make informed, reasoned judgments 
about community affairs.  Without the proverbial marketplace of ideas, public debate 
would be impoverished.
16
  Furthermore, the “semi-direct” democratic mechanisms 
included in Argentina’s constitution — public hearings, popular initiatives, and 
referenda, for example — are bereft of much meaning without access to information.   
In short, freedom of information is intimately tied to the fulfillment of other 
democratic and citizenship rights.  Supporters have emphasized these inter-connections in 
their frames.  The organizations have challenged policy makers with a straightforward 
question:  why have they failed to pass legislation when it is so fundamental for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Proyecto definitivo de Ley enviado al Congreso Nacional para su consideración,” available at: 
http://www.anticorrupcion.jus.gov.ar (Accessed 8/2/03).   
15
 Editorial authored by Alejandro Carrió and published in La Nación, issue dated 11/30/04.  He argues 
further that all countries truly committed to “republican” ideals have such a law. 
16
 “Ley de Acceso a la Información:  Fundamentos del Proyecto definitivo de Ley enviado al Congreso 




  Or, as one NGO leader put it, “Two decades after the 
democratic transition, and still no law.”
18 
 
 The groups’ dissemination of positive, constructive themes has relevance for a 
further aspect of framing:  the blame game.  The NGOs framed the initiative as an 
opportunity for policy makers to improve their image and to strengthen institutions and 
democracy.  They therefore avoided some of the dangers associated with the attribution 
of blame.  To be sure, the NGOs were critical of how Argentine political elites had 
comported themselves and cited the ongoing political crisis as grounds for reform.  
However, instead of emphasizing the corruption or ineptitude of government officials, 
they called for institutional renewal.  In doing so, the advocates refrained from alienating 
vast numbers of the policy-making elite.  Additionally, because the organizations’ frames 
did not revolve around the issue of culpability, they could channel more energy into the 
elements of framing discussed above.   
 Moreover, with respect to prognostic framing, the NGOs offered a feasible 
remedy in response to corruption and other political ills.  They asked policy makers to 
pass legislation, a task that elites were capable of performing.  In spite of the apparent 
enormity of the corruption problem, activists suggested that change was possible.  This 
framing strategy tends to bode well for participation in the policy process.  A further 
advantage enjoyed by proponents of reform was the absence of major “counter framing” 
in response to their discourse.  Although some interests likely opposed stronger 
transparency norms, I did not uncover evidence of an active effort to disseminate 
                                                 
17
 This question was raised during a December 2002 conference organized by CELS, ADC, and 




  Thus, the groups did not have to spend precious time combating 
counter frames.  In other cases of policy making, CSOs have not been so fortunate. 
 Finally, this case provides evidence that the perceived credibility of the groups 
articulating frames is important, as noted in Chapter 1.  Many of the NGOs involved in 
the campaign have established credentials as monitors of the state, political institutions, 
and/or power holders.  Several groups are experienced in the areas of legal advocacy, the 
defense of citizenship rights, and citizen participation in (and control of) public affairs.  
Their expertise suggests that they “know of what they speak” and can support their ideas 
with analysis and factual data.  Additionally, other civil societal actors and the public 
have recognized and validated the NGOs’ work.  Solid reputations have boosted their 
efforts to persuade governing elites and reach a wider audience.
20
 
In summary, the CSOs’ framing strategies were effective.  They successfully 
made a case for the overall importance of the transparency issue by calling attention to 
Argentina’s severe political and social crises and the widespread concern over corruption.  
In this way, they not only motivated their own memberships but also attracted the 
attention of policy makers and the citizenry.  More importantly, the groups integrated a 
number of constructive and positive messages into their frames.  To begin with, they 
framed freedom of information in a way that presented elites with an opportunity to 
address — or redress — the crisis.   Executive and legislative officials could “do the right 
                                                                                                                                                 
18
 Interview in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. 
19
 For instance, Argentina’s intelligence and security forces tend to guard their secrecy.  It is likely that the 
law will encounter some resistance from these quarters. 
20
 Moreover, the groups’ media and political connections enhanced their ability to disseminate their frames 
and gain the attention of both elites and the public.  In Chapter 4, I discuss these and other organizational 
resources and how groups mobilize them in alliances.  
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thing” by approving the reform.  Their framing strategies also underscored the need for 
more robust political institutions.  The NGOs cast freedom of information as a tool that 
would strengthen the representative and participatory forms of democracy enshrined in 
the constitution.  Activists linked transparency, citizen control and participation, 
democratic consolidation, and other positive themes, suggesting that these “good things 
go together.”  The emphasis on political and institutional renewal conveyed a sense of 
hope in a context characterized by widespread anger and disgust with the political 
system. 
The groups made further choices that proved advantageous.  First, they offered a 
feasible, tangible solution to pressing political problems.  Passing a law was within the 
power of legislative and executive branch actors, and the activists made the reform seem 
long overdue. Their frames also avoided the pitfalls of assigning blame, including 
alienating or threatening the policy-making establishment.  This caution should not be 
interpreted as an entirely conciliatory approach, however.  The organizations did not 
hesitate to criticize politicians or use provocative rhetoric.  For instance, one pro-reform 
document circulated among civil societal actors chastised elites for refusing to cease their 
“immoral practices” and for closing ranks to “defend their privileges.”
21
  Moreover, 
representatives of key NGOs expressed dismay when Duhalde failed to include the bill 
on the legislative agenda and criticized the president for turning his back on “legitimate 
                                                 
21
 The source of these sentiments is a document entitled the “May Laws,” which the Social Forum for 




  Still, for the most part, the activists packaged their ideas in ways 
that were palatable to elites.   
The case lends support to the theoretical arguments developed earlier.  The 
NGOs’ framing strategies had important consequences for their involvement in policy.  
They also made progress toward persuading legislators and executive branch officials to 
support and approve the reform.  The manner in which they politicized the transparency 
issue was captivating but also accorded well with the realities of policy making.   
 
Children’s advocacy in Argentina  
Children’s advocates in Argentina have experienced more mixed success with 
framing.  Some of their framing choices have been effective, while others have been less 
policy-friendly.  On the one hand, CSOs have succeeded in politicizing and calling 
attention to children’s issues and rights; they have made a compelling case for the 
importance of this policy domain and the consequences of neglecting it.  On the other 
hand, certain aspects of their frames — for instance, the explicit critiques of the 
prevailing social and political order — are ill suited to the policy process.  Each of these 




Motivational framing is the strong suit of many groups active in children’s issues.  
There are a number of reasons for this strength.  First, the human rights discourse enjoys 
                                                 
22
 Infocívica article dated 12/17/02 (http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03).      
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a great deal of prominence within Argentina.  Awareness that children are rights-bearing 
individuals has risen steadily since the early 1990s.  Children’s advocates — especially 
those who support this rights-based perspective — benefit from past human rights 
activism and the continuing resonance of these ideas.
24
  They draw on the existing 
discourse for their own frames.  Second, advocates are able to appeal to cultural values 
that transcend political, ideological, class, and other differences.  In general terms, most 
people accept children’s issues as a worthy cause.   
Third, the CSOs link the well-being of children to broader social themes of 
undeniable importance, including poverty.  In contemporary Argentina, children are 
abandoning school, working, and even dying as a consequence of the social crisis.  
Although these problems are hardly of recent origin, their sheer magnitude suggests that 
government officials and the public can no longer look the other way.  The salience of 
this issue area is almost beyond question.  Children are an exceptionally vulnerable 
segment of the population in the context of increasing unemployment and pauperization.  
To illustrate, an estimated two-thirds of Argentine children — more than 8,319,000 
individuals — were living in poverty by June 2002 (Fundación SES 2002).  In the 
country’s northernmost provinces, the proportion was calculated to be as high as 80%.
25 
 
Reported cases of abuse increased, along with numbers of children whose basic health 
                                                                                                                                                 
23
 Although CSOs working on children’s issues are relatively diverse, as noted in Chapter 2, it is possible to 
discern and evaluate the more dominant approaches to framing.  
24
 I develop this point further in Chapter 5.  CSOs that specialize in children’s rights do not merely benefit 
from the salience of human rights but also work to raise awareness of how these rights apply to young 
people.   
25
 These include the provinces of Chaco, Formosa, Jujuy, Salta, and Santiago del Estero.  The source of this 
estimate is CELS.   
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and nutritional needs were not being met.
26
  Instances of infant mortality also rose.  Other 
worrisome trends included declining school retention and growing numbers of children 
working in the informal sector.  A national task force on child labor estimated that some 
1,500,000 youngsters were working in 2003, and 75% were between six and twelve years 
of age.
27
  The sight of children selling items, washing car windshields, and collecting 
garbage became commonplace.  Concurrently, greater numbers of teenagers and young 
people — over 1,145,000 nationwide — were neither attending school nor working.  
They were simply “inactive” (Fundación SES 2002).
28
  
In an environment such as this, it is not surprising that children’s advocates have 
connected the welfare of children and families to social and economic issues.  By opting 
for this strategy, they gain the ear of policy makers, as well as a broader public audience.  
It becomes less politically feasible to undermine their frames, which convey a sense of 
urgency, severity, and propriety shared widely across Argentina.  Dismissing their 
concerns as exaggerated is no longer an option.  Calling attention to existing social 
conditions and their consequences for young people is therefore an effective way to 
galvanize decision makers and fellow citizens.   
Nevertheless, Argentines differ in their interpretations of (and proposed remedies 
for) these problems.  For example, when faced with increasing school dropout rates, some 
                                                 
26
 La Nación, issue dated 3/14/03.  Gaudin (2002) notes that increasing malnutrition accompanied the crisis 
in spite of Argentina’s status as a global leader in the production of food, a large percentage of which is 
exported.   
27
 Clarín, issue dated 4/7/03.  It is further estimated that 70% of these working children were collecting 
garbage.  Meanwhile, the school dropout rate rose to approximately 20%, compared to an average rate of 
6% over the past two decades (Gaudin 2002).  Teenagers were abandoning school for economic reasons at 
a rate of about 48% in urban areas according to UNICEF (Gaudin 2002). 
28
 The Fundación SES (2002) study targets the 15-24 age bracket. 
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observers view the affected children as victims deprived of their right to an education.  
Others associate greater numbers of uneducated and/or “inactive” youth with crime, 
delinquency, and decreasing personal safety.  Although the implications of children 
abandoning school may alarm both sets of individuals equally, they have divergent 
understandings of the problem and are predisposed to contrasting frames.  One NGO 
member explains that he would prefer to convince policy makers to address such issues 
by using a children’s rights discourse, but it is sometimes necessary to use “cruder 
language” — alluding to the consequences for law and order — to get them to appreciate 
the extent of the crisis.
29
  These considerations complicate children’s issues and the 
framing process.  Thus, referencing the social crisis by itself is insufficient as a discursive 
or persuasive strategy. 
Compared to the proponents of transparency, children’s advocates have a 
different approach to diagnostic and prognostic framing.  The more vociferous CSOs 
criticize and condemn government practices.  They have not often integrated constructive 
messages into their frames:  rather than look for a silver lining in the dark clouds of crisis, 
groups tend to convey just how gray a shadow these clouds cast over Argentine youth.  
Instead of suggesting a series of “good things” that go together (such as transparency, 
strong institutions, and democracy), activists offer a sequence of negative associations 
linking children’s problems to questionable institutions and policies.  Furthermore, they 
tend to frame problems affecting young people as structural and systemic. 
                                                 
29
 Interview in SES Foundation, Educational Policy Area, 3/12/03, Buenos Aires. 
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To begin with, when diagnosing the problems that afflict children, members of 
CSOs frequently discuss neoliberal reforms.
30
  Indeed, many of their discursive strategies 
rest on the assumption that the neoliberal model, poverty, and the regrettable state of the 
nation’s children are interconnected.  Those motivated by rights-based perspectives note 
the precariousness of social and economic rights (to work, housing, health, and 
education) in the wake of structural adjustment, social spending cuts, and growing 
unemployment.  According to this approach, structural factors go a long way toward 
explaining the plight of children.   
Advocates also trace numerous ills to national state institutions.  They underscore 
several aspects of the country’s criminal justice and legal systems that conspire against 
the rights and well-being of children.  One observer laments the “tragic” combination of 
antiquated laws and strong administrative capacity:  the government is effective at “doing 
what should not be done” to children, whereas provincial governments have more 
satisfactory laws but lack the resources to implement them.
31
  Groups emphasize that 
penal codes created during the dictatorship remain in effect today, and Argentina lags 
behind other Latin American countries in terms of granting rights to children accused of a 
crime (e.g., the right to legal defense).  Additionally, the framework “protecting” children 
“at risk,” which dates to 1919, is based on the doctrine of the “irregular situation.”
32
  The 
doctrine applies equally to children who have been mistreated and those who have 
committed offenses.  Judges who deem children to be at “moral or material risk” (defined 
                                                 
30
 Neoliberal reforms have included privatization, deregulation, welfare reform, trade liberalization, labor 
market “flexibilization,” and other changes, depending on the country and time period under study.  
31
 Interview in UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires.   
32
 I refer here to the Ley de Patronato de Menores. 
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vaguely) remove them from their families and place them in institutions.  Because the 
system “does not distinguish between those who have committed a crime and those who 
have been victims of one,” an abandoned, neglected, or abused child may end up in 
facilities similar to juvenile detention centers.  Critics charge that this approach is 
supported by a paternalistic view of children as the “property of their parents” — 




These wards of the state enter institutions that activists and other observers 
criticize as outmoded and antithetical to child development.  The exact number of 
institutionalized children is unknown, and living conditions obviously vary from place to 
place.  However, children’s advocates voice concerns over ill-treatment, overcrowding, 
and the lack of educational opportunities and privacy in many facilities (CELS n.d).  In 
multiple interviews, activists described the institutions in unequivocal terms as 
“prisons.”
34
  Members of CSOs often implicate the National Council of Childhood, 
Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF) in their critiques, because the agency oversees 
the system.
35
  In light of this model, group members have arrived at a number of negative 
conclusions.  Foremost among these is that “the state doesn’t care about the rights of 
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 “Legislación Penal Juvenil: Las trampas del discurso,” by Marta Pesenti, the Children’s Rights 
Association (ADI), available at: http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org (Accessed 5/9/04). 
34
 I am keeping the organizational affiliations of the individuals quoted here anonymous. They also point 
out that children remain in the system for as long as the authorities see fit. 
35
 Some facilities are state-run, while others are community organizations subsidized by the state.  
Accusations of corruption and clientelism have plagued CONAF and led to the removal of the agency’s 
director in the late 1990s (Bombal and Garay 2000).  The agency purportedly implements programs to 
promote children’s rights; however, while conducting research, I was unable to find evidence that such 




  CSOs — particularly those that adhere to the Convention — regard existing 
policies and practices as anathema to human rights norms.  An activist familiar with the 
system laments that “children are just a number.”
37
   Children’s advocates also conclude 
that the system is, in a word, “perverse.”
38
  Activists frame institutions as harming 
children, and the need to transform them is implicit in their critique.
39
  We observe less 
discursive signaling to elites that legislation is an “opportunity” to improve or strengthen 
institutions.  The groups’ framing strategies thus differ from the ones used by supporters 
of transparency.   
The “criminalization of poverty” discourse is an additional frame that children’s 
CSOs use.  This discourse, which has become increasingly common, knits together both 
the structural and institutional threads discussed above.
40
  In essence, advocates point to 
the inclusion of economically disadvantaged children in the category of youth at risk and 
the system’s failure to differentiate between those children and the ones in breach of the 
law.  Activists further sharpen their critique by connecting a perceived increase in 
“punitive policies” to neoliberalism — specifically, the state’s reduced role in economic 
and social matters and the mal-distribution of wealth.  Poverty is criminalized when 
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 I have kept the organizational affiliation of the person quoted here anonymous. 
37
 Interview in the Emmanuel Foundation, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires.  The same individual warns that once you 
enter the bureaucratic maze, “you’ll never find your way out.” 
38
 The source for this characterization is a document dated April 2002, authored by members of FADO, a 
group of community organizations dedicated to children at risk. 
39
 CSOs also draw attention to other ways in which the state harms young people.  For instance, CELS 
notes that teenagers and young adults are often victims of police brutality and excessive force.   
40
 This section draws primarily on the following sources: Interviews in ADI, 4/4/03, Collective of NGOs 
for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, and Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires.  Further sources 
include the non-governmental reports for the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (e.g., 
“Informe de organizaciones no gubernamentales argentinas sobre la aplicación de la Convención Sobre 
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power holders leave the causes of “social exclusion” intact while using the penal system 
to maintain the status quo.  Advocates take issue with a longstanding vision of children, 
reinforced by contemporary neoliberalism, as a “social menace” that “can only be 
controlled through punitive intervention rather than social policies” that are sensitive to 
child development.
41
  In the words of an NGO leader, questions that “should be addressed 
in the sphere of social policy are instead decided in the penal system.”
42
  
 The groups thus interpret social exclusion and punitive policies as 
“complementary” elements of a system and advance other structural critiques.  Although 
this approach provides a fairly sophisticated diagnosis of the problems affecting children, 
it poses some dilemmas with respect to prognostic framing.  In addition to falling short of 
offering viable solutions, it implies that real change would necessitate an overhaul of 
existing institutions and non-trivial adjustments to economic policies.  As argued 
previously, such a framing strategy is less amenable to the policy process.     
On the other hand, like the NGOs supporting freedom of information, children’s 
groups generally have welcomed legislation as a vehicle for change.  Passing a child 
protection law is a realistic response for CSOs to expect of governing elites.  Still, such 
reforms may require significant state intervention and expenditure, complicating policy 
making.  Moreover, some CSOs insist that bills contain provisions for institutional 
transformation.  For instance, members of the Committee for the Monitoring and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Derechos del Niño,” authored in 2002 by the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents) and 
documents published on ADI’s website (http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org). 
41
 Page 5, “Informe de organizaciones no gubernamentales argentinas sobre la aplicación de la Convención 
Sobre Derechos del Niño,” authored in 2002 by the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents.  For 
similar points, see “Régimen penal para menores,” an Infocívica article dated 4/27/04 
(http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/9/04), and “Los informes presentados al Comité de los Derechos 
del Niño de Naciones Unidas,” (http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org.  Accessed 5/1/03). 
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Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN) 
have called for a “new normative institutionality” and a “profound redesign of the state 
entities” involved in children’s issues (namely, CONAF).
43
   
Children’s advocates also reap the consequences of assigning blame as part of 
their framing strategies.  They risk threatening powerful actors, including proponents of 
neoliberal policies and authorities in both the judicial branch and CONAF.  Activists 
often call attention to the power of judges, who exercise considerable authority and 
discretion over the fate of children at risk.
44
  They also tend to identify CONAF officials 
as a vested interest and/or potential obstacle to reform.  Some argue that the agency seeks 
to maintain its own hegemony in children’s affairs and will likely resist the 
decentralization and democratization of policy making in this domain.
45
  All of these 




In fact, some opposition forces have introduced counter frames.  For example, the 
use of a youth-as-delinquents frame emphasizing crime and chaos has intensified in 
recent years.  As mentioned earlier, the delinquency frame is a predictable consequence 
                                                                                                                                                 
42
 Interview in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires. 
43
 ANSA, issue dated November 2003 (Año 5, no. 60). 
44
 Several advocates describe judges as “too powerful” because they interpret the meaning of this imprecise 
category.   
45
 According to activists, decentralization and democratization would ensure the participation of provincial 
authorities and civil societal actors in decision making (Interviews in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, and Collective 
of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires). 
46
 Such resistance can be active or passive.  For instance, activists commonly encounter “passive 
resistance” or the failure to effect change; meanwhile, opponents of reform have actively blocked the 
implementation of a law recently approved in the Province of Buenos Aires (Interview in ADI, 4/4/03, 
Buenos Aires). 
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of the deepening social crisis in Argentina and growing concerns over safety.
47
  It 
undermines the discourse on children’s rights and slows the progress toward 
comprehensive policies to protect young people.  The CSOs therefore are forced to 
expend some effort defending their frames against this competing rhetoric, especially if 
they wish to stay involved in policy.
48
  
In summary, this case provides evidence of both adroit and ineffectual framing.  
Children’s advocates have succeeded in drawing the attention of policy makers and the 
public to the plight of children.  They have made a compelling case for the importance of 
this issue area by attending to the motivational tasks of framing.  Their frames effectively 
communicate the severity and urgency of the problems afflicting young people.  They 
also suggest that society and the state have a moral obligation to tackle these problems.   
The CSOs offer persuasive critiques of existing practices.  Nevertheless, their 
emphasis on structural and systemic factors — perverse institutions, the “criminalization 
of poverty,” and the purported effects of neoliberalism — complicates their involvement 
in policy.  Identifying these as the main forces harming children is key to diagnostic 
framing but problematic for prognostic framing.  The frames do not emphasize feasible, 
workable solutions to problems, nor do they contain the positive elements observed in the 
transparency frames.  For instance, although civil societal actors seek the transformation 
of extant institutions and policies, they rarely make institutional “strengthening” a 
centerpiece of their frames.  
                                                 
47
 Maclure and Sotelo identify similar tendencies within Nicaragua, where “many people question the value 
of assisting youth who are deemed to be hooligans” (2004, 98). 
48
 Fortunately, a number of CSOs working on children’s issues enjoy credibility and social recognition, 
which boost their status as “carriers” of ideas. 
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Furthermore, the advocates face opposition in the form of counter frames, or 
alternative approaches to politicizing children’s issues.  Some also engage in the politics 
of blame and risk alienating powerful elites.  These framing strategies collide to some 
extent with the policy-making process and the “powers that be.”  Their mixed success 
with framing helps explain their intermediate levels of policy involvement. 
 
Children’s advocacy in Chile 
I suggested earlier that the nature of an issue (or issue area) rarely suffices as an 
explanation of the variation in policy involvement.  It is instead more fruitful to perform a 
comparative analysis of the strategies groups use to frame a given issue.   Investigating 
children’s advocacy in both Argentina and Chile affords us this opportunity.   
The majority of the Chilean CSOs contrast markedly with the Argentine groups in 
their approach to framing.  Many have made framing choices that are nearly the reverse 
of the strategies discussed above.  On the one hand, their frames frequently entail 
constructive messages and feasible remedies to problems; in addition, structural or 
systemic critiques are unusual.  Consequently, these discursive choices are less 
threatening to government officials and better suited to the policy process.  On the other 
hand, the organizations’ rhetoric tends to be somewhat muted and cautious.  CSOs have 
yet to introduce a set of captivating, compelling ideas that perform the motivational task 
of framing.  Notwithstanding these differences, their overall record of success, like that of 
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their Argentine colleagues, is mixed.
49
  This performance is reflected in their middling 
levels of participation in the executive branch policy designed to protect children. 
The groups’ motivational framing tends toward the conventional, which 
differentiates them from the Argentine CSOs.  First of all, unlike Argentina, Chile has not 
recently endured an economic and social crisis.  Because similarly high levels of moral 
outrage over the welfare of the nation’s children do not exist within Chile, groups cannot 
leverage this indignation in their framing.  Although the severity and urgency of Chile’s 
social problems do not parallel the emergency situation in Argentina, CSOs nevertheless 
have emphasized social issues in their attempts to galvanize decision makers and the 
public.  Like their Argentine counterparts, children’s advocates have drawn connections 
between poverty and threats to the well-being of youth.  Because people aged fourteen 
and under comprise approximately 39% of the total population living in poverty, groups 
tend to view children as a vulnerable segment of society in need of attention.
50 
  
This emphasis on poverty has contradictory effects.  It is effective in that poverty 
alleviation is already a salient theme in Chile.  In fact, reducing poverty has been a 
leading preoccupation of the Lagos Administration and a predominant discourse shared 
by both governmental and civil societal actors.  Combating poverty has become a sort of 
joint enterprise between both spheres, an area of policy collaboration and co-
administration.  Many groups involved in children’s issues contribute to the 
implementation of these policies in fulfillment of their missions to help families meet 
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 Children’s advocates in Chile do not share a single vision of the issue area (Interview in Children and 
Youth Area, Vicariate of the Social Pastoral, 11/4/02, Santiago).  Nevertheless, we can discuss the frames 




  These cooperative activities and the existence of a shared discourse 
between governmental and non-governmental actors signify that the poverty alleviation 
discourse is amenable to the policy process and acceptable to most elites.   
At the same time, however, CSOs have less “ownership” of this frame.  The 
poverty alleviation discourse emanates from government offices and multilateral banks as 
well as from the third sector.  After all, the Inter-American Development Bank has 
declared that “investing” in children is investing in a “better future” for countries in the 
region.
52
  Groups thus lose some authority as the originators — or main articulators — of 
ideas linking the problems affecting children to poverty.  Their message becomes 
somewhat diluted as it joins mainstream ideational currents.  Moreover, because the 
government discursively signals its concern with the well-being of children, the CSOs are 
less able to politicize the issue by arguing that leaders lack such concern.      
The CSOs’ diagnostic and prognostic framing strategies also differ substantially 
from the tactics used in Argentina.  For instance, they seldom connect the welfare of 
children to structural and institutional factors.  Interestingly, UNICEF has published 
critiques of the Chilean system that mirror those articulated by CSOs in Argentina.  
Experts argue, for example, that the framework for dealing with children at risk fails to 
distinguish between juvenile offenders and victims of poverty or abandonment.  Young 
                                                                                                                                                 
50
 The source of this figure is the 2000 Casen Survey.  UNICEF estimates that 29% of minors under the age 
of 18 live in poverty and 8.5% are indigent (ANSA, issue dated May 2004, Año 6, no. 63). 
51
 The Planning and Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN) is one example of the executive branch agencies 
that promote such cooperation.  Chilean CSOs of varying types receive substantial amounts of public 
funding to implement anti-poverty policies (Interview in the Division of Social Organizations (DOS), 
Citizen Participation and Public Policy Area, 10/9/02, Santiago). 
52
  See, for instance, “Políticas de Infancia y Adolescencia: La Experiencia del Proame (1996-2000),” a 
2000 publication that the IDB co-authored with Argentina’s Social Development Ministry.  Poverty 
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people are institutionalized and removed from their families and communities, with grave 
implications for their integration into society.  The familiar theme, the “criminalization of 
poverty,” thus emerges in these reports.
53
   
However, Chilean CSOs generally have not embraced this discourse.  Rather than 
promote a frame emphasizing the harm that such forces inflict on young people, groups 
sometimes disseminate pro-family messages.  The basic idea underlying this rhetoric is 
that families are the fundamental social unit responsible for child development.  Although 
the state shares in some of the responsibility, families bear the brunt and must therefore 
be strengthened.
54
  To illustrate, the Rodelillo Foundation helps impoverished families 
resolve conflicts, become educated, join the labor force, and obtain housing.  For this 
organization and others like it, “the family comes first.”
55
  The strengthening of the 
family is a positive frame on a variety of levels.  It conveys a message that is 
constructive, hopeful, and consistent with cherished values. 
This strategy clearly differs from tracing the hardships suffered by Chilean youth 
to a series of “perverse” state institutions, practices, and/or social and economic policies.  
On the contrary, pro-family framing is compatible with an individualistic or “privatized” 
approach to social problems and poverty, an increasingly common perspective in 
contemporary Chile.  One can view any number of problems affecting children and 
                                                                                                                                                 
alleviation is a component of the second generation of neoliberal reforms and a prominent goal of the 
international financial institutions and broader development community. 
53
 ANSA, issue dated May 2004 (Año 6, no. 63); “Infancia: Documento de Trabajo” no. 3 (November 
2003).  The penal codes governing juvenile crime, like those in Argentina, are quite old, dating to 1928. 
54
 Of course, a variety of Argentine CSOs active in children’s issues also operate under the assumption that 
the family is fundamentally important.  Nevertheless, the family strengthening discourse has not 
predominated. 
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teenagers — abuse, neglect, poor health and education, for instance — through an 
individualistic or familial lens.  This tendency is reflected in the concern among activists 
with high levels of domestic abuse and mistreatment of children.  According to UNICEF 
estimates, three of every four children is the victim of some form of physical or 
psychological abuse.
56
  CSOs also draw attention to child pornography, pedophilia, and 
the sexual exploitation of youth, viewed largely as private-sphere practices.
57
    
Thus, for a number of reasons, the groups’ framing choices are digestible to 
policy makers. The pro-family and poverty alleviation frames also suggest feasible 
remedies to pressing problems; governing elites can redress some of the most worrisome 
problems facing children by helping families in need and reducing overall poverty levels.  
Neither approach necessarily entails any deviation from the current neoliberal model of 
development.  In fact, similar logic already informs a number of government programs, 
including “Solidary Chile,” which targets the very poorest families for assistance.
58
   
 A further advantage of the CSOs’ framing is their approach to assigning blame.  
Unlike some of the Argentine groups, Chilean organizations have not emphasized 
culpability in their frames.  They tend to keep the targets of blame general or vague.  
                                                                                                                                                 
55 
Over the past decade, the Rodelillo Foundation has collaborated with national government agencies and 
municipalities. 
56
 See the 2000 UNICEF study cited in the online news service located at:  
http://www.sociedadcivil.cl/nuevodiario/default.asp (Accessed 6/10/04).  A 1994 study found that about 
63% of surveyed children had suffered some form of physical abuse at the hand of their parents.  See the 
data available on Paicabi’s website, located at:  http://www.paicabi.cl. (Accessed 6/10/04). 
57
 In 2004, the issue of pedophilia was squarely on the formal agenda following the discovery of a 
pedophilia ring.  The Concertación government passed new legislation designed to protect children from 
sexual exploitation. 
58
 Chile Solidario combats extreme poverty and provides families with monetary assistance and preferential 
access to other social programs.  The government planned to extend benefits to some 225,000 families 
during 2002-2005 (La Nación, issue dated 10/9/02).  Chileans living in conditions of extreme poverty 
comprise approximately 5.7% of the population (Casen Survey 2000).   
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While Argentine advocates charge that the authorities who operate facilities for children 
at risk — and judges who place minors in such institutions in the first place — mistreat 
young people, Chilean activists cite high instances of abuse within private households.  
Moreover, rather than contend that neoliberal policies harm children, CSOs are more 
likely to suggest that poverty harms children.  From the perspective of policy makers and 
other power holders, these discursive choices are less threatening and confrontational.  
However, it is not the case that CSOs always refrain from criticizing existing 
government institutions and policies.  In fact, a number of groups describe extant laws as 
contradictory and faulty, and few activists believe that the state lives up to its 
responsibility of guaranteeing children’s rights, as noted in Chapter 2.  Nevertheless, 
compared to the Argentine groups, children’s advocates in Chile have not emphasized 
these aspects in their framing as vigorously.  It bears reiteration that the primary concern 
of this chapter is not the ideas that reside in people’s hearts and minds, but their strategies 
for articulating ideas. 
 It also should be noted that Chilean activists, like Argentine advocates, must 
contend with incipient counter frames that equate youth with delinquency.  The media 
and certain political figures, for instance, have drawn attention to this theme in spite of 
the fact that only about ten percent of the suspects apprehended by the police are 
minors.
59
  Members of CSOs consequently express their unease with the “stigmatization” 
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 This figure, provided by the Chilean police, is reported in a UNICEF publication entitled, “Infancia: 




  Still, at present, the delinquency rhetoric does not appear to be a 
strong counter frame actively undermining the groups’ conceptions of children’s rights 
and needs.
61
    
Children’s advocates in Chile have used frames that differ starkly from the 
strategies observed in Argentina.  These differences highlight the varying ways in which 
civil societal actors can use their powers of persuasion within a given policy domain.  In 
their approach to diagnostic and prognostic framing, Chilean CSOs have addressed social 
issues by emphasizing poverty alleviation and strengthening the family.  Rhetoric that 
identifies structural and institutional factors (such as the legal and penal systems and/or 
the neoliberal model) as the main forces harming children is not as common as 
individualistic or familial discourses.  The pro-family frame offers positive imagery, a 
constructive message, and workable solutions to problems of widespread concern.  In 
general terms, the groups’ frames can be described as policy-friendly.  
The motivational aspects of the frames also are at variance with those found in 
Argentina.  Clearly, CSOs defending children in Chile face an altogether different social 
and political context.  Accordingly, they cannot tap into the kind of moral outrage over 
the condition of young people that one detects within Argentina.  Moreover, their 
discourse does not contrast dramatically with broadly accepted ideas linking the well-
being of children to the reduction of poverty.  Some of the groups’ rhetorical strategies 
overlap with those of other civil societal actors and government officials.     
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 INFOACNHU, issue dated April 2004 (Año 2, no.5).  In fact, experts within both Argentina and Chile are 
trying to collect more accurate data on the numbers of young delinquents to counter “alarmist” 
interpretations of the problem (ANSA, issue dated November 2003, Año 5, no. 60). 
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I have argued that the combination of these elements amounts to mixed success 
with framing, which helps explain the middling levels of policy involvement and 
influence in this case.  While the CSOs’ frames are generally amenable to both policy 
makers and the policy process, they also are fairly cautious.  Groups have yet to stimulate 
broader public interest in the well-being of children through the politicization of this 
issue.  It may be the case that CSOs must incorporate more forceful messages into their 
frames to rally the public and fellow civil societal actors to their cause.  This motivational 
work would put sufficient wind in their sails to increase their chances of participating in 
the adoption and agenda-setting phases of policy instead of playing a role primarily 
during the formulation stage. 
 
Environmental advocacy in Chile  
I already have suggested that environmentalism is a vastly more complicated and 
contentious policy domain than one might expect.  In Chile, one person’s environmental 
“calamity” is another’s economic “miracle.”  The Bío Bío River dam project lays bare 
this controversy.  In addition to analyzing this final case of policy making, I draw on 
other cases to demonstrate the challenges that CSOs face while devising frames in the 
environmental issue area.  Compared to the groups discussed above, the green NGOs’ 
success with framing has been limited.  Activists tend to emphasize institutional and 
structural factors, including the state’s architecture for environmental policy making and 
the neoliberal development model, which they depict as a destructive force.  Moreover, 
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 The discourse could gain ground if personal safety concerns increase, though the CSOs’ reputations as 
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their frames rarely contain positive messages or feasible solutions to problems.  These 
strategies have affected their capacity to influence decision making. 
 Studies of environmental movements in other parts of the world note several 
frames that activists often employ.  These include endangerment, calamity, loss — the 
disappearance of nature and culture — and injustice (Taylor 2000).
62
  Chilean groups 
have used similar rhetoric.  Their critiques of the current development model touch on 
each of these themes, which they interpret as the environmental sacrifices made in 
exchange for economic growth.  Although the NGOs vary in terms of their 
conservationist, environmentalist, ecological, and technical-professional orientations, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, they mostly coincide in this point. 
Green NGOs encounter some difficulties with respect to the motivational task of 
framing.  Unlike children’s advocates and supporters of increased transparency in 
Argentina, Chilean environmental activists cannot incorporate the language of “crisis” 
into their framing in as straightforward a manner.  Even though an array of environmental 
problems, such as smog and pollution, affect countless people, it is difficult to motivate 
the public and policy-making elite with a crisis discourse.  Whereas the gravity of 
Argentina’s social and political crises was undeniable, plenty of Chileans deny that 
anything approaching an environmental crisis is occurring in their country.  Indeed, some 
                                                                                                                                                 
credible sources of information would help them combat such tendencies.   
62 
Activists often emphasize environmental catastrophes, degradation, and hazards to humans and other 
species.  The environmental justice movement, which has gained ground in the United States in recent 
decades, focuses on the disproportionate effects of environmental problems on minorities and the 
economically disadvantaged.  
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As regards diagnostic and prognostic framing, the groups resort to several 
strategies, most of which convey negative messages.  To begin with, they tend to depict 
Chile’s model of development as a destructive force.  Deregulation, privatization, foreign 
direct investment, and exports are the most criticized aspects of “the model.”  All are 
thought to privilege the exploitation of natural resources and conspire against sustainable 
development.  Activists commonly identify environmental pillage as the main source of 
the country’s economic growth.  They assert that Chile’s integration into the global 
economy is driven by its natural resource base (e.g., minerals, forests, seafood, fruits and 
vegetables), and the environmental consequences of this export-oriented model are 
significant.  An estimated 80% of exported goods are natural resources, some of which 
remain unprocessed; the forestry, mining, and fishing industries alone account for 70% of 
these exports.
64
  Moreover, a report authored in Terram poses the following question:  if 
development projects generate unemployment, inequality, and environmental risk in the 
regions they are supposed to benefit, how can this pattern be construed as “development” 
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 This denial prompted the head of the Ecology Institute of Chile to compare the typical government 
official to an ostrich burying its head (La Tercera, issue dated 6/19/94). 
64
 The sources of these figures are position papers authored in Terram, including reports written by 
economist Marcel Claude, its former director (“Gestión Ambiental del Gobierno: Balance de una Década y 
su Proyección a Cuatro Años,” “Política Ambiental de Chile;” see also Claude 1999).  Members of Terram 
also estimate that copper production tripled during the past decade, and the native forest diminished by two 
million hectares from 1985-96 (Interview in Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago).  Moreover, by the mid-1990s, 
seafood exports had risen to account for 12% of Chilean export earnings; by 2001, farmed salmon and trout 
exports accounted for over 5% of these earnings (Schurman 2003).  Environmental consequences include 
over-fished waters and risks associated with salmon aquaculture (e.g., organic pollution and infectious 
diseases), which is increasingly common along the south-central coast of Chile’s lake district (Schurman 




  In short, advocates frame existing policies and practices as “the archetype of a 
radically unsustainable model” (Claude 1999, 61).  
Challenging the “economic growth first” mentality that predominates among 
policy makers is important to nearly all green NGOs representing a range of approaches.
66 
 
One environmentalist considers this focus on growth as bordering on the “pathological.”
67
  
A longtime conservationist concludes that economic considerations are consistently 
privileged; in spite of the incorporation of the “language” of environmentalism into the 
official discourse over the past decade or so, little has changed in practice.
68
  
Furthermore, according to a member of the Political Ecology Institute (IEP), most 
government authorities and politicians are unable or unwilling to incorporate green ideas 
into their way of thinking.  Instead, they simply “administer the model.”
69
  
From the perspective of many NGO members, state agencies are largely 
configured to implement this unsustainable model.  Like children’s advocates in 
Argentina, the activists expend much energy critiquing institutions.  In their view, these 
essentially serve to accommodate the “growth first” agenda by favoring big business 
interests and large-scale investment projects and ensuring lax environmental standards 
and regulation.  The National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) is the main target 
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 “Gestión Ambiental del Gobierno: Balance de una Década y su Proyección a Cuatro Años;” “Política 
Ambiental de Chile.”  
66
 Interview in the Environmental Research and Planning Center (CIPMA), 9/17/02, Santiago. 
67 
Interview in Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago. 
68
 For instance, Lagos included environmental issues in his “growth with equity” platform.  However, 
activists maintain that the political elite tend to lack the political will necessary to address environmental 
problems.  The conservationist quoted here claims he has grown “tired” of trying to persuade them 
(Interview in the Ecology Institute of Chile, 9/11/02, Santiago; see also the editorial published in La 
Tercera, issue dated 6/19/94). 
69
 Interview in the Political Ecology Institute, 9/11/02, Santiago. 
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of criticism.  A coordinating body (as opposed to a ministry), CONAMA is deficient in 
the autonomy and decision-making power necessary to protect the environment.  The 
agency depends upon the Ministries of Economy, Agriculture, Mining, Public Works, 
Health, Housing, and Planning, for example, and exercises little control over Chile’s 
natural resources.
70
  A chorus of NGO members describe CONAMA as lacking political, 
economic, and scientific clout, resources, leadership, and a clear purpose.
71
  It is therefore 
incapable of complying with the environmental norms codified in Chilean law.  
According to one characterization, CONAMA has “less weight than a box of popcorn.”
72
   
Participants in green NGOs are almost unanimous in their perception that 
CONAMA is biased in favor of large companies and permissive with respect to 
development projects funded with private and public investment.  A member of the 
Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF) contends that these interests 
prevail even when “environmental damage is certain.”  Another participant in CODEFF 
disapproves of the government’s belief in the “panacea” of concessions for business.
73
  A 
leader in Ecoceanos argues further that CONAMA defends polluting industries instead of 
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 These ministries and other government entities are represented on CONAMA’s board of directors 
(Interviews in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, and Greenpeace Chile, 9/27/02, Santiago). 
71
 Interviews in the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF), 10/14/02, FIMA, 10/2/02, 
and the Political Ecology Institute, 9/11/02, Santiago.  In approximately one decade of existence, 
CONAMA had five different directors; one of the more recent resignations was that of Gianni López in 
2004.   
72
 Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago.  Carruthers explains further that Chile’s environmental 
regime is borrowed from more developed countries and predicated on a strong, regulatory state.  However, 
the Chilean state provides limited resources to its institutions, which therefore lack “meaningful 
enforcement power” (2001, 349).  In fact, because government agencies must self-finance, the one in 
charge of forestry issues (CONAF) does so through revenues collected from turning native forests into 
chips and paper pulp for export. 
73





 Numerous activists believe that the agency was designed to operate in 
this way.  Several different groups criticized the Environmental Framework Law passed 
in 1994, which created CONAMA and the system for evaluating the environmental 
impact of development projects.
75 
 They warned that the law would benefit polluting 
industries and projects.
76
  Not surprisingly, 95% of the investment projects that underwent 
the environmental impact process during its first four years of existence were approved 
(Aylwin 2002).  Moreover, projects usually have been accepted “along favored lines” and 
subject to little modification (Carruthers 2001, 351). 
 Activists have incorporated other destructive aspects of the economic model and 
its caretaker institutions into their framing.  These include inequality and injustice.  
Members of organizations suggest that environmental policies and problems affect some 
groups of Chileans disproportionately.  One’s vulnerability tends to vary according to her 
socioeconomic status, occupation, dwelling place, and ethnicity.  Indeed, some green 
NGOs have integrated the threats to indigenous communities and their ways of life into 
the discourse on environmental harm.  They politicize the loss of ethnic and cultural 
diversity as well as the loss of nature and biodiversity.  Both are viewed as consequences 
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 Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago. 
75 
The Law (Ley Sobre Bases Generales del Medio Ambiente), approved during Aylwin’s Administration, 
also addresses access to environmental information and citizen participation. Silva (1997) attributes the 
chosen design of CONAMA to political divisions within the Concertación at that time.  A more progressive 
group of politicians, active in developing the law and supportive of an environmental ministry instead of a 
coordinating body, was politically sidelined, and business interests were favored.  For an assessment of the 
system for evaluating the environmental impact of projects (Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, 
or SEIA), see Sabatini, Sepúlveda and Blanco (2000). 
76
 La Época, issue dated 2/3/94; La Nación, issue dated 2/3/94.  Some groups, including the Political 
Ecology Institute, have claimed that the law was a means to an end:  an eventual free trade agreement with 
the United States (La Nación, issue dated 6/7/94).  FIMA, a public interest law firm, argues similarly that 
CONAMA is an institution that the Chilean government created to showcase to the world.  Chile is a 
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of the model, which “razes cultures and ecosystems to impose a ‘modern’ vision, which 
is leading us irreversibly to self-destruction,” according to the Political Ecology 
Institute.
77
  Such outlooks are reminiscent of Polanyi’s classic analysis of market forces.  
“To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their 
natural environment… would result in the demolition of society,” he warns; “nature 
would be reduced to its elements… and landscapes defiled” (1944, 73). 
  The Bío Bío River dam project is a paradigmatic case that has come to signify the 
model’s potential to threaten — and ultimately destroy — landscapes and ethno-cultural 
identities.  The case illustrates each of the alleged effects of the model:  the acceptance of 
large-scale investment at a high environmental cost, the “growth first” agenda, 
permissive institutions, and the resulting loss of nature and culture.  An ecologist 
declared the project to be “one of the most serious attacks” on the environment in recent 
history; another called it an ethnic and cultural (as well as an environmental) “disaster.”
78
  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the project already has entailed the displacement and 
relocation of hundreds of indigenous people and the disruption of their economic 
activities and customs. 
 In summary, the activists present a series of negative associations: the utter 
destruction wrought by the model, the almost “pathological” focus on growth among 
policy makers — poor stewards of Chile’s natural resources — biased institutions, loss, 
                                                                                                                                                 
member of Mercosur and the Asia Pacific Economic Conference and has agreements with the United 
States, Mexico, Canada, and the European Union, for instance. 
77
 The source of this quotation is the Institute’s website (http://www.iepe.org.  Accessed 3/15/04).  
78
 The leader of the Political Ecology Institute, quoted in La Insignia (January 2002); an editorial authored 
by the director of Sustainable Chile, dated 6/12/03 (http://www.sociedadcivil.cl/nuevodiario/default.asp.  
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injustice, and devastation.  However valid their diagnosis of environmental problems and 
issues may be, the NGOs encounter complications with respect to prognostic framing.  
Their general approach suggests that a significant transformation of existing institutions 
and policies is required.
79
  More specifically, their frames have not emphasized viable 
alternatives to the dam project.  These strategies do not readily lend themselves to policy 
making. 
Furthermore, assigning blame is an integral part of some groups’ frames.  In 
addition to alienating politicians who back neoliberal policies and the current 
configuration of environmental institutions, they have provoked the resistance of other 
powerful elites in both the government and the business world by criticizing large 
investment projects.  In fact, the area of overlap between these two spheres makes this 
strategy even more problematic.  Because public officials often are involved in certain 
industries and/or commercial ventures, it is difficult to know where private interests end 
and the public interest begins.  To illustrate, Frei, as president from 1994 to 2000, 
reportedly had prior ties to a consulting firm that helped build the first of the six Endesa 
dams, prompting accusations of a major conflict of interest.
80
  
According to green NGOs, this pattern is a recurring motif in Chilean 
environmental politics.  A member of Ecoceanos, for example, notes that high-ranking 
legislators and party leaders have personal and familial interests in the fishing industry.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Accessed 6/10/04).  The lawyer for families who resisted the dam project went so far as to use the term 
“genocide” (The Miami Herald, issue dated 11/6/02). 
79
  A handful of NGOs offer more pragmatic solutions to environmental problems.  For instance, CIPMA 
has studied ways in which CONAMA and some of its programs can be improved (see Sabatini, Sepúlveda 
and Blanco 2000).  In addition, CIPMA and House of Peace have pursued conflict resolution strategies in 
an effort to achieve dialogue among different actors (i.e., communities, business representatives, and 
government officials). 
 148 
Business leaders also obtain executive branch appointments, raising the possibility that 
they will grant concessions to themselves.
81
  An ecologist likewise concludes that the 
interests of big business, including foreign companies, frequently prevail over Chile’s 
national “environmental principles.”  She also accuses the government of riding 




Targeting powerful individuals with considerable stakes in this issue area is a 
risky strategy.  It has helped fuel active opposition against green NGOs and 
environmentalism more generally.  Opponents within the mass media, government, and 
political parties on the right have engaged in counter framing.
83
  They have publicly 
questioned the activists’ ideas and advanced alternative understandings of this policy 
domain.  These rival frames besiege environmental activists, who must defend both their 
ideas and their credibility.  Adversaries usually counter the frames that emphasize the 
destructive elements of the development model by communicating an array of messages.  
For instance, critics sometimes portray green NGOs as foes of growth, employment, and 
the struggle against poverty — busy defending wildlife instead of families struggling to 
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 The Miami Herald, issue dated 11/6/02.  The first dam was completed in 1994.   
81
 The activist likens this to “putting the cat in charge of the fish.”  Examples of political figures with ties to 
the fishing sector are the Zaldívar Brothers: one is president of the Christian Democrats, and the other is 
president of the Senate (Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago). In late 2002, Marcel Claude, then 
director of Terram, publicly noted these connections in an editorial, arguing that the brothers’ participation 
in the process of reforming the sector were in breach of congressional rules forbidding legislators from 
voting on issues involving personal interests (La Tercera, issue dated 11/27/02). 
82
 Editorials authored by the director of Sustainable Chile, dated 6/12/03 and 6/16/03, available at:  
http://www.sociedadcivil.cl/nuevodiario/default.asp.  Accessed 6/10/04. 
83
 Some of these actors ally with business interests opposed to environmentalism. 
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put food on the table.
84 
 A similarly common view holds that Chile cannot aspire to a 
cleaner environment than its level of economic development allows; the country cannot 
yet afford this luxury reserved for advanced, industrialized nations.
85
  A related tactic is to 
discredit environmentalism as a foreign import, an ideology thrust upon Chile from 
abroad.  Members of UDI (Independent Democratic Union) and other politicians used 
this strategy when they raised questions about the support some groups receive from 
green parties in Europe and foreign NGOs, such as the Deep Ecology Foundation.
86
  
Since the mid-to-late 1990s, actors on the right of the political spectrum have 
become vigorous producers and articulators of competing ideas about the environment.  
For example, Freedom and Development, a powerful think tank, describes itself as a 
“factory” of ideas pertaining to a variety of policy domains.
87
  The institute, closely 
connected to parties such as UDI, occupies the gray area between political society and 
civil society.  Its founder, Hernán Büchi, created it as a space where the architects of the 
political, economic, and social reforms of the Pinochet era could continue to advocate for 
— and act as custodians of — those changes.
88
  To an extent, it represents a “shadow 
government” for the right while the Concertación controls the executive branch.  
                                                 
84 
Interview in House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago.  Green activists obviously take issue with such 
dichotomies. 
85
 Interview in FIMA, 10/2/02, Santiago; see also Greenpeace Chile’s 2002 “Balance Ambiental.” 
86
 La Época, issue dated 5/26/95.  Nationalist sentiment also can be used in defense of the environment and 
to critique the “race to the bottom” to attract foreign investment.  For instance, activists are critical of 
multinational companies operating in Chile with much lower labor and environmental standards than those 
of their countries of origin (Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago). 
87
 The Institute analyzes a vast array of economic, social, and political issues and advises policy makers in 
both the executive and legislative branches.  Its staff frequently weighs in on subjects ranging from 
agriculture, labor, housing, and education to national defense and other topics. 
88
 Büchi also ran for president in 1989 as an independent.  Freedom and Development was created the 
following year. 
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Freedom and Development offers market-based solutions to environmental problems as 
alternatives to what they deem “populist” or “fundamentalist” approaches.  In 




 The press has disseminated these alternative ideas with gusto.  Freedom and 
Development staff members are regular contributors to El Mercurio, Qué Pasa?, and El 
Diario.  Furthermore, the editorial board of El Mercurio has asserted that radical strands 
of ecology amount to a kind of “fundamentalism.”  NGOs are harming Chile’s image 
with “distorted or false information” about companies and industries and should be 
punished for their defamatory campaigns.
90
  It bears noting that these critiques are not 
reserved for ecologists but levied against all groups that question the model’s 
sustainability.   
Although such contending discourses complicate the work of green NGOs, they 
also are an indication of the groups’ influence on Chile’s political discourse.  
Environmentalism has become a fixture of the public agenda.  In spite of their politically 
stronger position vis-à-vis green NGOs, opponents are compelled to engage (and debunk) 
environmentalist ideas.  
A final aspect of counter framing relates to Chile’s indigenous communities and 
therefore is particularly relevant to the Bío Bío River dam project.  As discussed 
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 To illustrate, some NGOs have been active in a transnational campaign urging consumers to buy Chilean 
wood products with the “sustainable” seal of the Forest Stewardship Council.  Freedom and Development 
argues that the initiative has harmed exports and that US$ 550 million in exports are at stake, along with 
numerous jobs (Libertad y Desarrollo no. 122, dated August 2002; see also La Nación, issue dated 
9/17/02). 
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previously, some NGO members lament the propensity of large-scale investment projects 
to encroach upon the lands of indigenous groups and threaten their way of life.  However, 
frames emphasizing the loss of ethno-cultural identity compete with a different 
interpretation:  indigenous peoples stand in the way of development and progress.  An 
historian suggests that the dam project symbolizes a fundamental conflict between such 
communities, the state, and proponents of neoliberalism, who cannot understand why 
these “backward” people resist the “benefits of modernization” (Mallon 1999, 461; 
Muñoz 2003).  Why do they refuse to participate in the market like “good Chileans” 
(460)?  The discourse of native peoples as obstacles to modernity has deeper roots in 
Chilean (and Latin American) history.  Contentious acts in opposition to the dam’s 
construction sometimes reinforce such views.  In 2001, for instance, activists under cover 
of foliage hurled sticks and stones at a convoy of trucks carrying equipment through 
indigenous territory (Muñoz 2003).
91
  When environmental NGOs integrate ethnic 
concerns into their framing, they take on centuries-old cultural baggage.  
 In brief, this case provides evidence of relatively unsuccessful framing as it 
pertains to the policy process.  However trenchant the green NGOs’ critiques of existing 
institutions and practices may be, their emphasis on structural and systemic factors can 
hinder their policy participation.  Constructive messages and feasible solutions are 
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 These ostensible attacks on companies and/or industries amount to “economic crimes” according to an 
UDI legislator (Ecoceanos News article dated 9/23/02, available at: http://www.parlamentodelmar.cl. 
Accessed 11/15/02). 
91
 Some Mapuche activists have engaged in other acts of contention, such as land occupations.  These draw 
the ire of landowners and logging companies, who have pressed the government to respond (Muñoz 2003; 
see also Millaman 2001). Some observers point to the increasing “judicialization” of ethnic conflict and 
attempts to cast the actions of some Mapuche as subversive.  Using national security measures inherited 
from the dictatorial period, government officials are pressuring the legal system to seek convictions of 
Mapuche leaders for “terrorist conduct” (Muñoz 2003).    
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relatively scarce in these frames.  The activists, like children’s advocates in Argentina, 
weave together a series of negative threads, including critiques of existing institutions, 
environmental decision making, and the elites who implement the model regardless of the 
consequences.  They also underscore inequality and injustice, suggesting that the fate of 
the natural world and the fate of indigenous groups are intertwined (and both imperiled).  
They frame the development model as a largely destructive force.  Some question 
whether an approach that requires so many environmental sacrifices in exchange for 
growth is worthy of the name “development.”  The dam project embodies each of these 
elements and is thus an emblematic case. 
Additionally, participants in green NGOs walk a difficult road with respect to the 
motivational task of framing.  In contrast with their colleagues working on transparency 
and children’s issues in Argentina, the activists are less able to make the case that Chile’s 
environmental health is in “crisis.”  They try nonetheless to heighten the salience of green 
issues.  Moreover, the advocates have played the blame game, often placing powerful 
leaders on the defensive.  The combination of targeting structures, institutions, and 
individuals for criticism is a dangerous one.  Not surprisingly, groups have encountered 
strong opposition, active counter framing, and competing approaches to politicizing 
environmental issues.   
For several reasons, then, the groups’ framing choices have set them on a 
collision course with the political establishment and the policy-making process.  It is no 
wonder that they are less involved in policy decision making compared to the other CSOs 
analyzed here.  Interestingly, some groups have begun to link environmental issues to a 
democratic discourse instead of focusing predominantly on questions surrounding 
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development.  They do so by invoking themes such as citizen participation in public 
affairs and citizen control (for instance, through better access to environmental 
information).  Further integration of these positive — and rather voguish — ideas into 
their frames could improve their chances of policy participation going forward.    
Stated briefly, framing is an important explanatory factor in each of the cases 
detailed above.  Varying degrees of success in framing help account for the high levels of 
policy participation in the struggle for freedom of information, the intermediate levels in 
the cases drawn from children’s advocacy, and the lower levels in the environmental 




In this chapter, I have focused on group strategies for mobilizing ideas — 
politicizing issues and articulating claims — through framing.  An overarching goal of 
the analysis has been to better understand the power of persuasion.  Activists exercise this 
form of power when they disseminate their understandings of issues and interpretations 
of reality, influence the public discourse and agenda, and capture the attention of policy 
elites and/or the citizenry.  They struggle to convince others that their cause is worthy and 
their message important.  Framing is a crucial aspect of these processes.  
Frames are arrayed along a broad spectrum, and the cases I have examined 
illustrate this diversity.  While some Chilean activists call attention to a “pathologically” 
growth-centered development model that leads to injustice, inequality, and devastation, 
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others emphasize strengthening families and easing their poverty.  Meanwhile, in 
Argentina, a number of civil societal actors underscore “perverse” institutions and 
practices — social exclusion and the criminalization of poverty, for instance — and their 
lamentable effects on children.  Other advocates look to political and institutional 
renewal as a way to achieve greater transparency, accountability, and democratic 
consolidation. 
 Some of the above strategies are more policy-friendly than others, and I have 
argued that effective frames entail certain characteristics.  In addition to underlining an 
issue’s importance or salience, CSOs need to include positive or constructive messages 
and feasible remedies to problems in their frames.  They also must avoid an emphasis on 
blame and defend themselves against counter frames.  Groups that successfully meet 
these conditions are more likely to participate in policy. 
The evidence supports the proposed relationship between effective framing and 
policy involvement, which holds across issue areas and both countries.  Specifically, 
Argentine transparency activists have met with more success than Chilean 
environmentalists; we observe mixed success on the part of children’s advocates in 
Argentina and Chile.  This variation is reflected in their respective levels of policy 
participation and influence.   
Advancing a set of new theoretical arguments concerning the policy consequences 
of framing choices and testing them empirically are among the dissertation’s main 
contributions.  Although my approach builds on the concepts of motivational, diagnostic, 
and prognostic framing, I move beyond existing work in several ways.  To begin with, 
research on the impact of framing remains scarce compared to work on how frames 
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mobilize would-be participants (i.e., drawing individuals into a social movement).  The 
causal relationship between framing and policy involvement is poorly understood.  
Additionally, I extend frame analysis to other categories of collective actors besides mass 
mobilizing social movements.  This conceptual tool is applicable to non-profit NGOs and 
community organizations working toward the public interest.  Thus, I try to transcend 
some of the disciplinary boundaries separating analysts focusing on different types of 
groups.  I also have taken a step in the direction of redressing the shortage of comparative 
work on CSOs’ strategies for politicizing issues and articulating ideas.   
Moreover, I weigh into the more general scholarly debate over the role of ideas in 
influencing political processes and outcomes.  I suggest that framing explains the 
observed variation in policy participation better than rival ideational factors, such as a 
group’s ideological proclivities or the characteristics of the specific issue at stake (how 
threatening, contentious, or intrinsically appealing it is).  The explanation offered here 
emphasizes the latitude that CSOs have while concocting frames:  some make difficult 
issues sound appealing, whereas others opt for more polemical language.  Although 
groups rarely use frames that are antithetical to their “true” beliefs or ideologies, they can 
select from different options.  They choose from many alternative approaches to 
“spinning” ideas.   
Of course, a number of factors govern these choices.  I therefore discuss both 
international and domestic factors that influence framing strategies in Chapter 5, placing 
frames in a broader political, cultural, and ideational context.  Although my theoretical 
approach favors agency over structure, I recognize that the mobilization of ideas does not 
occur in a void.  Furthermore, because framing does not suffice as an explanation of 
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policy participation and influence, Chapter 4 is dedicated to analyzing civil society 
alliances, the second independent variable of this project.  It is necessary to examine 
group strategies for combining and mobilizing resources along with their strategies for 
mobilizing ideas.    
  In conclusion, more research is needed if we are to understand these ideational 
processes and their consequences.  Analyses of framing tactics, their political and policy 
effects, and their relationship to the political, cultural, and social context would be 
especially useful.  Additional studies on the selection and crafting of frames also could be 
revealing.  Scholars can employ various modes of comparison — across different issue 
areas, nations, regions, and time, for example — to shed light on these questions.  
Moreover, a variegated analysis of distinct types of CSOs could uncover similarities and 
differences in their framing strategies.   
 Future work also should address the long-term implications of framing choices.  I 
have taken a relatively short-term view of the process, emphasizing the more immediate 
effects of framing on policy involvement.  An examination of framing over a longer 
period of time would reveal distinct patterns.
92
  Further research on the creative ways in 
which civil societal actors mobilize ideas will elucidate these and other issues.  Because 
little work has been completed, the possibilities for further research are practically 
endless, and the need is great.   
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 Additionally, some CSOs contribute to changes in political culture, which eventually can yield political 
and/or policy changes.     
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Chapter 4:  The Power of Partnerships 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A veteran NGO leader in Argentina once stated that no civil society organization 
is “strong” enough to effect political change by itself; however, none is so “weak” that it 
cannot make some contribution to the reform process.
1
  In this chapter, I analyze the 
dynamics of groups joining together to overcome individual “weakness” and influence 
policy.  I argue that when CSOs combine and mobilize organizational resources in 
alliances, their chances of policy involvement improve.  Effective civil society 
partnerships therefore represent another important pathway to participation.  
Few scholars have examined the creation, evolution, and impact of these 
partnerships in democratizing countries.
2
  Because analysts have neglected the 
relationship between alliances and policy influence, the causal arguments that I propose 
in the dissertation contribute to theory building in this area of inquiry.  I also undertake 
one of the first comparative analyses of alliances that draws on evidence from three 
distinct issue areas and two polities. 
I begin the chapter by recapitulating the arguments advanced in Chapter 1 
concerning the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables.  I then turn 
to the dissertation’s cases of policy making and trace the effects of alliance building on 
                                                 
1
 Carlos March, Executive Director, Citizen Power, quoted in an Infocívica article dated 12/6/02 
(http://www.infocivica.org. Accessed 5/15/03).   
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policy participation.  I demonstrate that by forming successful alliances, civil society 
groups can create opportunities for policy involvement.  However, given that CSOs do 
not always manage to cooperate with one another, I elaborate some of the challenges they 
face while endeavoring to create, maintain, and participate in alliances in the final 
section. 
 
THE ARGUMENT  
When asked about government–CSO relations in Argentina, the president of a 
small foundation answered wryly, “If you don’t attend a meeting, they won’t miss you.  
They’re not going to call to see why you didn’t show up.”
3
  It does seem far-fetched to 
expect policy makers to “miss” a single organization absent from such a gathering.  On 
the other hand, what occurs when groups join together?  Are governing elites as likely to 
marginalize an entire network or coalition of CSOs as they are to ignore individual 
groups during the policy process?    
The central claim of this chapter is that successful inter-organizational 
cooperation increases the likelihood of civil society involvement in policy.  Alliances can 
help individual groups overcome the obstacles that tend to limit their political influence 
in Latin America:  few resources, limited visibility, and high fragmentation.  Through 
cooperation, CSOs can combine and mobilize resources, solve coordination problems, 
                                                                                                                                                 
2
 Barring a few case studies and more technical, development-oriented studies of networks, there is little 
research on the topic (e.g., Bebbington et al. 1993; Chalmers and Piester 1995; Fisher 1993; Friedman 
2000; Umlas 1998).  
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achieve strength in numbers to back their collective demands, and present a united front 
vis-à-vis governing elites and other actors. 
Alliances facilitate participation during multiple phases of policy making.  During 
the formulation stage, for example, it is easier for government officials to consult 
representatives of a network or coalition than to address the needs of many separate 
groups.  Throughout the agenda-setting and adoption phases, CSOs seek the critical mass 
necessary to capture the attention of policy makers, persuade them to address an issue or 
problem, and pressure them to enact a certain policy.  As suggested in Chapter 1, 
coalitions are more likely to participate in policy agenda setting and adoption, whereas 
networks are often instrumental during the formulation stage.   
My findings indicate that not all alliances are created equal.  Several 
characteristics enhance their overall effectiveness and their impact on the dependent 
variable.  First, it is advantageous for groups to strive toward a delegation of 
responsibilities and a division of labor that maximizes their members’ respective 
strengths.  Second, they should strike a balance between internal diversity and cohesion.  
An alliance obviously unites CSOs that agree on particular objectives and strategies.  At 
the same time, the more diverse the participating groups’ ideological and political hues, 
areas of expertise, and organizational types are, the more the partnership will seem 
“representative” of broader constituencies.  Third, it is beneficial for alliances to forge 
ties to other networks, coalitions, or wider political movements pursuing similar goals. 
The logic of joining forces is compelling in countries where CSOs tend to lack 
certain resources — for instance, money and members — compared to their counterparts 
                                                                                                                                                 
3
 Interview in the City Foundation, 3/19/03, Buenos Aires. 
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in other nations.  As noted at the outset of the chapter, individual organizations in Latin 
American countries are rarely “strong” enough to get the job done alone.  However, most 
every group has talent and energy to contribute to a partnership.  Chilean and Argentine 
activists often bear in mind past experiences with resource constraints and political 
marginalization when weighing the relative costs and benefits of alliance building.  For 
many civil societal actors, cooperation seems an obvious choice:  in the words of one 
member of an Argentine NGO, “Either we unite, or we unite.”  She explains that team 
work is “a question of resources, efficiency, and pressure” and asks, “Why make similar 
demands separately from one another?”
4
  In short, trying to effect change single-handedly 
strikes some advocates as unproductive. 
 
THE EVIDENCE  
Available evidence suggests that the dissertation’s argument holds in both 
Argentina and Chile and across all three issue areas.  Comparative analysis of the four 
cases uncovers some very different inter-organizational dynamics and levels of 
cooperation.  These include:  an effective coalition in Argentina’s freedom of information 
campaign; weaker alliances uniting children’s advocates in Argentina; a more formal 
network of children’s groups in Chile; and lower levels of cooperation among Chilean 
environmentalists.  For each case, I summarize the organizational resources of the groups 
involved in that particular issue.  Specifically, I am interested in the potential for 
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 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.  In an analysis of social movement 
organizations, Hathaway and Meyers also mention the “undesirability of the alternatives” to participating in 
a coalition:  working separately often seems “inefficient and illogical” to participants (1997, 73).   
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translating these resources into political gains through alliance building.  I then outline 
the main features of the alliances that have emerged — their members, configurations, 
strengths, and weaknesses — and/or the forces conspiring against partnerships.  More 
importantly, I analyze the relationship between alliances and policy participation and 
influence. 
 
Advocating for freedom of information in Argentina  
The struggle for access to information legislation demonstrates the importance of 
alliances for policy influence.  The civil society coalition that favored reform was a 
principal means by which CSOs participated in policy debates, kept the issue on the 
formal agenda, and pressured leaders to approve the law.  The coalition is a crucial factor 




The coalition exemplifies many of the proposed benefits of forming alliances.  
Individual NGOs making similar demands separately from one another seemed like a 
recipe for political marginalization.  Instead, the strategy of joining forces created a 
critical mass and a common voice used to sway the authorities.  The CSOs coordinated 
activities skillfully, established a good division of labor based on their respective 
specialties, and pooled valuable resources.  Additional characteristics strengthened the 
coalition’s effectiveness:  a clear, specific objective motivated its collective actions; the 
participating NGOs were fairly diverse in their missions, histories, and politics; and they 
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succeeded in combining various audiences into a wider public constituency interested in 
transparency.
6
  Finally, other civil society networks and actors seeking a variety of 
political reforms joined with the coalition and augmented its influence.  
The alliance was not formalized into a legally constituted organization.  
Moreover, the coalition lacked both an official name and a designated set of leaders, 
though a member of the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting 
Equity and Growth (CIPPEC) became an effective coordinator during the campaign.
7
  
The core participants in the coalition were NGOs dedicated to transparency, political 
reform, citizenship rights, and/or public interest law.
8
  The groups successfully pooled 
organizational resources, including prestige, credibility, expertise, and political and 
media connections.   
To begin with, prestige was one of the more potent resources mobilized during the 
freedom of information campaign.  As suggested in Chapter 1, CSOs with proven 
credentials can sometimes leverage their credibility into policy advocacy.  The NGOs in 
question tend to enjoy high levels of recognition and credibility among fellow civil 
societal actors and the wider public.  Several of the organizations have established track 
records as legal advocates and/or watchdogs of the state.  Citizen Power, for example, has 
become a leader in monitoring political elites and institutions and encouraging citizen 
participation and control.  The Civil Rights Association (ADC), which specializes in 
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 Parts of this discussion are based on Risley (2003). 
6
 Interview in Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), 1/31/03, Buenos Aires. 
7
  I refer here to María Baron, Director, Transparency Area.   
8
 Examples include:  ADC (Civil Rights Association), CELS (Center for Legal and Social Studies), 
CIPPEC (Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and Growth), Citizen 
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public interest law and the defense of constitutional rights, is also prominent.  
Meanwhile, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) has the status of a veteran 
human rights organization that has taken on “new” issues since the democratic transition 
(most notably, the rule of law and institutional and police violence).  Thus, NGOs held in 
relatively high esteem were involved in the coalition.   
In addition to their reputations as monitors and public defenders, the NGOs 
possess specialized expertise.  In fact, the two resources are closely intertwined.  For 
instance, the Transparency Area Director of CIPPEC has an uncommon understanding of 
the legislative branch’s inner workings; this tactical knowledge assisted the coalition’s 
lobbying efforts.  Legal savvy also proved instrumental:  transparency proponents put 
their technical expertise to use while crafting policy proposals and arguments in support 
of access to information.
9
  One participant identified these high-quality proposals as key 
ingredients in achieving influence in the area of political reform.
10
  In short, the groups 
involved in the coalition combined their specific areas of knowledge (legal, institutional, 
and political) and used them ceaselessly during the campaign.  
Through their coalitional endeavors, activists also pooled media and political 
contacts.  As noted in Chapter 2, several groups regularly contributed to both mainstream 
and alternative media, thus increasing public awareness of the issue.  One NGO leader 
was partly joking when he claimed to use his professional experience in marketing to 
increase the visibility of civil societal actors; however, available evidence suggests that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commitment, Citizen Power, FARN (Environment and Natural Resources Foundation), Democratic 
Change Foundation, Innova, and Sophia Group Foundation.     
9
 The NGOs also boast relatively strong administrative capacities, a further example of the organizational 
resources that they pooled through coalition building.   
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he often has succeeded at circulating CSOs’ proposals and ideas in the media.
11
  
Additionally, some NGOs had connections to legislators and their staff members, while 
others enjoyed ties to executive branch officials.
12
  By merging these contacts, 
participants in the alliance increased their access to policy makers.   
The CSOs also enjoyed access to the Anticorruption Office, which was a useful 
resource during the formulation phase.
13
  Indeed, this case illustrates the leadership 
exchange pattern — the flow of individuals between civil society and the government — 
mentioned in Chapter 1.  The presence of former civil societal actors in the 
Anticorruption Office was a boon to a number of NGOs.  Moreover, the Office actually 
served as a venue for increased coordination among the CSOs, who decided to further 
harmonize their advocacy efforts during this stage.
14
   
In summary, by building a successful alliance, the organizations combined their 
resources and brought them to bear on policy makers throughout the freedom of 
information campaign.  When members of congress were considering the bill, the 
coalition lobbied both lawmakers and executive branch officials to ensure its inclusion on 
the legislative agenda, approval in the relevant committees, and eventual passage in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
10
 Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires.   
11
 I refer here to the president of Citizen Commitment, also a leader in the Social Forum for Transparency 
(Interview, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires).   
12
 For example, CIPPEC often works with legislative actors and government officials at various levels 
(Interview with the Project Coordinator, 4/14/03).  In addition, the Social Forum for Transparency 
collaborated with the government in the late 1990s on a program promoting access to public information 
(see the official website at http://www.cristal.gov.ar.  Accessed 10/1/03).   
13
 As described previously, the Anticorruption Office developed the freedom of information bill with input 
from various societal actors.  Preexisting personal relationships and the negotiated rulemaking sessions 
created opportunities for non-governmental actors to participate in the formulation of the policy.   
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lower chamber.  As outlined in Chapter 2, participants in the coalition used myriad 
strategies to pressure elites and engage the broader public, ranging from meeting with 
high-ranking officials to disseminating their message in the media.  Coalitional tactics 
help explain the CSOs’ high levels of participation and engagement in the policy process.  
What is more, the alliance actually succeeded in pushing the legislation forward. 
Accordingly, the participants’ subjective views of the coalition’s effectiveness 
were unanimously positive during interviews.  All agreed that the alliance was significant 
in terms of their own policy involvement and the bill’s progress in the legislature.  One 
NGO leader, for example, opined that pressuring jointly was “the only way” to get 
decision makers to listen and to effect change.
15
  Another concluded, “You can’t do 
anything alone.”
16
   Though perhaps overstated, such views provide evidence of the 
perceived importance of coalitional work.  The fact that most of these interviews 
occurred before the lower chamber passed the legislation in May 2003 makes this 
sanguine evaluation even more striking:  regardless of the ultimate outcome, the activists 
viewed the process as a good “model” for action.
17
  Moreover, they believed in the merits 
of joining forces despite the fact that their own individual organizations were relatively 
rich in resources.   
In Chapter 1, I suggested that CSOs participating in coalitions tend to view their 
differences as benefits rather than as risks that will imperil the alliance.  This tendency is 
                                                                                                                                                 
14
 Although the Office’s personnel played a less significant role during the adoption phase, they did 
maintain contact with participants in the coalition.  Personal relationships thus continued to be valuable 
resources for the groups as they engaged in advocacy.  
15 
Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires.   
16
 Interview in CIPPEC, Transparency Area, 2/11/03, Buenos Aires.   
17
 Interviews in ADC, 3/11/03, CIPPEC, Transparency Area, 2/11/03, and FARN, 1/31/03, Buenos Aires.   
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evident within the coalition promoting freedom of information.  In interviews, 
participants were quick to point out the dissimilarities among their respective NGOs.  
Although they did not describe the groups as “strange bedfellows,” they did highlight 
their varying areas of expertise, political proclivities, and other characteristics.  The 
advocates also underscored the benefits of combining these different strengths in the 
short term to achieve a shared policy objective.   
The experience of the campaign was also positive because other citizens joined 
and/or collaborated with the coalition at various stages, boosting its efforts.  Preexisting 
networks interested in political change were vital in this regard.  While some of the 
activities summarized above were coordinated by the core members of the coalition, 
others involved larger numbers of groups and volunteers.  For example, an open citizens’ 
forum, which convened organizations, networks, and religious figures, among others, 
served as a space for dialogue, coordination, and collective action.
18
  In addition, the 
Social Forum for Transparency, a highly visible network comprising NGOs dedicated to 
promoting citizen participation and control, became involved.
19
  In 2002, the network 
launched the “May Laws,” a pro-reform campaign designed to improve mechanisms of 
                                                 
18
 I refer here to the Cabildo Abierto Ciudadano, which translates as an open town meeting (in fact, it 
convenes in Buenos Aires’ historic city hall building near the Plaza de Mayo).   
19
 Examples of the Forum’s members include:  Citizen Commitment, Citizen Control Association, Citizen 
Power, CODESEDH (Committee for the Defense of Health, Ethics, and Human Rights), Democratic 
Change Foundation, Forum for Institutional Reconstruction, Permanent Forum for Social Ethics, and 
Sophia Group Foundation.  Other groupings of people and organizations pursuing similar reforms, such as 
Vox Populi and the Action Group, have emerged in recent years.      
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transparency and accountability.  The access to information law was among the changes 
proposed in this platform, which represented another tool for activists to leverage.
20 
   
Hundreds of organizations also took part in an initiative entitled, “more 
information, less corruption, less poverty,” coordinated by the Argentine Dialogue.  The 
United Nations Development Program and the Catholic Church instigated the Dialogue in 
2002, with the support of President Duhalde.  The process, which sought to formulate an 
agenda of “governability” amidst the crisis, entailed consulting multiple sectors of society 
(e.g., business, unions, religious denominations, grassroots and non-governmental 
organizations).  Participants authored several documents with sweeping 
recommendations on the social, economic, and political reforms needed to overcome the 
crisis.  Once again, access to information was among the proposed reforms, and 
transparency achieved a prominent status as one of the guiding principles of the 
Dialogue’s charter.
21
   
This concurrent activism in the area of transparency fueled the coalition’s efforts.  
Because the alliance was loosely organized, its members could absorb volunteers and 
coordinate with other groups and networks when such opportunities arose.  At the 
individual and organizational levels, there was considerable overlap between the coalition 
and the other initiatives described here.  Nevertheless, the existence of a broader, more 
diversified support base helped the coalition step up its pressure on policy makers. 
                                                 
20
 Interview in Social Forum for Transparency, 3/13/03, Buenos Aires; pamphlet on the May Laws (Leyes 
de Mayo), dated 5/02.  The document supports the recommendations of the political reform committee of 
the Argentine Dialogue.     
21
 In addition to defining the broad contours of future policies, the recommendations called for specific 
policies (such as emergency social programs) and new institutions, namely councils to monitor social 
policies.  I am indebted to Norberto Borzese for sharing his materials on the Dialogue.   
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In short, the coalitional strategy was a crucial means by which CSOs participated 
in and influenced policy.  The CSOs’ coordinated advocacy efforts, directed at both 
branches of government, were instrumental for the passage of the bill in the lower 
chamber.  The freedom of information case therefore supports the causal arguments 
developed earlier. 
 
Children’s advocacy in Argentina  
The experiences of groups working on children’s issues contrast with those of the 
transparency advocates.  Partnerships among children’s advocates have been less 
effectual than the strong coalition analyzed above.  Specifically, inter-organizational 
cooperation has facilitated CSO participation in policy since the early 1990s; however, in 
recent years, growing fragmentation has hindered the development of a broader alliance 
and produced two separate, smaller partnerships.  This tendency partially accounts for the 
intermediate levels of participation observed in the case of national legislation designed 
to protect children.   
  Compared to most of the NGOs involved in the access to information campaign, 
many of the CSOs active in children’s issues are somewhat deficient in funds, staff, and 
administrative capacity.
22
  However, they are hardly devoid of organizational resources, 
and the most important groups count on several important assets, including expertise, 
media contacts, and credibility.  To begin with, numerous professionals — social 
                                                 
22
 A United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) official describes Argentine children’s organizations as 
under-institutionalized and lacking in managerial capacity compared to CSOs in other issue areas 
(Interview in UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires).   
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workers, lawyers, psychologists, and pediatricians — have developed specialized 
knowledge of children’s themes.  Their expertise is potentially valuable to policy makers.  
In addition, the press has been something of an ally for promoters of children’s rights.
23
  
The resulting media exposure has helped raise public awareness of (and respect for) the 
work of both domestic and international organizations, such as UNICEF.
24
     
As mentioned in Chapter 2, groups associated with this policy domain have 
gained credibility through their monitoring activities and, in particular, their preparation 
of the non-governmental reports for the United Nations on Argentina’s compliance with 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  Like activists in favor of transparency, 
children’s advocates have strong credentials as watchdogs of the state.  Moreover, the 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo are especially esteemed actors involved in children’s 
rights.  Indeed, their group is among the most respected and recognized CSOs in all of 
Argentina.
25
  The Grandmothers’ participation in this issue area thus brings additional 
credibility and authority to children’s advocacy. 
A final set of resources worth noting are political connections.  Some of the 
activists maintain contact with legislators interested in children’s issues and note that a 
                                                 
23
 Interview with Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CASACIDN), 3/11/03, Buenos Aires; see also Bombal and Garay (2000).  Examples 
of newspaper editorials and other analyses can be found on the Children’s Rights Association website 
(http://www.derechosdelainfancia.org). 
24
 Interview in UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires.  The Argentine office of UNICEF has provided 
groups with project-based funding and technical assistance (e.g., administrative guides, research, 
educational materials).  Additionally, international NGOs offer funding and support to domestic groups.  I 
analyze these transnational linkages in Chapter 5.   
25
 The group is also widely recognized abroad.  One of its most recent honors was the United Nations Prize 
in the Field of Human Rights, bestowed on its president, Estela Carlotto, in 2003. 
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healthy dialogue exists between them.
26
  On the other hand, the majority of those 
interviewed characterize their interactions with officials in the National Council of 
Childhood, Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF) as unsatisfying.  Moreover, the 
exchange of leadership between this bureau and the NGO world has yielded few benefits 
for civil societal actors.
27
   
 Have children’s advocates converted their organizational assets into political 
strength through alliance building?  Various CSOs have in fact combined and deployed 
their resources by forming partnerships.  Nevertheless, in recent years, problems have 
arisen within the main existing alliance, the Committee for the Monitoring and 
Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CASACIDN).  
This internal discord and the general trend toward fragmentation in this issue area help 
explain civil society’s intermediate levels of involvement in the case of national child 
protection legislation.  
A number of groups — including the Argentine Pediatrics Society and the 
aforementioned Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo — created CASACIDN in 1991.  
Compared to informal alliances like the access to information coalition, CASACIDN is 
slightly more structured, with an identifiable leadership and membership.
28
  The 
Committee emerged from the collective effort to prepare the first non-governmental 
report for the U.N. Committee on Children’s Rights.  Upon the document’s completion in 
                                                 
26
 E.g., interview in the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires. 
27
 After Norberto Liwski, the leader of an NGO (CODESEDH), became the director of CONAF, a dramatic 
shift toward including more CSOs in policy making did not occur according to most activists; some also 
conclude that “state practices have remained the same” under his leadership.  I am keeping the 
organizational affiliations of the persons quoted here anonymous. 
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1993, the alliance gained members and increased its activities through the mid-1990s 
(Bombal and Garay 2000).  CASACIDN’s goals were not limited to monitoring existing 
state practices; participants also sought to encourage institutional and policy reforms in 
accordance with the Convention.
29
  During this more promising phase, the alliance 
became an interlocutor vis-à-vis the government and a legitimate source of information 
on the well-being of children (Bombal and Garay 2000).   
CASACIDN endures but is not an especially robust alliance.  Bombal and 
Garay’s (2000) earlier study of the Committee identified several internal weaknesses, 
including limited mobilization and coordination of its member groups, inadequate 
delegation of responsibilities to these participants, and inefficient decision-making 
processes.  In the absence of an external stimulus, such as an approaching deadline for 
reporting to the U.N., CASACIDN’s activities tend to diminish, and its members focus 
inward on their own individual groups.  Coordination and decision making increasingly 
have fallen into the “hands of a smaller number of people” (2000, 26).   
Since the time Bombal and Garay conducted their research, these problems have 
worsened.  For instance, some members verbalize their disillusionment with the 
concentration of decision-making authority within CASACIDN.  They maintain that a 
few individuals have been “running the show” and “making pronouncements” on behalf 
of the alliance without consulting others.
30
  In addition, all of the individuals whom I 
                                                                                                                                                 
28
 Specifically, the Committee has a president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer, as well as an 
executive director.  It lacks a separate physical space and staff. 
29
 Members of the Committee also strive to monitor the state and promote children’s rights through 
education, training workshops, and raising overall public awareness.  In addition to preparing the 1993 
U.N. report, they generated the 2000 report. 
30
  The organizational affiliations of the persons quoted here are kept anonymous. 
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interviewed acknowledge personal and political rifts.  Although the fragmentation 
process has not yet culminated in the disintegration of CASACIDN, its membership 
apparently has undergone changes and a net decrease.  Additionally, while the 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo remain involved, they tend to collaborate more 
closely with fellow human rights organizations than with CASACIDN in their day-to-day 
work, according to one participant.
31
  
Furthermore, a new alliance, the Collective of NGOs for Children and 
Adolescents, was founded in 2001.
32
  One of the more vigorous rights-promoting groups, 
the Children’s Rights Association (ADI), left CASACIDN to help organize the 
Collective, which comprises approximately eight active groups.
33
  Ironically, the 
circumstances of its creation parallel those surrounding the establishment of 
CASACIDN:  participants joined together to prepare the following year’s report to the 
U.N. (when it became evident that CASACIDN did not intend to submit one).  
Meanwhile, other organizations, such as the Emmanuel Foundation, have abandoned 
CASACIDN but so far have refrained from joining the Collective.   
The trend toward fragmentation manifests itself in other ways besides the 
existence of these two separate (and more diminutive) alliances.  There is no national 
                                                 
31
  Interview in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires.  This is the case in spite of the fact that the president 
of the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo holds a leadership position in CASACIDN. 
32
  Based on documentary evidence, CASACIDN has lost approximately 13 members but gained several 
others.  Presently, it comprises an estimated 15 members, down from about 20 in the mid-1990s.  Examples 
of current members include:  American Association of Jurists, Argentine Pediatrics Society, Buenos Aires 
Lawyers’ Association, Civil Association for the Equality of Rights, Center for Legal Studies of Children 
and Youth (CELIJ), Center for Political and Social Studies for Human Development (CESPEDH), 
Christian Youth Association (YMCA), Foundation for Participation (FUNDAPART), Grandmothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo, Integrated Center for Social Rehabilitation (CIRSA), Union of Argentine Women (UMA), 
Women’s Studies Center (CEDEM), and affiliates in the provinces.    
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network on children’s issues, which some activists regard as an important deficiency.
34
  
Moreover, outside observers also note that effective team work has eluded advocates.  A 
government administrator, for instance, opines that they have been largely unable to view 
themselves as a “collective” and a “potential political force;” similarly, a UNICEF 
official concludes that groups have fallen short of achieving the “critical mass necessary 
for pressuring the authorities.”
35
     
These tendencies have clear implications for CSO involvement in policy making.  
In Chapter 2, I offered the case of child protection legislation as an example of 
intermediate levels of policy participation.  Groups have advocated for reforms in this 
policy domain and collaborated with legislators in the formulation of bills, and the 
existence of CASACIDN eased civil society participation in policy making through the 
mid- to late-1990s.  However, more recently, the alliance has experienced a decline in 
membership and activity.  It is likely that a stronger partnership would have led to better 
access to policy makers and more influence over the content of legislation.  In short, we 
observe mixed success with respect to alliance building, which helps account for the 
middling levels of policy involvement.        
Several factors have impaired the development of more effective alliances in this 
issue area.  As noted in Chapter 2, CSOs involved in children’s issues are diverse with 
respect to their missions, activities, organizational structures, and understandings of child 
                                                                                                                                                 
33
  Surcos and El Arca also left the Committee to participate in the Collective.  Additional participants 
include:  Anahí, Pelota de Trapo, Hacer Lugar, and the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH). 
34
 Interview in the Collective of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires.  Members of 
organizations in Buenos Aires also express interest in building bridges to groups in Argentina’s interior 
(Interview in the Children’s Rights Association, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires).    
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welfare.  For example, the fact that some groups (and not others) embrace a rights-based 
perspective is a basis for differentiation as well as an ongoing source of tension.
36
  
Personal and political schisms also have conspired against stronger partnerships and the 
pursuit of shared goals.  Thus, compared to participants in the freedom of information 
coalition, the CSOs seem less capable of combining their individual specialties and 
strengths, thereby achieving “unity in diversity.”  
Furthermore, the access to information case demonstrates that collaborating with 
existing networks and broader reform movements bolsters an alliance’s strength.  Groups 
working on children’s issues would benefit from closer ties with other civil societal 
actors who share common interests.
37
  A plethora of research institutes, human rights 
groups, and other organizations have provided children’s advocates with technical 
assistance and information during the preparation of the U.N. reports.
38
  CELS, for 
instance, has furnished statistics pertaining to children’s social and economic rights and 
the incidence of police and institutional violence affecting young people.  However, 
groups have garnered less support when the time comes for advocacy as opposed to 
monitoring, for pressuring decision makers to enact reforms rather than critiquing 
existing policies.   
                                                                                                                                                 
35
 Interviews in the Council of the Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents, the Government of the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, 4/15/03, and UNICEF Argentina, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires.   
36
 Interview in CASACIDN, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires.  Activists who promote children’s rights sometimes 
dismiss providers of direct assistance as embodying Argentina’s long tradition of “paternalistic” forms of 
charity.  Bombal and Garay (2000) also identify this cleavage. 
37
 For instance, there is some overlap between so-called children’s issues and issues of concern to women’s 
advocates.  In fact, several members of the Children’s Rights Association were previously active in the 
women’s movement.   
38
 Numerous groups also have lent their support to the finished reports.  The 2002 document counted on 
such approval from CORREPI (Coordinating Body against Police and Institutional Repression), 
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 The struggle for transparency also highlights the importance of seizing 
opportunities to gain wider public support for one’s cause.  As outlined previously, the 
promotion of access to information dovetailed with the recommendations in favor of 
increased transparency that emerged from the Argentine Dialogue.  The status of children 
was also at the forefront of these proposals in 2002, because overcoming the 
socioeconomic crisis was a major objective of the Dialogue.  Yet it was other actors — 
not children’s CSOs — who organized a campaign for emergency social policies.  An 
assortment of NGOs, alliances, a journalist, and the newspaper, La Nación, formulated a 
proposal for nutritional assistance targeting impoverished children and pregnant women.  
Choosing the popular initiative as their advocacy instrument, they collected over one 
million signatures of support and submitted the bill to the legislature.  In less than a year, 
the law was passed and implemented, reaching an estimated ten million Argentines.
39
  
Observers tend to regard the campaign as a successful case of varied civil societal actors 
working in concert, but it also represents a lost opportunity for children’s advocates to 
make political demands alongside other citizens.
40
   
In fact, the social crisis has posed further challenges to groups, especially those 
trying to ameliorate its effects.  In the context of growing hunger, homelessness, and 
child labor, activists increasingly have devoted time and resources to direct assistance 
activities.  This has complicated their efforts to mobilize organizational resources through 
                                                                                                                                                 
Foundation for the Study and Research of Women (FEIM), Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Founding 
Group), Peace and Justice Service (SERPAJ), and a variety of university-based institutions, among others.   
39
 La Nación, issue dated 12/1/03.  The campaign, entitled “The Most Urgent Hunger,” involved Citizen 
Power, the Sophia Group, the Solidary Network, and other actors.  The resulting program targets poor 
children under the age of five.  It is reportedly the second time a popular initiative has become law 
(Infocívica article dated 7/7/03, available at: http://www.infocivica.org.  Accessed 8/2/03). 
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alliance building and, more generally, to engage in advocacy.  A member of a faith-based 
group lamented that “there’s always some urgent task to perform,” and “you can only fit 
so much into a day’s work.”
41
  Even members of organizations primarily interested in 
promoting rights, most notably the Children’s Rights Association, have become involved 
in meeting children’s nutritional needs and providing other services.
42
  Thus, the social 
situation has overwhelmed some CSOs; transparency activists were not forced to grapple 
with such dilemmas.      
The factors that have hindered the development of stronger CSO partnerships 
among children’s advocates will likely persist in the near term.  Nevertheless, it is 
possible that CSOs will overcome some of the fragmentation analyzed here by 
regrouping in CASACIDN, consolidating the newer Collective, or creating other 
alliances. 
 
Children’s advocacy in Chile 
 Because children’s advocacy in Chile differs from activism within Argentina in 
several respects, interesting opportunities for comparative analysis exist.  In this section, I 
focus on one key difference:  Chilean groups have established a national NGO network.  
The experiences of this emergent network provide empirical support for the theoretical 
arguments presented earlier:  it is more convenient for government officials to consult 
                                                                                                                                                 
40
 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.   
41
 This comment and others like it were made during a meeting of the Social Sector Forum’s committee on 
children’s issues, held on 3/5/03, in Buenos Aires.     
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more formal and/or permanent alliances than to seek out many atomized groups; and 
decision makers often regard such entities as “representative” of a wider range of civil 
society voices.  In short, CSO partnerships can be advantageous during policy 
formulation.  At the same time, the Chilean example suggests that this mode of civil 
society participation may entail certain limitations, which I discuss below.    
Like children’s advocates in Argentina, Chilean activists have valuable 
organizational resources to bring to bear on the political process.  A number of groups 
have professional staff members and/or volunteers and relatively well-developed 
administrative capacities.  Most CSOs possess much-needed expertise and information on 
the status of their country’s youth; and through the preparation of the reports for the U.N., 
they have become reliable monitors of the state.
43 
 Some of the groups also have useful 
political and bureaucratic contacts and audiences interested in their work in both the 
legislative and executive branches.   
It bears mentioning that numerous CSOs are involved in combating poverty and 
helping families meet their basic needs.
44
  However, the social and economic 
circumstances under which they operate obviously are less dire than the Argentine 
                                                                                                                                                 
42
 Interviews in the Children’s Rights Association (ADI), 4/4/03, and the Collective of NGOs for Children 
and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires.  Among other activities, ADI has organized a network of 
community kitchens in Buenos Aires Province. 
43
 In addition, they are embedded in the international children’s rights movement and recipients of funding 
and support from abroad.  For instance, as suggested by its name, the Chilean Association Pro United 
Nations (ACHNU) has ties to the U.N. community, as well as other global actors.  
44
 Groups address basic needs by implementing government policies or running their own programs, as 
noted in Chapter 2.     
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context.  They are thus more able to resist being drawn into the emergency assistance 
quagmire, which consumes precious resources.
45
    
Children’s advocates have succeeded in pooling their resources, coordinating their 
efforts, and presenting a united front vis-à-vis governing elites.  They formalized their 
cooperation by creating the National Network of Children’s and Youth NGOs, 
constituted in 2001 during a series of meetings involving approximately 60 organizations.  
However, some of the member groups had collaborated previously while preparing the 
U.N. reports and engaging in other common pursuits.  The network is comprised of 
regional branches and a national board, which currently includes representatives from the 
Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU) and the Peace and Justice Service 
(SERPAJ), among others.  It is both large and diverse.   
The network has three main objectives.  First, it seeks to facilitate collaboration, 
dialogue, and the exchange of information, know-how, and experiences among member 
groups.  Second, participating organizations identify themselves as “critical and 
constructive” monitors of the state’s compliance with the Convention.  Third, the network 
aspires to influence policy reforms.  A goal underlying all three objectives is to become 
an authoritative “spokesperson” for children’s issues.
46
 
 Although the network is in a nascent stage of development, it appears to be 
moving in the intended directions.  From the perspective of a board member and 
coordinator, the formation of the network has been a significant impetus for both its 
                                                 
45
 These CSOs, like most in the region, must deal with resource shortages:  an oft-cited constraint is the 
preponderance of short-term, project-based instead of longer-term funding for organizational development.   
46
 The source for these objectives is an introductory document, “Carta Presentación,” authored by the 
network. 
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members and the government.  Public officials are more obligated than before to take 
their presence into account, she argues:  “At least now they have to call us.”
47
  The leader 
suggests further that the network’s more “representative” character is one reason why 
decision makers should consult the alliance (as opposed to individual groups).   
Indeed, governing elites seem content to take them up on this offer.  They tend to 
welcome the existence of something approximating an encompassing association that 
speaks on behalf of myriad CSOs.  Accordingly, a staff member at the Planning and 
Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN) accepts the network as a legitimate civil society 
interlocutor.
48
  More recently, the network has become involved in a newly created civil 
society advisory committee convened by the government.  Members have expressed their 
hope that participating in this forum will improve their chances of influencing the agenda 
and promoting their proposals.
49
 
 Thus, in terms of access to government policy makers, the national NGO network 
has one foot in the door.  While the network was being formally constituted, officials in 
the executive branch were involving CSOs in the formulation of their child protection 
policy.  However, as noted in Chapter 2, this is a case of intermediate levels of civil 
society participation in policy making.  One of the reasons for these middling levels is the 
relative lack of stakeholdership in the resulting policy:  the role of CSOs in shaping the 
actual contours of the reform was minor compared to that of government officials.  In 
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 Interview in ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago.  
48
 Interview in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/18/02, Santiago.  Similar views were expressed during a 
further interview in this Division, held on 10/10/02.    
49
 Specifically, the committee is organized by a council of ministers involved in children’s issues (Consejo 
de Ministros por la Infancia), over which MIDEPLAN presides (For details, see ACHNU’s website, 
available at: http://www.achnu.cl.  Accessed 6/10/04).     
 180 
general, this case exemplifies more of a top-down, government-led dynamic compared to 
the instances of policy making examined earlier.  It is understandable that a civil society 
network would aspire to be consulted by the government; nevertheless, if pressure from 
below does not accompany such consultations, CSO participation may remain limited.  
Further research is needed to ascertain whether networks are more susceptible than 
informal coalitions to these top-down modes of inclusion in policy making.    
 Additionally, some members question the extent to which the network actually 
represents them.  People involved in smaller CSOs, for instance, express concern that the 
more dominant NGOs seek a “monopoly” on children’s issues.
50
  The resources and 
leadership of a few large, well-organized, and bureaucratic NGOs in this issue area may 
have facilitated the establishment of the network; ironically, however, these same factors 
may cause problems within the alliance that hinder its endurance and efficacy over time.  
In a later section of the chapter, I discuss apprehensions regarding unequal power 
relationships within alliances, as well as other common pitfalls for inter-organizational 
cooperation.   
In summary, instead of a loose coalition, children’s advocates in Chile have 
established a more formal vehicle for cooperation.  Unlike the Argentine alliances 
examined previously, the network is national in scope.  Moreover, in this issue area, no 
other alliance currently rivals the network, which is trying to consolidate its status as the 
foremost interlocutor vis-à-vis the government.  I have argued that the network’s 
effectiveness has helped facilitate CSO involvement in policy formulation.  On the other 
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 I am keeping the organizational affiliations of the persons quoted here anonymous.      
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hand, I have cautioned that the “participation via consultation” dynamic may differ 
qualitatively from participation bolstered by pressure “from below.” 
Environmental advocacy in Chile  
The final instance of policy making discussed in this section is drawn from the 
environmental issue area in Chile.  Although I emphasize the case of the Bío Bío River 
dam project described in Chapter 2, a number of my conclusions are generalizable to 
other environmental policies.  In this domain, we find less robust evidence of CSOs 
joining forces to generate a critical mass, present a united front, and coordinate their 
political actions.  These lower levels of inter-organizational cooperation have hindered 
civil society participation in policy making.  
Green NGOs tend to have abundant organizational resources — such as expertise 
and administrative capacity — which they theoretically could devote to alliance building.  
For instance, over the past decade, most of the groups have become more 
professionalized.  Laboring under the assumption that government officials “only listen to 
technical arguments,” they commonly defend the environment with detailed research 
rather than emotional pleas on behalf of whales or pretty birds.
51
  Moreover, the NGOs 
have moved toward further specialization.  As discussed previously, they have created 
specific niches within the broader issue area of environmentalism (such as public interest 
law, Chile’s native forests, and marine wildlife and resources). 
Like their counterparts in the policy areas discussed earlier, environmentalists are 
adept monitors of the private and public sectors.  They have demonstrated their citizen 
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control capabilities time and again by holding government officials to account, alleging 
irregularities or cases of corruption, and calling for increased public access to 
environmental information.  The Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna 
(CODEFF), active since 1968, probably enjoys the most prestige, and its wide 
membership provides some additional legitimacy.  Although green NGOs have yet to 
achieve the high levels of social recognition enjoyed by some of the other CSOs 
described earlier, they count on a fairly strong media presence.
52
   
In addition, the Political Ecology Institute (IEP), Terram, and other NGOs have 
working relationships with legislators representing various political parties, especially 
members of the parliamentary green caucus (bancada verde).
53
  Examples of 
collaboration include organizing meetings, exchanging information and analysis, and 
holding joint press conferences.  To a lesser extent, members of groups — for example, 
CODEFF — also enjoy a good rapport with officials in the National Environmental 
Commission (CONAMA).
54 
      
                                                                                                                                                 
51
 Interview in the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna (CODEFF), 10/14/02, Santiago.  
52
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the relationship of the organizations to the press (and consequently, to the 
public) is complicated.  Actors with opposing views, including pundits on the right, have targeted 
environmentalists for criticism, and vitriolic exchanges in the media occasionally ensue.  Some civil society 
personalities gain notoriety instead of prestige from this type of coverage.   
53
 Interviews in Political Ecology Institute, 9/16/02, and Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago.  Deputies Alejandro 
Navarro and Leopoldo Sánchez and Senator Antonio Horvath, among others, have been active in 
environmental issues.  Green NGOs also are embedded in international environmental advocacy networks; 
many gain access to material and ideational resources by participating in transnational movements and 
events, as I outline in Chapter 5.   
54
 As in the case of children’s advocacy in Argentina, the movement of civil society leaders into 
government positions (an aspect of leadership exchange) has not led to favorable outcomes.  The most 
high-profile example is Lagos’ appointment of Adriana Hoffman, of Defenders of the Chilean Forest, as 
director of CONAMA.  All those interviewed regarded the policies approved during her brief tenure as 
setbacks for the environment, though they respect her as a colleague.  
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Chilean environmental groups have considerable organizational assets that could 
be mobilized through alliance building.  However, compared to the other CSOs analyzed 
in this chapter, they have been less successful at combining and mobilizing these 
resources in partnerships.  Concretely, the green NGOs did not form a broad-based 
alliance in response to the Bío Bío project.  Additionally, with the exception of CODEFF 
and the Political Ecology Institute, the most important NGOs refrained from joining the 
alliance that did emerge.  That coalition, which remained active throughout the 1990s, 
comprised individuals and groups involved in human rights, indigenous rights, and 
similar causes.
55
  Thus, limited inter-organizational cooperation has been a significant 
barrier to CSO participation in this case of policy making.   
Moreover, looking beyond the particulars of the dam project, one observes that no 
broadly inclusive network or umbrella group exists at the national level.  As discussed 
previously, the children’s network brings together a diverse range of organizations, 
including those perceived as the most “significant” actors in that issue area.   In contrast, 
the environmental CSOs have yet to create a network of comparable breadth.  The 
National Network for Ecological Action (Renace), for instance, has a large and diverse 
membership that includes grassroots actors.  Nevertheless, Renace does not include most 
of the green NGOs examined here and is representative of the ecological wing of the 
movement.
56
  Hence, no existing network unites the most prominent NGOs, transcends 
                                                 
55
 The name of the task force was Action Group for the Bío Bío, GABB (Grupo de Acción del Bío Bío).  
For descriptions of its activities, see Aylwin (2002) and Claude (1999).  
56
 The Political Ecology Institute is closely affiliated with (and helped create) Renace.  There has been 
some coordination between Renace and the Bío Bío task force. 
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some of their differences, and appears to outsiders (i.e., governing elites) as a legitimate 
representative of the majority of environmental advocates.       
The lack of sustained cooperation among groups does not escape several NGO 
leaders, who conclude that “solidarity has been scarce,” and that groups exist as small, 
separate, and largely “self-sufficient” entities (Claude 1999).
57
  The absence of a national 
environmental network or other encompassing association also provokes unease within 
CONAMA.  For example, an official charged with incorporating CSOs into the agency’s 
advisory councils remarks that this absence complicates her work:  selecting 
“representative” groups is hardly a straightforward task.
58
 
The sources of this fragmentation are varied.  To begin with, the NGOs are 
diverse in terms of their specific focus areas, as mentioned previously.  For now, 
organizations appear to be consolidating their respective niches rather than joining forces 
to combine their expertise.  Furthermore, they do not share a single understanding of all 
policy issues owing to the divergent conservationist, environmental, ecological, or 
technical perspectives of their members.   
Strategic and tactical differences among the NGOs also have provoked 
disagreements.  Activists claim, for instance, that past adventures in the realm of electoral 
politics have caused estrangement.  Specifically, an NGO member became a candidate in 
the 1999 presidential race with the backing of some fellow ecologists; other individuals 
                                                 
57
 Interview in House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago.  Ad hoc coalitions occasionally emerge during issue-
specific campaigns.     
58
 Interview in CONAMA, Department of Environmental Culture and Human Environment, 10/7/02, 
Santiago.  The agency’s solution is to ask CSOs to elect representatives.  
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and groups instead endorsed Lagos’ candidacy.
59
  In addition, some groups have moved in 
the direction of increased dialogue with businesses to facilitate conflict resolution 
between the private sector and local communities.
60
  Observers often note as an example 
the perceived coziness between the Environmental Research and Planning Center 
(CIPMA), a research institute dating to the dictatorial period, and the business elite 
(Carruthers 2001; Silva 1997).  Other NGOs view this sort of rapprochement and the 
search for market-based solutions for environmental conflicts as objectionable, given that 
the political and economic systems already privilege business interests.   
In brief, several factors have encumbered alliance building in this issue area.  
However, the NGOs may be able to better negotiate their differences and achieve greater 
coordination in the future.  Additionally — or perhaps as an alternative strategy — they 
will likely forge partnerships with other social actors.  In fact, several organizations 
already have made serious efforts to work with aggrieved or “affected” groups, whose 
livelihoods are intimately connected to the health of the environment.  To illustrate, 
Ecoceanos and Terram each maintain ties to organizations of traditional fishermen in the 
South-Central regions of Chile.
61
  The existence of encompassing associations of 
fisherman, such as the national confederation, CONAPACH, facilitates such linkages.  
Traditional, small-scale fishing methods are widely recognized as more sustainable in 
terms of both the environment and employment opportunities compared to the practices 
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 I refer here to Sara Larraín (Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago).  Claude (1999) provides further 
details of the resulting rift.      
60
 House of Peace also serves as an intermediary between communities and business and facilitates 
dialogue among a variety of social actors (Interview, 9/17/02, Santiago).      
61
 Interviews in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, and Terram, 10/10/02, Santiago; see also the bulletin published by 
Parlamento del Mar, issue dated 9/02).  The term in Spanish is pescadores artesanales.   
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of larger enterprises and multinational corporations.  NGOs also have collaborated with 
indigenous communities.  Environmental advocates likewise could pursue alliances with 
segments of the agricultural sector and the tourism industry.  In short, a more inclusive 
movement for reform — one that involves actors besides urban, middle-class activists — 
may coalesce and engage the policy process.
62
 
Based on the empirical data summarized above, it should be clear that CSOs do 
not always succeed in forging alliances; indeed, they often fail.  This raises a key 
question:  if the strategy of building partnerships increases the likelihood of policy 
involvement and influence, what are the chances that groups will in fact cooperate?  
Because collective action cannot be taken for granted, it is necessary to discuss the 
challenges involved in forming, maintaining, and participating in alliances.  These factors 
help explain the considerable variation across time and space in levels of inter-
organizational cooperation. 
 
THE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION:  CREATING AND MAINTAINING ALLIANCES 
 
To build a successful partnership, CSOs first must overcome the collective action 
problem.  Olson’s (1965) classic work analyzes the collective action dilemma at the level 
of the rational individual considering membership in a group.
63
  The logic of his argument 
                                                 
62
 Studies conducted by Hochstetler (1997) and Umlas (1998) provide comparative evidence from Brazil 
and Mexico, respectively, of middle-class, urban environmental activists cooperating with grassroots, base, 
and indigenous organizations. 
63
 A rationalist perspective suggests that an individual is unlikely to join an organization pursuing collective 
goods, or indivisible benefits intended for a larger group.  Consequently, organizations offer selective 
incentives:  a glossy newsletter, discounted insurance, or other “noncollective” goods and services that 
increase the private value of membership.  Otherwise, individuals will free ride, enjoying the collective 
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extends to organizations contemplating joining an alliance.  However, in a study of 
lobbying coalitions in the United States, Hula (1999) argues that the collective action and 
free rider dilemmas are less stark at the organizational level.
64
   Unlike inactive 
individuals, interest groups need no enticing to jump into the political fray; they are 
already active and invested in a given policy issue.  The author also suggests that 
coalitions provide selective benefits, such as information, to participating organizations.  
Members of individual groups also perceive coalitional tactics to be effective strategies 
for realizing their objectives.  Thus, alliance building can be understood as a rational, 
utility-maximizing behavior.  
Moreover, commitment to a set of common values or views can be an equally 
important source of motivation for alliance building.  Much as “principled ideas” are an 
impetus for the transnational advocacy networks analyzed by Keck and Sikkink (1998a), 
shared ideas sustain domestic-level cooperation.  In short, we can identify both rational 
and principled motivations for inter-organizational cooperation.    
Nevertheless, groups encounter many obstacles along the path of cooperation.  In 
this section, I focus on some of the internal difficulties plaguing alliances, namely, factors 
                                                                                                                                                 
benefits without contributing to the group.  Some social movement scholars (among others) have taken 
issue with elements of this approach.  In addition to noting the ubiquity of collective action, they challenge 
the notion that organizations often rely on selective incentives.  They suggest that moral and “solidary” 
incentives, which blur the distinction between collective and selective, are important for organizational 
maintenance; examples include a shared “moral vision” and the “self-respect” of the collectivity (Jenkins 
1987, 303; Tarrow 1994).  Analysts also expect the free rider problem to be more serious for groups 
“whose members are self-consciously seeking to maximize their own material self-interest” than for 
“purposive groups, whose members are more committed to an ideology stressing the collective welfare” 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 138).   
64
 Hula (1999) focuses on traditional pressure groups engaged predominantly in lobbying inside the 
beltway, but a similarly rational calculus occurs within other types of citizen organizations.     
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over which groups exercise some control.
65
  These include competition among individual 
organizations, concerns about their autonomy, leadership rivalries, perceptions of unequal 
power relations within alliances, and limited human resources.  All alliances, whether 
nascent or longstanding, must address the challenges summarized here; partnerships 
require continual maintenance and constant renegotiation.   
To begin with, the perennial problem of inter-organizational competition hampers 
the emergence and persistence of alliances.  CSOs compete with one another for 
financing and recognition.  Groups — seeking satisfaction for their “organizational egos” 
— vie for both funds and “credit” for successful projects or outcomes (Berry 1997).
66
  In 
a competitive or zero-sum environment, a CSO is likely to regard a certain source of 
funding, piece of information, area of expertise, or other asset as a strategic advantage.  
When the group shares such resources with others, it risks losing its competitive edge.  
The organization also may lose some of the credit its members think it deserves when 
recognition is distributed among several CSOs.  For instance, an NGO member suggests 
that groups are uncomfortable with the notion of sharing what they consider to be 
“theirs.”
67
   Similarly, Shepard (2003) identifies a process of “dilution,” whereby a 
network’s success masks the contributions of its member groups.  This phenomenon 
applies to other types of alliances, as well.  In brief, competition should not be 
underestimated in contexts where CSOs often struggle for their very survival.      
                                                 
65
 CSOs trying to create and maintain alliances also confront a number of environmental challenges (e.g., 
political cultural or institutional factors), which I address in Chapter 5. 
66
 In a description of this tendency in American politics, Berry states that “a group’s organizational ego 
makes it want to shine on its own some of the time and to gain the reputation of being able to make things 
happen in Washington” (1997, 193).  
67
 Interview in the Commitment Foundation, 2/26/03, Buenos Aires. 
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The question of autonomy also arises when CSOs consider entering into 
partnerships.
68
  Groups carefully guard their independence and self-determination.  They 
seek to maintain their capacity to determine organizational goals and courses of action 
and are usually unwilling to relinquish their independence for the sake of the collectivity.  
Stated differently, almost everyone likes the idea of coordination, but no one wants to be 
coordinated (Gordenker and Weiss 1995b; Jönsson and Söderholm 1995).  
Leadership rivalries pose several related challenges.  One would expect leadership 
problems to complicate the creation of an alliance, as various individuals and/or groups 
compete for control of the incipient partnership.  On the other hand, it may be more 
common for such problems to threaten the survival of an alliance.  My findings indicate 
that members of CSOs sometimes question leaders and express misgivings about the 
extent to which they adequately represent participating organizations.  While some 
activists cast doubt on the abilities of specific people to direct the alliance, they more 
often communicate reservations about internal decision-making processes.  A recurring 
perception is that one or two organizations dominate these procedures and lack 
accountability to other participants, who conclude, “They don’t speak for all of us.”
69
  I 
presented evidence of such views in the analysis of the Chilean National Network of 
Children’s and Youth NGOs and Argentina’s CASACIDN.  In both cases, there are 
participants who question the degree to which leaders represent the membership and 
harbor fears of concentrated decision making, inequality, and/or dominance.  They 
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 Scholars tend to dwell on CSOs’ independence from political parties and the state, a theme which I 
address in Chapter 6.   
69
 The organizational affiliation of the person quoted here is kept anonymous. 
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remark that a few people make pronouncements on behalf of the alliance, sometimes 
without consulting other contributors.
70
 
It also can be difficult for overcommitted and overstretched groups to devote 
human resources to partnership-related activities.  An NGO member explains that civil 
societal actors contemplating involvement in an alliance realize that “the coordination of 
all those projects requires time and effort.”
71
  Indeed, time is a precious commodity for all 
participants in CSOs and especially volunteers, who usually have other jobs and 
responsibilities.  Furthermore, CSOs that routinely cooperate with other groups risk 
developing a sort of alliance fatigue.  This can occur when a certain constellation of 
issues, such as political reform in present-day Argentina, spawn multiple alliances.  
Oftentimes, the same people participate in various working groups, “chatting about the 
same things” at different meetings.
72 
 Too much overlap can lead to overkill. 
Each of these issues affects the decision calculus that occurs within individual 
groups with respect to creating, joining, and staying active in a partnership.  Even 
members of organizations that collaborate with other groups on a regular basis are 
sometimes ambivalent on the subject:  one such activist explained that working in 
alliances is not a “unanimous policy” among her colleagues, who frequently discuss the 
pros and cons involved.
73
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 According to Olvera (2000), Mexico’s Civic Alliance has experienced internal tensions related to the 
degree to which the centralized leadership consults its geographically dispersed support base.     
71
 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.  Shepard (2003) makes a similar 
observation. 
72
 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires.   
73
 Interview in CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires.   
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In short, the degree to which CSOs succeed in joining forces varies significantly 
owing to a number of challenges inherent to alliance building.  Additionally, groups 
always face multiple obstacles simultaneously, given that they are closely intertwined.  
Enumerating all of the creative strategies that CSOs use to overcome these difficulties is 
not among the goals of this chapter.  Instead, I propose one strategy:  opting for a 
coalitional structure.  Compared to other types of partnerships, ad hoc coalitions are 
better able to surmount the obstacles discussed above.  In fact, coalitions can circumvent 
some of the thornier issues altogether.  Coalitions tend to be informal, temporary 
arrangements motivated by a concrete and/or limited set of goals.  By nature, they 
confront internal and external obstacles with greater flexibility than alliances that are 
formally constituted, permanent, interested in multiple objectives, and comprised of 
numerous groups.  Coalitions are particularly adept at dealing with questions surrounding 
autonomy, leadership, and alliance fatigue.   
Members of individual groups often view coalitions favorably, because they 
believe such arrangements do not require that they surrender much organizational 
autonomy.  Coalitions entail CSOs acting in concert but not necessarily joining a more 
permanent collectivity.  Participants thus enjoy the benefits of presenting a united front to 
outsiders — for instance, governing elites and the broader public — on a given issue 
while also retaining their independence.  When the time comes to decide an 
organization’s position or course of action on other issues, groups can do so without 
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consulting their peers.  They are free to either go on hiatus or continue coordinating their 
efforts for the foreseeable future.
74
    
In addition to guarding their freedom to maneuver, individual CSOs tend to 
protect their own resources.  They therefore express reluctance to devote material and 
human resources to building a more lasting (or bureaucratic) alliance structure.  
Coalitional strategies rarely necessitate the creation of such a structure.  Moreover, once 
created, formal alliances usually compete with individual groups for scarce funding.  As a 
result, some civil societal actors view them as potential rivals or threats.  In contrast, 
coalitions can allay these concerns to a large extent.     
A coalitional approach also may diminish anxieties related to leadership.  With 
respect to representation and accountability, more is at stake for leaders of formal 
alliances, especially those with wider memberships.  As discussed previously, networks 
and umbrella groups commonly purport to “represent” particular segments of civil 
society, such as the majority of children’s NGOs.  Sometimes encompassing associations 
include an even broader cross-section of issue areas or types of CSOs (e.g., NGOs or base 
organizations).  Their leaders consequently claim to speak on behalf of these 
constituencies.  Coalitions, on the other hand, are organized around specific issues or 
policy goals and rarely make such claims.   
By and large, it is not feasible for formal alliances to remain leaderless.  Even 
networks — which frequently aspire to “horizontal” decision making — often select 
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 The ability to retain group autonomy is sometimes cited as a benefit of coalitions in other political 
contexts.  Examples of works that discuss interest group coalitions in the United States include Berry 
(1997), Costain (1980), Gelb and Palley (1996), Hrebenar (1997), and Hula (1999).  In addition, Shepard 
 193 
leaders.  In contrast, coalitions sometimes refrain from naming official leaders.  Instead, 
one or more individuals (or groups) coordinate the coalition’s activities without 
necessarily making key decisions or regularly speaking on behalf of the participating 
CSOs.  I observed this sort of coordination in the freedom of information campaign.  
Such an arrangement circumvents the leadership issue to an extent.  Furthermore, 
leadership rivalries and disputes tend to be “less intense,” because activists realize that 
future opportunities for leadership will surface along with new political struggles and 
different coalitions (Costain 1980, 491).  These considerations help lower the stakes.       
A final advantage of coalitions also stems from their temporary nature.  If 
members of a coalition are experiencing alliance fatigue, they can dissolve the alliance or 
suspend its activities.  They may reactivate the coalition at a later date, especially when 
personal friendships have formed among participants.  However they proceed, periods of 
abeyance or inactivity are acceptable.  On the other hand, when a more permanent 
alliance undergoes such a period, outsiders usually interpret it as a sign of decline or 
weakness.   
In summary, coalitions confront certain obstacles with superior agility compared 
to more formal, enduring alliances with varied goals and larger memberships.  Coalitions 
frequently skirt around some of the tougher issues facing partnerships, such as leadership 
disputes.  Nevertheless, other types of alliances are not doomed to failure; rather, they 
must go to greater lengths to create appropriate mechanisms for internal decision making 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2003) suggests that coalitions are better able to respond rapidly to changing political circumstances 




  In particular, good “governance” can mitigate some of the problems 
associated with representation and accountability and smooth the path of cooperation. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have elucidated the difficult choices that members of CSOs 
encounter in the pursuit of cooperation.  Earlier I cited an NGO member who expressed 
confusion as to why an individual organization would make policy demands alone instead 
of teaming up with other groups that share its goals.  Trying to achieve change single-
handedly struck her as inefficient.  For her, the “choice” that participants in CSOs face 
was clear: “Either we unite, or we unite.”
76
  For others, the choice can be more agonizing, 
especially when they perceive dangers to their autonomy or unequal power relations 
within alliances.  Even groups motivated to construct, join, and remain involved in 
alliances confront serious challenges; hence, levels of cooperation vary across cases.   
The results of my comparative analysis demonstrate that these varying levels have 
a direct impact on policy involvement.  For instance, the coalition in favor of freedom of 
information legislation illustrates many of the advantages of forming alliances and 
produced positive results.  In contrast, the case of children’s advocacy in Argentina 
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 Sikkink (2002) underscores the need for internal democratic practices within transnational networks to 
address accountability, transparency, and representation (see also Florini 2000).  Similarly, Jordan and Van 
Tuijl (2000) suggest that members of transnational networks have a “political responsibility” toward others 
engaged in an advocacy campaign to conduct democratically.  Examples of the dimensions of this 
responsibility include establishing transparent goals, ensuring equitable flows of information, and jointly 
managing strategy.  In her study of networks uniting women’s sexual and reproductive rights advocates, 
Shepard (2003) emphasizes issues pertaining to internal governance within NGO networks (e.g., 
membership and decision making). 
76
 Interview in CIPPEC, Project Coordination, 4/14/03, Buenos Aires. 
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produced more mixed results:  inter-organizational cooperation facilitated CSO 
participation in policy for a time, but a more recent trend toward fragmentation has 
hindered their ability to stay involved.  Their counterparts in Chile, however, are in the 
process of solidifying a national network.  This case provides evidence that networks can 
be instrumental during policy formulation.  Finally, several factors conspire against 
partnerships among Chilean environmental NGOs.  The dearth of broad-based alliances 
helps explain the lower levels of policy involvement in this instance.   
The evidence thus supports the arguments proposed in Chapter 1, which suggest 
that the likelihood of policy participation increases when CSOs combine and deploy 
organizational resources in alliances.  By joining forces, groups pool their expertise, 
credibility, political and media connections, administrative capacities, information, ideas, 
and know-how.  In addition, they can create a critical mass and back their collective 
demands with greater numbers, thereby attracting the attention of governing elites and the 
public.  Through alliances, CSOs also can coordinate their advocacy efforts and avoid 
redundancies in their activities.  These benefits of alliances have consequences for civil 
society influence during the formulation, agenda-setting, and adoption phases of policy.   
Moreover, certain characteristics enhance the effectiveness of alliances and their 
impact on the dependent variable.  These include ties to other alliances or political 
movements, a good division of labor and successful coordination, and a balance between 
internal diversity and cohesion (or agreement on basic goals and strategies).  Given the 
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difficulty of this balancing act, advocates often identify group differences as the most 
challenging aspect of alliance building.
77
   
By advancing causal arguments and weighing them against the available 
evidence, I seek to contribute to an area of inquiry that has received surprisingly little 
attention.  To date, few scholars have investigated CSO partnerships in countries that 
have undergone democratic transitions.  I have put my ideas into conversation with the 
pluralist and corporatist traditions, as well as more recent work on Latin American civil 
societies.  However, my theoretical contribution is distinctive in a number of ways.  To 
begin with, the logic of cooperating to augment one’s political strength is relevant in 
political systems that lack the features traditionally associated with pluralism or 
corporatism.  Furthermore, the imperative to join together not only governs the behavior 
of narrowly defined “interest groups” but applies more broadly to the non-profit, public 
interest CSOs that are the focus of this dissertation.  Indeed, alliances are probably even 
more essential in countries where the third sector is developing, CSOs generally lack 
material resources, and the relationship between the government and civil society is in the 
process of being defined and negotiated.   
A further contribution of the chapter is methodological:  I undertake a 
comparative analysis of alliances using evidence from three distinct issue areas and two 
countries.  This fulfills an urgent need for more comprehensive, systematic, critical, and 
comparative analyses of civil societal behavior.   
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 Interviews in the Civil Rights Association, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires, ACHNU, 11/4/02, Santiago, and 
House of Peace, 9/17/02, Santiago.    
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Future research should delve more deeply into a number of questions related to 
the internal structures and practices of alliances.  For instance, what other strategies do 
CSOs use to overcome the above-mentioned challenges of building and maintaining 
partnerships?  What are the origins and consequences of different types of governance 
procedures:  how do member groups decide on these arrangements; and how do they 
affect the overall agility, accountability, and effectiveness of alliances?  In general, more 
data are needed to elucidate the trade-offs involved in selecting particular types of 
alliances.   
Another question worth investigating is whether partnerships have implications 
for citizen control as well as for citizen participation.  For instance, alliances may 
facilitate civil society’s role in monitoring existing policies.  By cooperating, CSOs can 
pool their expertise and maximize their ability to gather the information needed to 
evaluate government programs.  Additionally, it is probably difficult for the government 
to co-opt every last member of the alliance; hence, the groups involved are more likely to 
remain independent from the government, which is necessary for effective, credible 
monitoring.  Recent initiatives in Argentina serve to illustrate this point.  The World 
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank selected a national consortium of over 50 
NGOs to monitor the social policies they were funding in late 2002 and early 2003.  The 
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 Interview with the General Coordinator of the Social Sector Forum Consortium, 3/12/03, Buenos Aires.  
At this time, the banks were financing a number of emergency social programs to address Argentina’s 
economic crisis.  The consortium includes a diverse array of development, direct assistance, and faith-based 
organizations.  Its main responsibilities are to obtain feedback from recipients of social programs, register 
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In conclusion, alliances, like effective framing, represent a significant pathway to 
civil society participation in policy making.  To explain policy influence, we must look to 
CSOs’ strategies for mobilizing both ideas and resources.  Together, successful framing 
and partnerships account for much of the observed variation on the dependent variable.  
By forming effective alliances and framing ideas in persuasive ways, groups are 
generating their own opportunities for participation.  In this chapter and the last, I have 
privileged the agency of civil societal actors over structural factors.  My purpose in 
Chapter 5 is entirely different:  I address the broader domestic and international context 
in which framing and alliance building occur.    
                                                                                                                                                 
complaints or irregularities, produce reports, and make recommendations about the administration of the 
policies (La Nación, issue dated 2/4/03).  First on its agenda was evaluating a program providing assistance 
for unemployed heads of households with children (Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados).   
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Chapter 5:  Factors That Influence Framing and Alliance Building 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While many civil societal actors are preoccupied with the implications of 
international flows of trade and investment, some also are mindful of other forms of 
“globalization.”  A Chilean environmental activist, for instance, considers the 
transnational exchange of ideas, analysis, and information to be the “more positive aspect 
of globalization.”
1  Like his fellow NGO leaders, he participates in regional and 
international events and values these opportunities to link up with sympathetic 
individuals active in NGOs and networks.  Civil societies in Latin America are thus 
embedded in a complex web of global relationships.  With these linkages in mind, I have 
argued throughout the dissertation that it is necessary to integrate transnational factors 
into analyses of domestic-level advocacy to achieve a closer fit between theory and the 
empirical realities of democratizing, developing nations. 
In the present chapter, I examine the global and domestic political context in 
which groups mobilize.  Up to this point, I have investigated the strategies that CSOs use 
to exercise their political voices and influence the policy process.  I therefore have 
focused on the agency of civil societal actors rather than on structural variables.  In the 
paragraphs that follow, however, I contemplate the environmental factors that constrain 
and shape activists’ choices with regard to framing and alliance building.  By placing 
                                                 
1
 Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago.      
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group strategies in their proper perspective, I offer an analysis of advocacy that is not 
purely agency-driven.  
My main goal in this chapter is to take a step back in the causal chain by 
proposing domestic and international factors that affect the independent variables of the 
dissertation and consequently have an indirect impact on the dependent variable.  These 
include political institutions and “master frames” at the domestic level and flows of 
resources and ideas at the international level.
2
  I argue that institutional features — the 
extent to which the political system is centralized, for example — shape patterns of 
alliance building.  Additionally, I suggest that master frames and the political rhetoric 
previously used by activists influence CSOs’ framing strategies.  Investigating these 
domestic contextual factors requires a shift in the mode of comparative analysis from the 
case comparisons performed in Chapters Three and Four to country-level comparisons 
between Argentina and Chile.  I also analyze the two forms of transnational influence on 
domestic activism mentioned above:  the availability of international norms and financial 
and other resources.      
 
THE POWER OF IDEAS:  CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
In this section, I discuss two factors that affect groups’ framing strategies, turning 
first to international exchanges and transfers of ideas.  I submit that these factors can 
influence the process of frame selection but seldom dictate that choice.    
                                                 
2
 Although other contextual variables could be discussed, I have narrowed the scope of this chapter to these 
four factors, which I consider to be the most significant. 
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Transnational flows of ideas 
Analysts of various global actors — multilateral banks, intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), and international NGOs, networks, and social movements — often 
underscore their role as “carriers” of world views, ideologies, and ideas.
3
  In particular, 
studies of transnational activists and NGOs tend to highlight their contributions to the 
development, diffusion, and institutionalization of norms (Clark 2001; Florini 2000; 
Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002).  These shared standards for behavior are sometimes 
codified in international or regional conventions, which subsequently are ratified by 
states.  Hence, they can serve as useful tools for domestic activists, who try to bring 




We cannot examine any of the dissertation’s issue areas without considering the 
international circulation of ideas and discourses.  However, civil societal actors rarely 
incorporate global norms into their frames in an automatic or absolute way.  Because the 
most effective frames resonate with domestic circumstances, activists who merely 
“import” pre-fabricated or -packaged sets of ideas are unlikely to enjoy much success.  
Norms are thus better understood as one of several factors influencing a CSO’s approach 
                                                 
3
 Representative works on transnational advocacy networks, social movements, and NGOs include Boli and 
Thomas (1999), Della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht (1999), Gordenker and Weiss (1995a & 1995b), Jordan and 
Van Tuijl (2000), Keck and Sikkink (1998a), Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002), Korzeniewicz and Smith 
(2001), Smith (1997), and Wapner (1995).  Another growing literature addresses international policy 
diffusion, or the process whereby policy alternatives and analysis travel across nations owing to a variety of 
mechanisms (e.g., Rogers 1995; Weyland 2004).   
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to politicizing issues.  Specifically, I argue that norms can contribute to activists’ 
interpretations of reality and understandings of a given policy domain.  These are key 
ingredients in framing, which infuses experiences with meaning that can legitimate and 
guide collective action.  The exchange and availability of international ideas also can 
provide discursive shortcuts:  rather than create their own political discourse “from 
scratch,” groups can build on existing ones.  Moreover, they lend legitimacy to their 




Transnational norms are especially relevant for the motivational aspects of 
framing discussed in Chapter 3.  Norms can help activists communicate the importance of 
an issue and a sense of moral obligation, thus providing a rationale for action.  I therefore 
offer illustrations of domestic CSOs drawing on international norms for their 
motivational framing.  To begin with, activists promoting freedom of information have 
made frequent appeals to global and regional norms of transparency in newspaper 
editorials and their own publications on the subject.
6
  The norms are articulated in the 
Organization of American States’ (OAS) Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 
among other texts.  Argentina integrated the Convention into its legal framework in 
                                                                                                                                                 
4
 Keck and Sikkink (1998a) define “accountability politics” as exposing the distance between governments’ 
actual practices and their discursive positions on issues such as human rights.    
5 
In addition, by putting their ideas into conversation with international discourses, CSOs can reach a wider 
audience of people who speak a similar language.    
6
 See, for instance, an editorial authored by Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting 




  Because the document explicitly recognizes the role of civil society in the 
struggle against corruption, a committee comprising the Social Forum of Transparency, 
Citizen Power, Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), associations of lawyers, and 
other actors has been created to monitor Argentina’s compliance with the Convention.
8
  
Argentina is likewise a signatory to the United Nation’s Convention against Corruption, 
adopted in December 2003.  Transparency International, a global coalition of NGOs, is 
another important advocate and carrier of norms in this issue area.
9
  Citizen Power has 
served as the Argentine chapter of Transparency International since 1996, and other 
groups have maintained contact with the alliance (as well as with other international 
actors).  These ties facilitate the exchange of ideas. 
The promotion of these norms in international venues stems from two main sets 
of ideas.  First, global actors often consider transparency as one of several indicators of 
democratic consolidation and deepening.  Second, curbing corruption is part of the 
second generation of neoliberal reforms recommended by proponents of the Washington 
Consensus.  Thus, transparency is associated with democracy and neoliberalism, the two 
most hegemonic global discourses of the current era.  This lends considerable authority to 
the demands of domestic activists. 
                                                 
7
 I refer here to Law no. 24.759.  The right to information is also included in Argentina’s constitution.  
Specifically, Articles 38, 41, and 42 address access to information in reference to political parties, the 
environment, and consumers, respectively.   
8
 Judges, representatives from the University of Buenos Aires law school, and other participants also are 
active on the Committee, which is apparently the first of its kind (see the 2002 report entitled Primer 
Informe, authored by the Colegio Público de Abogados de la Capital Federal, Sede de la Secretaría 
Ejecutiva, Comisión de Seguimiento del Cumplimiento de la Convención Interamericana Contra la 
Corrupción).   
9
 Transparency International, founded in 1993, is well known for its annual index, which gauges 
perceptions of corruption across nations.  In addition, the Inter-American Dialogue and Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation have been involved in the struggle against corruption.  
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Indeed, NGOs have used transparency norms and conventions to justify swift 
political reforms within Argentina.  Their assertion that every self-respecting democratic 
regime should have freedom of information laws and safeguards is based in part on the 
international community’s shared view that corruption produces negative effects in all of 
the world’s democracies.  Activists ask why governing elites have failed to pass 
legislation so essential to democratic consolidation.  Whether an appeal to international 
norms is necessary to convey the policy’s salience is debatable, however.  The groups 
have been able to make a compelling case for the importance and urgency of 
transparency issues by emphasizing Argentines’ widespread concern over corruption (as 
well as the larger political crisis there).  Citizens perceive rampant corruption as an 
eminently Argentine problem, and the NGOs’ frames resonate with these domestic 
realities and perceptions.   
Children’s advocates in Argentina and Chile likewise have drawn on international 
norms and tailored them to domestic politics.  The adoption of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in the United Nations in 1989 was a defining moment for the global 
children’s rights movement, which has sought to institutionalize the Convention’s norms 
over the past decade.  The 1990s began with the World Summit for Children, hosted by 
the U.N., and the 2000s got underway with the Organization of American States 
designating 2001 as the Year of Children and Adolescents.  The shift from a 
needs/welfare perspective to a rights/protection discourse represents a significant victory 
for the movement (Brown Thompson 1997).
10
 
                                                 
10
 According to Brown Thompson (1997), compared to other global movements, the children’s rights 
movement is still in the early stages of incorporating these perspectives into legal norms and institutions.   
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 As suggested in previous chapters, the Convention on the Rights of the Child is 
essential to the work of myriad groups within Argentina and Chile.  Both states ratified 
the Convention, and Argentina also incorporated the text into its constitution.  Activists 
take advantage of these normative (and legal) frameworks to raise awareness of 
children’s rights, monitor state compliance with the Convention, and advocate for 
change.
11 
 According to the leader of a Chilean organization, groups try to exploit the 
“gap” between the Convention’s standards and reality.
12
  In addition, many advocates 
have strong ties to the United Nations community, including the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the Latin American and Caribbean “caucus” of NGOs 




 It is therefore not surprising that a number of Argentine and Chilean CSOs invoke 
international norms in their publications and organizational materials, as well as during 
public events.  In addition to providing a discursive shortcut, children’s rights norms help 
groups persuade others that both the state and society have a moral obligation to ensure 
the welfare of young people.  Children’s advocates can further legitimate their demands 
                                                 
11
 As discussed previously, the most common monitoring activity is the preparation of non-governmental 
reports for the U.N.’s Committee on the Rights of the Child in Geneva, which tracks state compliance with 
the Convention.  The Children’s Rights Association (ADI) tries to use the norms of the Convention to 
effect cultural change by training public school teachers and encouraging youth participation in public or 
community affairs (Interview in ADI, 4/4/03, Buenos Aires).   
12
 Interview in Chilean Association Pro United Nations (ACHNU), 11/4/02, Santiago.  
13
 The Committee for the Monitoring and Application of the International Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CASACIDN), ADI, and the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, among other Argentine groups, 
have participated in international meetings and events.  A recent example of such a meeting is the 
children’s summit held in New York City in 2002.  However, activists observe that other Latin American 
countries tend to have a stronger presence in these venues compared to Argentina (Interview in Collective 
of NGOs for Children and Adolescents, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires). 
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for immediate policy and institutional reforms.
14
  As in the freedom of information case, 
however, domestic groups encountered a special set of circumstances in Argentina:  as 
increasing numbers of young people suffered from malnutrition, dropped out of school, 
and worked in the informal sector, the plight of children became undeniable.  With 
respect to their motivational framing, activists could underscore the severity of these 
problems and tap into the public’s moral indignation.  Domestic factors therefore were 
more integral to the framing process than global norms. 
Lastly, participants in green NGOs in Chile have appealed to international 
normative frameworks.  Transnational linkages in the environmental issue area are quite 
dense:  Keck and Sikkink, for instance, note the “hundreds” of environmental networks 
that exist worldwide (1998a, 132; see also Kamieniecki 1993).  In addition to networks 
and NGOs, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and other global agencies 
have been at the forefront of ideational and discursive change.  These transnational actors 
have served as promoters and articulators of ideas — concerning sustainable 
development, conservation, and stewardship, for example — and norms, including the 
right to a healthy environment.
15
  It bears noting that international networks of 
environmentalists are usually bound by both norms and scientific ideas; thus, they often 
                                                 
14
 Like transparency, poverty alleviation is a component of the second generation of neoliberal reforms and 
a prominent goal of the international financial institutions (and broader development community).  
“Investing” in children is an investment in a country’s future development and prosperity, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4.  Because the well-being of children is related to reducing poverty, children’s advocates may 
gain an even wider international audience in the future.   
15
 In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development proposed a definition for sustainable 
development (development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs).  In addition, global discourses and norms have emerged with respect to the 
rights of indigenous peoples.  These clearly are relevant to the Bío Bío River dam project, which has 
threatened indigenous communities in Chile, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
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resemble epistemic communities as much as transnational advocacy networks, which 
share more “principled” sets of ideas (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998a).
16
   
Members of green NGOs make use of both sets of ideas in their advocacy work.  
In fact, an activist who is generally critical of economic and financial globalization refers 
to this transnational exchange of ideas as the “more positive aspect of globalization,” as 
noted at the outset.
17  Chilean groups participate in movements, events, and dialogues at 
the international and regional levels, often liaising with groups or alliances abroad that 
share their respective niches.  For instance, FIMA is involved in an environmental law 
partnership; Defenders of the Chilean Forest have found global counterparts interested in 
native forest protection; and the Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna 
(CODEFF) maintains ties with the Nature Conservancy, Forest Stewardship Council, and 
Friends of the Earth, among others. 
Once again, activists have emphasized the disparity between global standards and 
practices within their home country and used international norms to lend legitimacy to 
their demands.  For example, several green NGOs have drawn on international norms 
regarding citizen participation in environmental decision making and access to 
information.  These norms appear in the “Access Initiative” of the Rio Declaration’s 
Principle 10.  This document was prepared during the 1992 U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development, better known as the Earth Summit.  An alliance called 
“Partnerships for Principle 10” has since promoted the norms on a global scale.  Principle 
                                                 
16
  Partly for this reason, Keck and Sikkink (1998a) suggest that environmental advocacy networks are less 
clearly “principled” than the human rights networks discussed in their study. 
17
 Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago.  The NGO leader also values the exchange of information and 
analysis in global forums.    
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10 is thus another instrument that domestic CSOs use to improve levels of citizen 
involvement in policy and public access to environmental information, such as analyses 
of the environmental impact of major investment projects and statistics pertaining to the 
overall state of the environment.
18   
In summary, transnational norms should be considered as factors that influence 
domestic framing strategies by shaping activists’ understandings of issues and providing 
discursive shortcuts.  They also can help legitimate the claims that groups advance.  
Because norms help communicate values and principled stances on issues, they often 
benefit motivational framing.  International norms therefore affect CSO involvement in 
policy making indirectly through their influence on framing.   
Examining the relationship between norms and framing strategies leaves room for 
the agency of domestic actors.  Transnational flows of ideas are multi-directional, and 
Latin American activists have contributed to the development and institutionalization of 
norms over time.  For example, human rights advocates collaborated with Amnesty 
International to create a normative framework against the “forced disappearances” and 
other violations that had occurred in the region from the 1960s–1980s (Clark 2001).  
Additionally, members of CSOs within Latin American nations are seldom passive, 
unquestioning recipients of ideas or discourses from abroad.  Rather, they are free to 
emphasize certain aspects and (re)configure them in distinctive ways depending on their 
environment.  The following section suggests one important reason why global ideational 
influences rarely produce uniform effects at the domestic level.   
                                                 
18
 The Environmental Research and Planning Center (CIPMA), Terram, and Participa authored a study on 
these subjects.  The 2001 report is available at: http://www.participa.cl/html/not_cumbreConama.htm 
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Master frames in Argentina and Chile 
  Because CSOs respond to their political, social, economic, and cultural surround, 
framing patterns vary across time and space.  Innumerable domestic factors affect 
groups’ framing strategies, constrain their choices, and encourage some types of frames 
over others.
19
  The present discussion focuses narrowly on one ideational factor:  the 
availability of a “master frame.”  Master frames essentially perform the same functions as 
regular frames but on a larger scale (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 1992).  
An array of movement-specific frames can be derived from these “generic” frames, 
which are sometimes quite flexible and inclusive.  For instance, scholars regard the civil 
rights movement in the United States as a “progenitor” movement:  subsequent activists, 
including feminists and women’s rights advocates, inherited certain ideas and discourses 
from the movement (Zald 1996).   
Once a master frame enters the cultural lexicon, activists may tap into it while 
devising their own framing strategies, much in the same way that they draw on 
international norms.  Like norms, master frames influence groups’ understandings and 
interpretations of issues, provide discursive shortcuts, and legitimate collective action.  
Civil societal actors can build on discourses introduced by those who preceded them.  
Accordingly, one finds different master frames in Argentina and Chile based on their 
respective histories and legacies of prior activism.  A human rights master frame exists in 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Accessed 6/10/03).  Such initiatives also are known as environmental “right-to-know” movements.   
19
 Reese and Newcombe (2003) offer a model of frame creation that includes cultural and political 
conditions, as well as organizational ideologies, which shape framing options.   
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Argentina, while a democratization frame has developed in Chile (Friedman and 
Hochstetler 2002; Noonan 1995).  Argentina’s master frame is a legacy of the human 
rights abuses committed under military rule and the movement that emerged in response.  
Since the democratic transition, Argentina has experienced a “flowering of dialogue on 
human rights issues” (Brysk 1994, 136).  Human rights organizations no longer have 
ownership of this dialogue, because a variety of groups and individuals — labor unions, 
neighborhood organizations, academics, journalists, artists — have contributed to it.
20
  
The human rights master frame has achieved a high degree of resonance.   
Contemporary civil societal actors in Argentina thus find themselves in an 
ideational environment shaped by several decades of rights-based activism.  To illustrate, 
children’s advocates tend to benefit from the continuing resonance of human rights.  
They draw on and reinforce this discourse in their framing, as explored in Chapter 3.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of social themes — such as marginalization and the 
criminalization of poverty — in their frames echoes discursive trends within the human 
rights movement.  Since the democratic transition, human rights activists increasingly 
have called attention to social issues.  Some even refer to poor and unemployed 
Argentines as the “socially disappeared” or “the system’s new disappeared.”
21
  In their 
view, the neoliberal model entails the pauperization of the middle and working classes 
and the further marginalization of the poor by excluding them from the labor market and 
social welfare.  They construe this social exclusion as a form of violence that parallels the 
                                                 
20
 For an appraisal of the movement’s contributions to political cultural change, see Peruzzotti (2002).   
21
 Interviews in Children for Identity and Justice and Against Forgetting and Silence (HIJOS), 7/31/97, and 
the Argentine League for the Rights of Man, 7/10/97, Buenos Aires; see also SERPAJ’s publication Paz y 
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brutality of the military dictatorship.
22
  In a broader sense, elements of both the children’s 
and human rights frames illustrate the larger historical pattern of Argentines demanding 
social and economic rights.  An awareness of this tradition provides some additional 
perspective on the frames of children’s groups.   
By comparison, the human rights “rallying cry” is heard less often in Chile.  The 
human rights movement there has not been as influential as Argentina’s; the concept, 
though important, does not resonate as broadly and deeply.
23
  The myriad NGOs that 
opposed the continuation of the Pinochet regime converged around a “return to 
democracy” master frame at the time of the transition (Noonan 1995).
24
  More than a 
decade later, the ideas of democratization and democratic citizenship continue to 
motivate civil society organizing.  They also serve as the nucleus of a discourse that 
revolves around notions of citizen participation and control.  
The CSOs that most often couch their activities in these terms are Participa 
(“participate” in English) and the Ideas Foundation.  Citizen participation has been the 
specialty of both NGOs since they organized to educate and mobilize voters during the 
1988 plebiscite.  Participa seeks to develop an informed, responsible citizenry and to 
encourage cooperation among civil society, the government, and private, for-profit actors.  
The Ideas Foundation draws on a similar discourse by emphasizing the need for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Justicia, dated December 1996, and documents posted to the web site of the Association of the Mothers of 
the Plaza de Mayo, at: http: //www.madres.org. (Accessed 8/23/02).  
22
 See Risley (2004) for an analysis of the neoliberalism-as-violence discourse in contemporary Argentina.  
23
 I am not suggesting that human rights advocacy has dissipated in Chile.  A number of groups —  The 
Center for Mental Health and Human Rights (CINTRAS), Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of 
the People’s Rights (CODEPU), and Social Assistance Foundation of the Christian Churches (FASIC), as 
well as groups of families of the disappeared and executed, for example — have continued their efforts in 
the post-transition era.     
 212 
stronger civil society, a more active citizenry, and a “deeper” democracy.
25
  As suggested 
earlier, green NGOs also occasionally use this language, though it has yet to become the 
predominant discourse of that issue area.  These tendencies demonstrate the continuing 
resonance of the democracy/democratic citizenship master frame within Chile.  Like 
global norms, master frames affect but do not govern CSOs’ framing strategies. 
 
THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS:  CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
Having considered framing activities in their broader political and ideational 
contexts, I now turn to environmental factors that influence alliance building.  As in the 
last section, I discuss both transnational and domestic variables:  funding and other 
resources from abroad and political institutions in Argentina and Chile.   
 
Transnational flows of resources 
I alluded to the international donor community and its unabashed enthusiasm for 
civil society in Chapter 1 (e.g., Carothers and Ottaway 2000; Foweraker 2001; Grugel 
2000; Howell and Pearce 2001; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Meyer 1999).  Domestic 
alliances frequently maintain ties with foreign governments and foundations, multilateral 
banks, U.N. agencies, and other donors, as well as with international NGOs and advocacy 
                                                                                                                                                 
24
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, Pinochet was defeated in a 1988 plebiscite preceded by a broad-based 
campaign against the continuation of his regime.     
25
 Both Participa and the Ideas Foundation have been involved in the Citizens’ Council convened by the 
Lagos government (and other advisory boards), as well as a variety of civil society alliances, including 
ACCION (Chilean Association of NGOs), discussed below.  FORJA (Juridical Training for Action) is a 
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networks.  I argue that resources and support from abroad can help sustain and strengthen 
existing domestic partnerships.  In some cases, global actors play a role in shaping 
alliances and influencing their structures or activities.  They also can ease the creation of 
new alliances, thereby diminishing some of the challenges of building partnerships that I 
outlined in Chapter 4.  In that discussion, I identified resource deficiencies as a hindrance 
to inter-organizational cooperation.  It is challenging for overstretched groups to devote 
human and other resources to joint endeavors.  However, an influx of international funds 
and technical assistance changes the calculus of the costs and benefits of participating in 
alliances.  The effect can be direct, when the support is destined for the establishment or 
maintenance of alliances per se, or indirect, when individual groups receive assistance.  
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), World Bank, Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the Ford and Avina Foundations, and various international 
NGOs have supported alliances directly in Argentina and Chile.
26
  In general, donors find 
alliances appealing for both logistical and normative reasons.  Funding an alliance limits 
the number of grant actions, lowers administrative costs, and eases the burden of program 
officers, who can quickly familiarize themselves with the characteristics of a single 
alliance instead of learning the nuances of many different CSOs competing for funding 
(Fisher 1993; Shepard 2003).  Additionally, the Ford Foundation and other important 
                                                                                                                                                 
further example of a public interest organization seeking to strengthen citizen participation; its area of 
emphasis is improving access to justice.     
26
 The Ford Foundation and the IDB have supported Chile’s ACCION, and the Avina Foundation has 
funded Argentina’s Social Sector Forum through programs intended to strengthen civil society.  The Forum 
also has received general support and project funding from the UNDP, foreign NGOs, and multilateral 
banks, particularly the World Bank.  I address these and other alliances below.  
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International assistance can affect alliance building indirectly by supporting the 
individual CSOs that constitute partnerships.   This support frees up group resources for 
use in alliances.  Many of the organizations examined in the dissertation have benefited 
from such funding.  The Argentine organizations backing freedom of information, for 
instance, have connections to an impressive assortment of global institutions:  the Ford 
and Tinker Foundations have supported the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), 
Citizen Power, and the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), among 
others.  Additional foundations, intergovernmental organizations, and multilateral banks 
also have provided assistance.
28
   
Likewise, a number of children’s organizations in Argentina and Chile receive 
substantial support from Save the Children and other international NGOs.  In 2001, 
roughly one-half of the financing of the Chilean Association Pro United Nations 
(ACHNU) came from foreign sources, such as the European Union.
29
  Additionally, as 
part of its effort to strengthen civil society, UNICEF offers CSOs project-based funding 
                                                 
27
 Moreover, donors such as OXFAM support individual CSOs with the goal of enhancing their advocacy 
role. Great Britain also has funded ACHNU and OPCION in Chile to augment civil society’s capacity to 
influence policy and promote institutional reforms.  
28
 Further examples of supporters include the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), Kettering Foundation, Konrad Adenauer Foundation (which have 
assisted Citizen Power), the International Republican Institute, World Bank, and Inter-American 
Development Bank (which have assisted CIPPEC), and Organization of American States and William and 
Flora Hewlett Foundation (which have assisted FARN). CELS also maintains ties to European 
organizations, foreign universities, the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) in the United 
States, and other institutions.  Additionally, the Organization of American States and Inter-American 
Dialogue helped domestic groups — CELS and the Civil Rights Association (ADC) in particular — 
organize a conference in Buenos Aires in December 2002 on freedom of information.  Journalists, 
legislators, public officials, academics, and members of CSOs participated in the conference. 
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and technical assistance (e.g., research and educational materials).
30
  In short, these NGOs 
tend to be well supported by global actors. 
Two qualifications regarding transnational exchanges of resource must be noted.  
First, under some circumstances, international support can hinder as much as help 
domestic partnerships.  For instance, when leaders appear more beholden to foreign 
donors than to member groups, tensions within alliances are created or exacerbated.  
Similarly, CSOs that lack the necessary opportunities or know-how to secure 
international funding may resent organizations with more grant-writing experience, 
money, and connections abroad.  Certain NGOs — namely, larger, more bureaucratic 
organizations — have better grant-seeking infrastructures and access to donors compared 
to other groups within developing countries.  A cycle is set into motion that continues to 
privilege those NGOs, creating a funding hierarchy among CSOs (Sikkink 2002).
31
  Such 
dynamics also may hamper inter-organizational cooperation.  Thus, global assistance is 
no panacea.    
Second, domestic alliances and CSOs are not mere beneficiaries of international 
support.  Their members are often active participants in international (and regional) 
networks and contributors to global events, conferences, and campaigns.  Though largely 
incapable of donating money to such causes, they are able to share other resources.  For 
                                                                                                                                                 
29
 The source of this information is the ACHNU’s annual report for 2001.  
30
 Furthermore, the Argentine office of UNICEF sometimes provides political support for the advocacy 
work of domestic CSOs (Interview in UNICEF, 4/11/03, Buenos Aires).   
31 
Some scholars express concern over the power differentials involved with the donor community in the 
“North” funding civil society in the “South,” as well as CSO dependence on external funding.  In addition, 
members of CSOs often lament the relative abundance of short-term, project-based funding over funding 
intended for organizational maintenance and capacity building.  For analyses of donor-related issues in 
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example, many swap information and analysis with representatives of intergovernmental 
entities and fellow NGOs in international forums.  In fact, some domestic groups have 
founded their own transnational networks:  the Inter-American Network for Democracy, 
which originated within Argentine NGOs Citizen Power and Conciencia, comprises more 
than 250 member organizations.
32
  As mentioned previously, civil societal actors in Latin 
America are not only affected by international trends; they also influence and play a role 
in these processes.  
 In brief, transnational flows of resources can help sustain and strengthen domestic 
alliances, ease the establishment of new ones, and influence the shape of emergent 
partnerships.  Nevertheless, although we find similar international dynamics across Latin 
America, alliances are not uniform across the region (or other democratizing and 
developing areas).  It is therefore necessary to examine the different domestic 
environments in which alliance building occurs.  In the next section, I place particular 
emphasis on the political institutional milieu. 
 
Political institutions in Argentina and Chile 
Patterns of alliance building within Argentina differ from those observed in 
neighboring Chile.  A comparison of the two countries suggests that national political 
institutions shape these patterns by encouraging certain types of partnerships over others.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Latin America, see Carothers and Ottaway (2000), Foweraker (2001), Grugel (2000), Howell and Pearce 
(2001), Hulme and Edwards (1997), and Meyer (1999).      
32
 This network, created in 1995, seeks to “consolidate participatory democracy, build citizenship and work 
for a solidary continental integration” (Infocívica article, dated 1/19/04 (http://www.infocivica.org. 
Accessed 5/9/04).   
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Specifically, formal alliances of national scope are well suited to Chile’s more centralized 
political institutions, whereas less formal coalitions are a reasonable choice in Argentina 
considering its multiple access points, more dispersed decision-making power, and 
relatively ad hoc, improvised approach to interacting with civil society.  Borrowing 
Skocpol’s (1992) term, civil society organizing sometimes achieves a good “fit” with a 
country’s political institutionality.
33
   
Chile provides evidence of two interrelated trends.  The first is an impulse to 
formalize inter-organizational cooperation through the establishment of permanent 
networks and coordinating bodies.  Second, alliance building is moving in the direction 
of encompassing associations that include a wide cross-section of CSOs.  These multi-
sectoral entities comprise NGOs, base organizations, and other types of civil society 
groups.  The most important coordinating bodies are ACCION (Chilean Association of 
NGOs) and ASONG (Association of NGOs), which comprise approximately 75 and 35 
organizations, respectively.  ACCION members are predominantly organizations active 
in the areas of development, poverty alleviation, the environment, and women’s, 
children’s, and indigenous peoples’ issues.  Many were involved in broad-based 
mobilizations demanding human rights and democracy during the final months of the 
Pinochet regime.  The profile of a typical ASONG affiliate is a charitable, volunteer-
                                                 
33
 From a historical institutionalist perspective, Skocpol (2003 & 1992) argues that the federated structure 
of the American women’s movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries achieved a good 
“fit” with the federalism of the political system.    
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based, and/or ecumenical group with ties to transnational organizations, including the 
Salvation Army, Girl Scouts, and Global Mother’s Movement.
34
  
In addition, Chilean CSOs have formed even larger groupings:  “meta-networks” 
or “networks of networks” (Shepard 2003; see also Fisher 1993).  For example, seven 
existing alliances — including ACCION and ASONG — comprise the Convergence of 
NGO Networks (Congress).  The Civil Society Forum is broader still, encompassing 
think tanks, professional associations, indigenous groups, neighborhood organizations, 
cultural and recreational centers, as well as a variety of NGOs.
35 
                    
A meta-network of comparable magnitude and breadth has yet to emerge in 
Argentina.  The only encompassing association that approximates the Chilean alliances 
summarized above is the Social Sector Forum, a national federation of around 220 
diverse civic associations, foundations, and networks.  Member groups range from 
charitable, faith-based, and/or globally embedded organizations (similar to ASONG’s 
membership) to NGOs and research centers with myriad social, educational, and 
developmental aims (like the participants in ACCION).
36
  One of the Social Sector 
Forum’s objectives is to represent the third sector vis-à-vis the government, for-profit 
                                                 
34
 Interviews in ACCION, 9/16/02, and ASONG, 9/26/02, Santiago.  ACCION translates into English as 
“Action.”  Examples of its members include ACHNU, Committee for the Defense of Flora and Fauna 
(CODEFF), Economy of Work Program (PET), Ideas Foundation, OPCION, Participa, Political Ecology 
Institute (IEP), SERPAJ Chile, the Women’s Institute, and Women’s Studies Center (CEM). 
35
 In addition to ACCION and ASONG, Congress (Congreso) comprises the Chilean Alliance for Fair and 
Responsible Trade, Komyuniti Platform, Novib Platform, Solidary Development Network (REDESOL), 
and National Network for Ecological Action (RENACE).  Launched in 2002, the Civil Society Forum 
(Foro de la Sociedad Civil) is extremely large and diverse but still in the beginning stages of development.  
36
 The majority of the members are involved in the areas of health, education, the well-being of children, 
culture, and community development.  Some examples include the Argentine Federation of University 
Women, Argentine Israelite Mutual Aid Association (AMIA), Cáritas, CELS, Christian Youth Association, 
Citizen Power, City Foundation, Conciencia, Democratic Change Foundation, FARN, Lion’s Club, and 
Red Cross.   
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sector, and international actors.  However, under this veneer of unity is a rather 
fragmented — and in some cases inactive — membership.  A recent source of 
disagreement is the Forum’s public image.  To an extent, its leaders have emphasized the 
traditional charity role of CSOs and their social assistance activities, such as attending to 
orphaned children, running soup kitchens, and growing vegetables in communal 
gardens.
37
  Some of the member groups would prefer the federation to project a more 
updated and multifaceted image of associational life.
38
   
Stated briefly, compared to their Argentine peers, Chilean civil societal actors are 
making more concerted efforts to organize the sphere and build bridges among its 
different components.  Additionally, Argentine CSOs have not yet created an equivalent 
to the Chilean meta-networks.  These national differences suggest that alliances tend to 
mirror their institutional environment.  In general, Chile’s political system is more 
centralized than Argentina’s, and although the executive branch is dominant in both 
polities, decision-making and political power is more dispersed in Argentina.
39
  For 
instance, Argentine provincial governors often assert their power vis-à-vis the president, 
a federal dynamic largely absent from Chilean politics.  Furthermore, Argentine political 
parties have undergone fragmentation in recent years, as evidenced by the dissolution of 
the Alianza coalition and the multiple Peronist factions (three of which ran their own 
                                                 
37
 This orientation is apparent in a supplemental section of La Nación, to which the Forum contributed for a 
time.  The supplement, entitled “Solidarity,” focused on CSOs’ direct assistance activities and encouraged 
volunteerism and philanthropy.    
38
 Interview in CODESEDH (Committee for the Defense of Health, Ethics, and Human Rights), 3/21/03, 
Buenos Aires.       
39
 On presidentialism in Latin America, see Linz and Valenzuela (1994) and Mainwaring and Shugart 
(1997).  For analyses of Chile’s local democracy and the more limited extent of decentralization there, see 
De la Maza (1999) and Garretón (1999).    
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presidential candidates in 2003).
40 
 In Chile, on the other hand, two party blocs have 
prevailed:  the center-left governing bloc, the Concertación, and the alliance between the 
UDI (Independent Democratic Union) and RN (National Renovation) on the right.  
Political power in Chile thus tends to be relatively concentrated.  
 Moreover, analysts typically characterize Chile as a polity with a “statist soul” 
(PNUD 2002).
41
  The Chilean state has long been active in structuring and 
institutionalizing political life (PNUD 2000).  In keeping with this historical pattern, the 
state has sought to define and regulate its relationship to civil society through legal, 
financial, and other mechanisms.
42
  The Lagos Administration’s policy of encouraging 
citizen participation in governance can be understood as the most recent effort to do so.  
As a presidential hopeful, Lagos embraced a discourse of citizen involvement in public 
affairs and increased cooperation between civil society and the government.  Upon 
assuming office in 2000, he issued a Directive mandating participatory processes and 
institutional reforms across the executive branch.
43
  The Administration also has 
                                                 
40
 The Alianza (Alliance for Jobs, Justice, and Education), emerged in 1996 and comprised the Radical 
Civic Union (UCR) and Frepaso parties.  De la Rúa, the Alliance’s presidential candidate, occupied office 
from December 1999 to December 2001. 
41
 The phrase in Spanish is alma estatal.  
42 
For an historical overview of the civil society–government relationship, see the final report of the 
Citizens’ Council convened by Lagos (Consejo Ciudadano Para el Desarrollo de la Sociedad Civil), 
“Informe Final,” dated 12/00.  The authors contend that the state largely has determined the nature of the 
relationship (sometimes through coercive means).     
43
 Most government documents define participation as the intervention of citizens (both individuals and 
organized groups) in decisions affecting them and their surroundings (e.g., Segpres 2001).  Each ministry 
and agency decides how to incorporate the participatory “variable” into policy making. According to an 
evaluation of 161 pilot programs conducted in several government agencies, participation was evenly 
distributed across three phases of policy:  design and diagnosis (31%); implementation (32%); and 
evaluation and control (37%) (“Mesa Gubernamental ‘Participación Ciudadana en Políticas y Programas 
Públicos’:  Panorama General,” authored in 2000 in DOS).  See Margård and Rindefjäll (2001) for an early 
assessment of this discursive shift and the resulting reforms.      
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implemented programs intended to strengthen the administrative capacity of civil society 
organizations and networks.   
 The received wisdom within the Chilean government is that cooperation among 
the state, the market, and the “third sector” is necessary and desirable for development 
and poverty alleviation.  However, Lagos provides political and democratic rationales for 
the initiatives, citing the Administration’s goal of bridging the perceived “gap” between 
the government and the citizenry (SEGEGOB 2001).
44
  Government officials are familiar 
with an analysis undertaken by the Chilean branch of the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) in 2000, which emphasizes public disenchantment with political elites 
and institutions.
45 
 One of the report’s most vigorous recommendations is to integrate this 
disaffected citizenry into politics (“ciudadanizar la política”) by promoting associational 
life and creating participatory spaces within the public sphere.   
 In short, the Chilean government is taking steps to strengthen civil societal actors 
and include citizens in policy making.  The process has been uneven, and critics doubt 
that it will result in meaningful forms of participation.
46
  Even so, these recent initiatives 
fit into a more enduring pattern:  the institutionalization of the government–CSO 
relationship (and politics in general).   
                                                 
44
 Government documents on the subject are available at: http://www.participacionciudadana.cl.  Chileans 
commonly use the term brecha (which translates as rift or gap) to assess the relationship between political 
elites and institutions and citizens.  Chapter 2 provides an overview of such perceptions and the oft-cited 
“crises of political representation” in Latin American countries.  
45
 The analysis was included in the UNDP’s widely disseminated human development report (PNUD 
2000).  Officials (for instance, in MIDEPLAN) often cite the report’s conclusions during interviews and 
conferences and in documents.  
46
 In Chapter 6, I briefly discuss the concerns raised in Chile and elsewhere about the merits of such 
reforms. 
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Argentina’s approach to government–civil society interactions contrasts markedly 
with these institutionalizing tendencies.  To begin with, the ideas of citizen participation 
and cooperation between CSOs and the government are less pervasive.  Such notions, 
though not completely absent from the official discourse, do not enjoy the same currency 
as they do in Chile.  No administration in the post-transition era has granted them a 
privileged place on the formal agenda or designed a comprehensive, national policy to 
foster participation.  Consequently, government–CSO linkages tend to be relatively ad 
hoc and dependent on the discretion of individual elites or public officials (Friedman and 
Hochstetler 2002; Ryan 2001).
47
  While Chilean elites apparently have sought to channel 
participation and keep the proverbial “lid” on political activity, the pot boiled over in 
Argentina in late 2001 and early 2002, when scores of citizens turned to contentious, 
disruptive politics.  However, even in the aftermath of the crisis, government officials 
refrained from enacting major participatory reforms.
48 
 
A comparison of the countries’ agencies charged with liaising with CSOs further 
illustrates these differences.  In Chile, bureaucrats are attending to the institutionalization 
of citizen participation.  For example, the Division of Social Organizations (DOS), whose 
mandate is promoting participation, has been overseeing executive branch compliance 
                                                 
47
 Advisory councils and other types of participatory institutions have existed at the national level, but they 
do not appear to be the product of a comprehensive set of policies toward civil society.  Armony concludes 
that Argentine state agencies have “failed to create and institutionalize channels, incentives, and chances 
for civil society involvement (2004, 215).  Ryan (2001) argues that the participatory mechanisms included 
in Argentina’s constitution should be institutionalized so that citizen involvement does not depend solely 
on the discretion of officials. 
48
 Councils were created at various levels of government during 1990s in the areas of social policy, 
women’s issues, and the environment (Filmus 1997).  In the midst of Argentina’s political and social crises 
of the early 2000s, the government established further councils in an attempt to recover some legitimacy 
(Interview in FARN, 1/31/03, Buenos Aires).  A number of these are involved in monitoring the 
administration of emergency social programs. 
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with the Lagos Directive.
49
  An official there describes her work as “institutionalizing the 
participatory variable” across various ministries and agencies.
50
  The staff also researches 
associational life (e.g., DOS 2001).  In addition, the Social Division of the Planning and 
Cooperation Ministry (MIDEPLAN) has published a number of studies and held 
countless conferences on civil society organizing and CSO-government partnerships in 
the area of social policy.
51
 
In theory, similar goals motivate the work of Argentina’s National Center for 
Community Organizations (CENOC), housed in the Social Development Ministry.  The 
agency’s publications state its interest in strengthening CSOs, raising awareness about 
their areas of expertise, encouraging their involvement in policy making, and opening 
new “spaces for dialogue and citizen participation” (CENOC 1998, 11; CENOC 2003).
52
  
In practice, however, CENOC’s main achievement arguably has been to build a database 
of Argentine organizations.  In a number of interviews, members of CSOs expressed 
uncertainty with respect to the agency’s other activities, speculating that these have 
                                                 
49
 DOS, created in 1990, is part of the General Secretariat of the Government Ministry (SEGEGOB). 
50
 Interview in the Division of Social Organizations, Citizen Participation and Public Policies Area, 
10/9/02, Santiago.    
51
 Examples of such conferences include “Innovative Perspectives on Social Policy” (5/23-24/02) and 
“Relevant Experiences for Overcoming Poverty” (10/29-30/02), both organized by MIDEPLAN and 
CEPAL, and the Thirteenth Annual Johns Hopkins International Philanthropy Fellows Conference, held in 
2001 (see MIDEPLAN 2002 for the published proceedings). MIDEPLAN’s Social Division was formerly 
the Department of NGO-Government Linkage, created immediately after the democratic transition to 
disseminate information about CSOs and funding opportunities, study the needs of the third sector, and 
promote dialogue with between civil societal actors and the government (Clewett 2001; Crino et al. 2000; 
Jiménez de la Jara 1996).   
52
 For further examples of these goals, see CENOC’s bulletins, for example, the issue dated 
September/October 2001 (Año 6, no. 40).  Its staff considers greater awareness of CSOs and their work as a 
necessary condition for increased dialogue between governing elites and the third sector (and the inclusion 




  Additionally, the CENOC officials whom I consulted had little 
knowledge of the degree to which government agencies have created “spaces for 
dialogue” with civil societal actors.
54
  Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) likewise note 
CENOC’s unclear mandate and lack of progress in facilitating ties between the 
government and CSOs.  Compared to their Chilean counterparts, the Argentine officials 
appear less invested in the institutionalization of citizen participation and ill aware of the 
actions of other government bureaus on this front.   
Stated briefly, Chile’s political system is more centralized than Argentina’s, and 
political power remains relatively concentrated.  The Chilean state traditionally has 
shaped and directed its relationship to civil society; the Lagos Administration’s policies 
can be understood as part of this historical pattern and ongoing effort to institutionalize 
government–CSO relations.  In contrast, linkages in Argentina are often informal, 
improvised, and/or dependent on the will of individuals occupying government positions.   
These differences help explain the divergent patterns of alliance building within 
both countries.  Informal, short-term alliances (such as coalitions or working groups) are 
a reasonable choice given Argentina’s political system.  Alliances situated at this end of 
the spectrum of possible partnerships can respond ably to the system’s dispersed 
decision-making power, varied access points, and ad hoc, informal opportunities for 
policy involvement.  Similarly, alliances located near the formal, permanent end of the 
spectrum — encompassing associations, umbrella groups, or federations, for instance — 
                                                 
53
 Interviews in the Commitment Foundation, 2/26/03, and the Children’s Commission of the Social Sector 
Forum, 3/5/03, Buenos Aires.  Some of these issues stem from CENOC’s limited budget, which has been 
reduced in recent years (Interview in CENOC, 3/4/03, Buenos Aires; see also Friedman and Hochstetler 
2002).  
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are well suited to the Chilean context.  Stable networks, meta-networks, and coordinating 
bodies are also good matches.  An organized, enduring alliance is better able to interact 
with the nation’s centralized institutions and to accept top-down invitations to participate 
in decision making.  A decent “fit” with Chile’s political institutions is achieved (Skocpol 
1992).  
Moreover, government-civil society linkages in Chile are being shaped by 
attitudes that are sometimes reminiscent of corporatism.
55
  Networks, encompassing 
associations, and other alliances are frequently perceived as legitimate actors and useful 
tools for achieving greater efficiency in civil society-government relations.  In addition, 
governmental and civil societal actors alike often share the expectation of increased 
interaction as a result of establishing CSO partnerships.  To illustrate, government 
officials seem inclined to accept formal alliances as civil society interlocutors that 
represent some broader constituency.  They also openly welcome the convenience of 
alliances:  consulting a network or umbrella group strikes them as a more efficient 
strategy than seeking the input of many different groups.
56
  It is therefore not surprising 
that one component of the Lagos initiative is strengthening such partnerships.  
Conversely, when sectors of civil society are fragmented or divided, it is difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                 
54
 Interview in CENOC, 3/4/03, Buenos Aires.   
55
 Notwithstanding these attitudes, Chile’s approach to interest articulation and representation does not 
approximate the classic corporatist model, as suggested in Chapter 1 (Bickford 1999).  The government 
does not grant representational monopolies to encompassing associations, and existing alliances generally 
lack the vertical organization and national scope of the traditional peak association.        
56
 Such views were expressed by a member of MIDEPLAN’s staff (Interview in the Social Division, 
10/10/02, Santiago) and also appear in government documents pertaining to the Lagos initiative, available 
at: http://www.participacionciudadana.cl.    
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ascertain who “speaks” for them, according to a staff member of DOS.
57
  This scenario is 
disquieting for bureaucrats responsible for reaching out to CSOs.  As noted in Chapter 4, 
an official in Chile’s environmental commission (CONAMA) points out that the absence 
of a national network of green NGOs complicates her task of finding groups to represent 
civil society groups in advisory councils.
58
   
The behavior of governmental actors is sometimes consistent with these views, 
and they have conferred with both issue-specific alliances and encompassing associations 
that include wider cross-sections of NGOs and/or CSOs.  For example, representatives 
from the NGO associations, ACCION and ASONG, have weighed in on debates over tax, 
legal, and other reforms pertaining to the third sector.  They also have participated in 
various advisory boards, including the Citizens’ Council that made recommendations to 
Lagos as he embarked on the participatory reforms.
59
  In addition, MIDEPLAN regularly 
invites them to meetings and conferences on themes such as development and poverty 
reduction.
60
  The leadership of a federation of approximately 2,800 neighborhood 
organizations in the Metropolitan Region likewise has served on the Citizens’ Council 
                                                 
57
 Interview in the Division of Social Organizations (DOS), Citizen Participation and Public Policy Area, 
10/9/02, Santiago.  Some members of CSOs believe that, on the contrary, the government prefers civil 
society to be “atomized” and fragmented (Interview in NGO “Roots,” 11/4/02, Santiago).   
58
 Interviews in MIDEPLAN, Social Division, 10/10/02 & 10/18/02, and CONAMA, Department of 
Environmental Culture and Human Environment, 10/7/02, Santiago.      
59
 As a presidential candidate, Lagos committed himself to promoting citizen participation and 
strengthening civil society via a 1999 agreement with CSOs.  He convened a Citizens’ Council comprising 
representatives of NGOs and other civil societal actors, who reported on the nature of government-civil 
society linkages, and legal, funding, and other issues in 2000 (Consejo Ciudadano para el Desarrollo de la 
Sociedad Civil, “Informe Final”).  A number of these points were included in the Lagos Directive. 
60
 The associations also have served on MIDEPLAN’s Social Policy Committee, an advisory board 
involved in the design, control, and evaluation of social policies.  The leader of ASONG characterizes her 
relationship with government officials as “cordial,” whereas members of ACCION tend to be more critical 
of the quality of their encounters with officials, though they remain open to continued dialogue (Interviews 
in ASONG, 9/26/02, and ACCION, 9/16/02, Santiago). 
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and maintained contact with several ministries.
61
  Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 4, the 
emergence of the National Network of Children’s and Youth NGOs generally has met 
with the approval of government officials.   
Participants in alliances commonly aspire to play a representational role but are 
cautious when making claims of representation.  An oft-cited objective of alliance 
building is to transform civil society into a legitimate “counterpart” or “interlocutor” vis-
à-vis the state and the private, for-profit sphere.
62
  For instance, the organizers of the Civil 
Society Forum, a meta-network, use this language to convey their goal of countering the 
power of the government and business while also engaging in dialogue with both 
sectors.
63
  Similarly, the founding members of the National Network of Children’s and 
Youth NGOs seek to become a respected authority on children’s issues.  At the same 
time, although leaders of alliances may feel comfortable speaking on behalf of their 
membership, few claim the status of “spokesperson” for all groups active in a particular 
issue area or all NGOs.
64
  Fewer still harbor delusions that they serve as proxies for “civil 
society” as a whole.  Nevertheless, within Chile there is palpable interest in alliances that 
purport to represent myriad CSOs.  The quasi-corporatist inclinations described here are 
                                                 
61
 I refer here to the Federación Metropolitana de Uniones Comunales de Juntas de Vecinos.  The 
organizations are grouped into sixty unions at the comuna level and then into the federation, which has 
interacted with the Health and Transportation Ministries, MIDEPLAN, and DOS, for example.   
62
 See the report of the Citizen’s Council (Consejo Ciudadano Para el Desarrollo de la Sociedad Civil), 
“Informe Final,” dated 12/00, and Castillo (2002).  The Spanish words often used by civil societal actors 
include referente and interlocutor, which lose something in translation. 
63
 The Forum also seeks to strengthen civil society and achieve a greater presence in policy making.  The 
overarching vision motivating the alliance is a less elitist democracy (Castillo 2002).  As discussed earlier, 
the Argentine Social Sector Forum also seeks to become a civil society interlocutor vis-à-vis the public and 
private sectors.  
64
 In her study of sexual and reproductive rights NGO networks, Shepard (2003) likewise points out that 
leaders of networks are aware that they do not “represent” the women’s movement or civil society.  On the 
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less evident in the words and deeds of Argentines.  Indeed, the dynamics of alliance 
building are bound to differ considerably in Argentina, where power is more dispersed 
and government–civil society linkages are rather ad hoc. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have examined civil society organizing through a wider-angle 
lens that captures both domestic and international variables that influence patterns of 
framing and alliance building.  A more complete view of advocacy has emerged from this 
analysis.  First, I suggested that global norms and domestic master frames are available to 
activists when they devise their frames.  They can shape civil societal actors’ 
understandings and interpretations of issues and legitimate their advocacy efforts.  Norms 
and master frames may be thought of as the rhetorical and discursive inheritance that 
groups receive from the activists who have preceded them.   
 I then discussed two additional factors with implications for alliances.  I proposed 
that transnational flows of resources and support can strengthen existing alliances and 
facilitate the creation of new ones.  At times, international actors — especially donors — 
have a say in what type of alliance emerges.  Turning to the domestic level of analysis, I 
underscored the ways in which alliances in Argentina and Chile mirror their institutional 
surround.  Political institutions do not determine the characteristics of partnerships, which 
civil societal actors ultimately choose; rather, they constrain such choices, encouraging 
and discouraging certain types of alliances.     
                                                                                                                                                 
other hand, Olvera (2000) asserts that participants in the Civic Alliance have “monopolized” the identity of 
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In fact, we can draw similar conclusions regarding all of the contextual factors 
analyzed here.  Such factors influence, shape, and/or constrain group behavior with 
respect to framing and building partnerships.  However, CSOs have significant room for 
maneuver while selecting frames and participating in alliances.  Thus, the external 
environment rarely dictates the strategies of groups or the outcome of a particular case of 
policy making.   
  More cross-national, comparative research is needed to elucidate the origins of 
civil society frames and alliances, as well as the contextual variables that affect CSOs’ 
strategies.  For example, culture could be an important topic for investigation.  In 
addition to influencing framing, political cultural factors may shape alliance building 
indirectly by creating expectations of either cooperation or conflict.
65
  To illustrate, 
Chileans often discuss the “culture of consensus” that predominates in that country, citing 
as evidence the tendency to avoid overt disagreement and low levels of trust in society’s 
ability to deal with conflict (PNUD 2000; Portales 2000).
66
  Their more conciliatory and 
consensus-based approach to politics probably eases the formation and maintenance of 
alliances.  Individuals who have internalized social expectations of cooperation are more 
likely to believe that partnerships are desirable and/or achievable.     
On the other hand, Argentines are more prone to describe their political culture as 
adversarial.   Because political contestation and discord often prevail over consensus and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mexican civil society and tried to make it synonymous with NGOs (and movements close to NGOs). 
65
 Legal structures also deserve attention.  For instance, an inhospitable legal environment can dissuade or 
complicate the establishment of formal partnerships. Many federations, umbrella associations, and other 
formal alliances seek to obtain their own legal status as second- or third-tier organizations.    
66
 Interview in Ecoceanos, 9/13/02, Santiago.  Fittingly enough, a number of individuals whom I 
interviewed agree unanimously with this characterization.  Some observers also note that unresolved 
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accommodation, people expect conflict rather than cooperation.  It is no wonder, then, 
that an NGO leader comments that civil society groups may claim to work together, but 
seldom is the collaboration very “serious.”
67
  Similarly, a member of a different 
organization remarks that the “culture of joining together” remains weak in Argentina.
68 
 
Armony (2004) concludes further that civil societal actors are often competitive and 
hostile toward one another due to low levels of social trust.
69
  Of course, the fact that 
CSOs manage to overcome such obstacles serves as a reminder that political culture is 
neither hegemonic nor immutable.  In fact, social movements and citizen groups 
frequently contest and challenge — and occasionally even transform — the dominant 
culture.
70
   Likewise, they often seek to change political and legal institutions.  It is 
therefore essential that scholars explore the interplay and the reciprocal influence 
between these factors and civil societal behavior.     
 Indeed, one of the goals of this chapter has been to bridge the divide separating 
the literatures on institutions and civil society.  Political scientists can combine these 
                                                                                                                                                 
political issues tend to lurk beneath this seemingly placid surface; they identify these tendencies as legacies 
of authoritarian rule (e.g., Portales 2000).  
67
 Interview with the Coordinator of the Social Sector Forum Consortium, 3/12/03, Buenos Aires.   
68
 Interview in the Commitment Foundation, 2/26/03, Buenos Aires. 
69
 Armony (2004) goes beyond cultural factors to emphasize other aspects of Argentina’s political and 
social context — in particular, inequality and a weak rule of law — which are said to hinder cooperation.  
Armony does note that some CSOs are open to collaboration and cites CELS and Citizen Power, both 
discussed in the dissertation, as examples.  Some sources argue alternatively that cooperation levels among 
NGOs have risen since the mid-1990s (Interview in the Social Forum for Transparency, 2/4/03, Buenos 
Aires; see also CENOC 2003).  Moreover, community groups historically have formed alliances in 
Argentina.  For instance, mutual aid associations (mutuales), which help people meet health, housing, and 
other needs, have long united into larger organizations, such as the leagues of the early twentieth century 
(Di Stefano et al. 2002). 
70
 Some activists in Latin America view solidarity as intrinsically valuable because of their lived 
experiences under authoritarianism, which seeks to instill (or reinforce) social atomization.  On the legacies 
of fear and repression in the Southern Cone, see Corradi, Weiss Fagen and Garretón (1992).  Left-leaning 
activists also tend to contrast solidarity with neoliberalism.  They perceive themselves as combating what 
Roberts calls the “authoritarian experiment in market individualism” (1998, 161; see also Portales 2000).   
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analytic perspectives and investigate the relationship between civil society organizing and 
institutions.  Such an approach yields findings that merit further attention.  For instance, 
the patterns of government-civil society linkage that are emerging in Chile and Argentina 
entail both advantages and disadvantages.  As an example, interactions between Chilean 
elites and CSOs are more regular and predictable; however, this process of articulation 
tends to be government-dominated and could yield limited forms of participation or even 
co-optation.  In the future, scholars may observe a progressively more top-down 
dynamic, whereby the consultation of civil societal actors occurs largely on the 
government’s terms.  Additional work is needed to fully understand the trade-offs 
associated with different patterns of linkage in Argentina, Chile, and other democracies.   
Furthermore, in Chapter 4, I suggested that coalitions confront several of the 
challenges associated with alliance building with greater flexibility than more formal 
partnerships.  Examples of such obstacles include competition among individual 
organizations, concerns about their autonomy, and leadership rivalries.  If formal and/or 
permanent alliances continue to proliferate in Chile, activists will have to devise 
strategies to overcome these obstacles and create adequate mechanisms for internal 
decision making and democracy.   
Another lesson of this chapter is that political scientists should continue to situate 
their work at the nexus between comparative politics and international relations.  
Examining connections between international and domestic politics has become 
increasingly necessary in studies of Latin American civil societies, which form part of a 
complex web of transnational relationships.  This is especially the case for the 
dissertation owing to its focus on the areas of transparency, the rights and well-being of 
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children, and the environment.  As discussed previously, these issues have spawned 
global epistemic communities and advocacy networks; thus, they are fertile ground for 
research on the internationalization of ideas and norms (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 
1998a).  Moreover, some of the donors that support civil society in Latin America have 
gravitated toward organizations involved in causes related directly to democratization, 
such as the promotion of citizenship rights (Carothers and Ottaway 2000).
71
  This funding 
preference further necessitates the integration of global factors into the analysis.  Scholars 
should endeavor to trace transnational trends and processes to domestic outcomes.
72
  For 
instance, drawing connections between norms and framing is more instructive than 
merely noting the existence of norms and assuming some domestic political effect. 
In conclusion, throughout the dissertation, I have argued that successful framing 
and alliance building help explain policy participation and influence.  However, to steer 
clear of an overly voluntaristic account of participation, I have considered other factors 
besides the strategies of CSOs in this chapter.  Their advocacy efforts do not occur in a 
vacuum; they are shaped and constrained by myriad contextual factors.  In the following 
chapter, I return to the dissertation’s central argument.  After summarizing the main 
findings of my research, I discuss their broader significance and identify several 
promising opportunities for future research on civil society advocacy and related themes. 
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 Carothers and Ottaway (2000) focus primarily on the funding patterns of USAID.  
72
 Examples of works that span the international and domestic levels of analysis include Keck and Sikkink 
(1998a) and Smith (1997) and case studies authored by Brysk (1996, 1994 & 1993), Ewig (1999), 
Hochstetler (2000), and Navarro and Bourque (1998).  
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Chapter 6:  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Civil societal actors pursuing policy influence in Latin American countries face a 
number of daunting challenges, which I have discussed throughout the dissertation.  They 
operate in environments often characterized by political crisis and disenchantment, hard 
economic times, and resource scarcity.  Groups must contend with the mutual distrust 
that commonly taints government–civil society relations, threats to their autonomy, and 
deep misgivings about linking up with political institutions and elites.  Legacies and 
shared memories of authoritarian rule occasionally exacerbate these difficulties.   
However, CSOs are sometimes able to surmount the obstacles to successful 
advocacy and to exercise their policy voices.  Within Argentina and Chile, for instance, 
they have raised public awareness of pressing issues, offered ideas and analysis to policy 
formulation, collaborated with governing elites, conveyed political demands, put pressure 
on elected officials to pass reforms, and contributed to policy debates and processes in 
other ways.  Thus, the search for meaningful policy participation that motivated this 
project has not been in vain.    
Although I have focused my research on the politics of civil society advocacy in 
Argentina and Chile, I seek to contribute more generally to the study of policy influence 
in democratizing polities.  I have analyzed the strategies that groups use to influence 
policy decision making, as well as the consequences of their strategies.  In this 
concluding chapter, I review the accomplishments and failures of CSOs in the policy 
arena and restate my explanation of these varied levels of success.  Next, I summarize the 
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dissertation’s main theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions.  I also 
discuss its implications for democracy, both in theory and in practice.  I then suggest 
some avenues for further research that will deepen our understanding of advocacy and the 
political impact of civil societies in Latin America and beyond.  
 
PATHWAYS TO PARTICIPATION:  A REVIEW   
Much of the existing literature leads us to expect low levels of citizen engagement 
with the policy process and limited influence over decision making.  Latin American 
specialists in particular tend to emphasize a plethora of institutional, structural, and 
societal factors that hinder meaningful policy participation in the region.  For all of the 
reasons discussed previously — ranging from the effects of neoliberal reforms and the 
technocratic, delegative, and/or exclusionary nature of policy making to the post-
transition “demobilization” of civil society — scholars presume that the advocacy efforts 
of CSOs will meet with little success.   
The literature therefore contrasts markedly with analyses of longstanding 
democracies, which often take interactions between governments and organized groups 
of citizens for granted.  Scholars assume a certain degree of citizen influence over policy 
in both the “actively inclusive” corporatist environments of some European nations and 
the “passively inclusive,” pluralist United States.  In fact, political scientists and pundits 
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alike frequently conclude that the upsurge in “single-issue” and “special interest” 
advocacy has “overloaded” the American political system.
1
  
Notwithstanding these divergent tendencies in existing scholarship, NGOs and 
other civil society groups can and do influence policy in democratizing nations.  This is 
true even in environments characterized by resource scarcity and restricted access to the 
political system.  In every case of policy making drawn from the dissertation’s three issue 
areas (the environment, the rights and well-being of children, and transparency), CSOs 
have participated in the agenda-setting, formulation, and/or adoption phases.  This 
finding is puzzling in light of the conventional wisdom.  Of course, we observe different 
levels of civil society involvement and influence in each case.  Proponents of freedom of 
information in Argentina largely succeeded in their efforts to articulate their interests, 
shape both policy debates and the actual content of the legislation, pressure for its 
passage in congress, and build momentum and broader support for the reform.  On the 
other hand, green NGOs in Chile were less able to influence and stay involved in 
environmental policy making, and children’s advocates in Argentina and Chile achieved 
intermediate levels of participation.  
I have explained this variation by analyzing group strategies for combining and 
mobilizing their resources in alliances, as well as their strategies for mobilizing ideas.  In 
Chapter 3, I demonstrated that civil societal actors often rely on the persuasiveness of 
their ideas to achieve influence.  CSOs that politicize issues and frame ideas successfully 
are more likely to influence policy.  Certain framing strategies are well suited to the 
                                                 
1
 See Jenkins (1987) for a summary of the “overload” arguments.  I am borrowing the categories of actively 
inclusive and passively inclusive from Dryzek et al. (2003).  
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policy process.  In addition to increasing the salience of an issue or problem, successful 
frames include positive or constructive messages and feasible, realistic solutions to 
problems.  Effective frames also de-emphasize culpability when assigning blame is likely 
to antagonize policy makers and others in positions of authority.  Groups sometimes are 
forced to defend themselves against counter frames and other competing discourses 
during this process. 
Framing is a crucial aspect of organizational efforts to disseminate understandings 
of issues and interpretations of reality, influence the public agenda, capture the attention 
of governing elites, fellow civil societal actors, and the broader public, and convince 
these audiences that their cause is worthy.  Clearly, the degree to which CSOs excel at 
using their powers of persuasion varies significantly.  This variation was captured by the 
dissertation’s main cases:  freedom of information supporters engaged in effective 
framing; children’s advocates in both countries experienced more mixed success with 
framing; and the environmental groups enjoyed the least success. 
In Chapter 4, I showed that effective civil society alliances can facilitate 
participation and influence during policy making.  The logic of forming partnerships is 
compelling in countries where CSOs are comparatively deficient in resources.  When 
individual groups pool resources in alliances, they can overcome their political 
“weakness” and translate organizational assets into political strength.  Through alliance 
building, CSOs can coordinate their political activities and avoid redundancies or overlap 
in their work.  They also can achieve strength numbers and present a united front to 
governing elites, other civil societal actors, and the public.   
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I have argued further that certain characteristics enhance the effectiveness of 
alliances, including an efficient division of labor, a proper balance between internal 
diversity and cohesion, and a willingness to forge ties to other alliances or movements.  
The coalition pressuring for freedom of information had these attributes and therefore 
nicely illustrates the advantages of joining forces.  In contrast, environmental NGOs 
failed to achieve a broad-based alliance, which limited their political influence.  
Children’s advocates in Argentina have experienced middling levels of success:  an 
alliance did coalesce but subsequently weakened and fragmented.  Meanwhile, their 
counterparts in Chile have constructed a national network, which seems poised to play an 
important role in that policy domain.     
The cases demonstrate that existing partnerships differ considerably in terms of 
their organization, characteristics, and overall efficacy.  In addition, the findings indicate 
that CSOs do not always manage to establish (or participate in) alliances in the first place.  
Inter-organizational cooperation is contingent upon their ability to surmount a number of 
obstacles involved in forming, maintaining, and participating in alliances.  The evidence 
also suggests that coalitions are more adroit at addressing challenges related to 
organizational autonomy, leadership issues, and alliance fatigue.   
 In short, by forming successful partnerships and framing ideas in persuasive 
ways, CSOs can create opportunities for policy influence.  My theoretical approach helps 
solve the puzzle of influence in contexts where we rarely expect to find successful 
advocacy.  Because the explanatory variables emphasize the strategies that civil societal 
actors use to exercise their political voices, my framework privileges agency over 
structure.  On the other hand, I have placed these strategies in their proper perspective by 
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considering the broader domestic and international context in which framing and alliance 
building occur.  Chapter 5 focused on transnational flows of resources and ideas, 
domestic master frames, and political institutions.  These factors — which are external to 
the CSOs themselves — can influence, shape, and constrain group behaviors; they 
therefore affect policy influence indirectly.  Nevertheless, the contextual variables did not 
determine the political outcomes of the cases examined here.    
For the sake of clarity, I have discussed framing and alliances in separate 
chapters.  However, it is worth noting that these independent variables sometimes work 
in tandem and have a synergistic effect on the dependent variable.  For instance, my 
arguments concerning framing strategies also apply to alliances.  Like individual groups, 
coalitions, networks, and other partnerships engage in framing.
2
  In fact, when CSOs 
participate in an alliance, this may increase the “volume” of their frames and political 
rhetoric, thereby improving their chances of being heard by governing elites and the 
public.  Partnerships also allow groups to combine resources that are instrumental for the 
dissemination of ideas and frames.  Good contacts in the mass media or within the 
government are key examples of such resources.  Another vital attribute is perceived 
credibility or integrity:  CSOs with proven expertise and/or established reputations in a 
certain issue area will be greeted as more legitimate “carriers” of ideas.  Alliances 
facilitate the pooling of these and other resources that are relevant to framing.  We 
observed these patterns in the freedom of information case. 
                                                 
2
 Croteau and Hicks (2003) discuss framing that takes place at the level of the coalition, which they 
conceptualize as a diverse group of actors (not only SMOs) seeking social change.  Such a coalition must 
link together various organizational frames.   
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Furthermore, when groups share ideas, discourses, or even incipient frames, these 
commonalities can ease the formation of alliances.  As mentioned previously, shared 
ideas — especially “principled” ideas and norms — are powerful factors motivating 
inter-organizational cooperation (Keck and Sikkink 1998a).  Members of a particular 
CSO working on an issue independently may find that members of other groups 
understand (or talk about) issues in similar ways.
3
  These similarities will likely help 
them overcome some of the barriers to alliance building and maintenance discussed in 
Chapter 4.  In brief, the project’s two explanatory factors are interrelated and thus can 
have a joint effect on civil society influence.   
In summary, when successful framing and alliance building are present 
simultaneously, the likelihood that CSOs will be involved and influential in policy 
decision making increases.  What are the implications of this conclusion?  What is the 
theoretical, methodological, and practical significance of the dissertation’s findings?  I 
address these questions in the next two sections.   
 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
This dissertation makes a number of theoretical contributions to the comparative 
politics field.  The first is to bridge a considerable lacuna in the literature.  Scholars have 
not paid sufficient attention to civil society involvement and influence in democratizing 
nations.  Analysts largely have neglected the political and policy impact of civil society 
                                                 
3
 Ideological and discursive similarities among groups often stem from their respective organizational 
missions, areas of emphasis, composition (i.e., elite versus grassroots), and access to the international ideas 
and norms outlined in Chapter 5.   
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organizing; instead, they tend to explore the emergence and evolution of groups or 
movements, the overall vibrancy of civil society, and the production of social capital.  
Those who do examine the policy role of CSOs frequently emphasize their 
responsibilities in the implementation of policies and the delivery of social services.  My 
focus on advocacy differentiates this project from much of the existing work on civil 
society.   
In addition to exploring political activities that are poorly understood, my research 
counters the prevailing tendency to discount the possibility of effective advocacy.  Thus, 
as noted above, the dissertation helps solve the puzzle of civil society influence where it 
is generally not expected.  The project’s theoretical approach offers a superior 
explanation of this influence compared to alternative accounts.  For example, in Chapter 
1, I evaluated institutionalist perspectives, with an emphasis on participatory institutions 
within governments; I also discussed the international diffusion of discourses and 
practices that favor citizen participation in governance.  Contrary to initial expectations, 
neither of these factors “from above” is as significant as civil societal factors “from 
below” in the dissertation’s cases.  Moreover, explanations that simply identify group 
resources as correlates of influence fail to illuminate the process whereby organizations 
translate these resources into political gains.  Such an approach also falls short of 
explaining how resource-deficient groups exercise their policy voices.   
My theoretical framework builds on several bodies of scholarship, including 
literatures on state-society linkages, collective action frames, and different types of 
voluntary associations (namely, interest groups, non-profits, and NGOs).  However, the 
theory moves well beyond existing works in several ways.  First and foremost, I propose 
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original arguments regarding the policy consequences of framing and alliance building.  
Scholars have not traced the effects of frames and partnerships on civil society 
involvement and influence in decision making.  For instance, research on the impact of 
framing is rare compared to studies of frames mobilizing would-be participants in social 
movements; likewise, there are few studies of the policy implications of alliances.   
Second, I extend frame analysis to other categories of collective actors besides 
social (or protest) movements.  Similarly, I show that the logic of inter-organizational 
cooperation transcends the narrowly defined interest group category and applies more 
broadly to the CSOs examined in the dissertation.  Third, I redress the surprising paucity 
of comparative work on group strategies for building alliances and framing ideas in Latin 
American and Third Wave democracies.   
Furthermore, my frame analysis contributes to a larger debate over the role of 
ideas in shaping political processes and outcomes.  In recent years, political scientists 
have shown a renewed interest in ideas and norms; nevertheless, more research is needed 
on the ideational work that civil societal actors perform.   Rather than operationalizing 
ideas per se as independent variables, I examine how these actors use ideas strategically, 
in accordance with the dissertation’s agency-centered approach.       
 I contribute to each of these areas of research by positing new causal 
relationships, building on existing analytic and theoretical tools, and applying them to 
different types of groups and political contexts.  I tackle a neglected research question 
and challenge several common propositions found in the scholarship.   I also engage a 
variety of literatures in an effort to break down some of the disciplinary walls that divide 
analysts focusing on similar dimensions of collective action.   
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 From a methodological perspective, I seek to offset the tendency toward 
descriptive and non-comparative case studies in the literature on civil society.  My 
comparative analysis of framing and alliances draws on evidence from three issue areas 
and two democratizing countries and thus produces more generalizable results.  In 
addition to comparing cases of policy making within Argentina and Chile, I contrast 
children’s advocacy in Argentina and Chile to demonstrate the variety of possible 
approaches to framing and alliance building within a single policy domain.  Moreover, 
Chapter 5 entails a shift from case-level to country-level comparisons to show how the 
domestic political context influences group behavior.  National-level policy making — 
usually considered to be a less auspicious venue for citizen participation — represents a 
more difficult test of the theory.   
Finally, while the dissertation is chiefly a study of domestic advocacy, I 
contemplate various types of connections between international and domestic politics.  
By incorporating transnational exchanges of resources and ideas into the analysis, I have 
put my ideas into dialogue with several growing literatures situated at the nexus between 
comparative politics and international relations.  Indeed, I have argued that it is crucial to 
examine the global dimensions of civil society organizing in developing, democratizing 
countries. 
My research has further implications for the study of democratization, a core 
subfield within comparative politics.  The following section therefore suggests several 
ways in which the dissertation deepens our understanding of democratic consolidation, 
stability, and quality. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE 
This project seeks to contribute to the theoretical and methodological debates that 
recur in the democratization literature and to strengthen our grasp of democratic praxis in 
Latin America and elsewhere.  Questions surrounding political participation, voice, and 
influence are relevant to citizens, activists, and policy makers in democracies.
4
   The 
exercise of citizenship and the types of democracies being consolidated in Latin America 
are issues that weigh heavily on the minds of numerous civil societal actors.  Moreover, 
these themes are essential to the study of politics. 
Advocacy is one of several roles that CSOs play in a democracy.  As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, they also seek to achieve cultural, social, and political change in the longer 
term.  Thus, my emphasis on advocacy should not be construed as a normative preference 
for this role over all others; I do not recommend that CSOs become “pressure groups” 
that only endeavor to shape policy.  Still, policy influence has been surprisingly absent 
from the literature on Third Wave democracies.  Democratization scholars tend to focus 
on elites, institutions, or civil society.  Sub-divided into separate literatures, analysts spar 
over which of these factors is most crucial for democratic consolidation.  Meanwhile, 
they tend to overlook linkages among CSOs, governments, and parties and the ways in 
which citizens engage the institutions and processes of democracy.   
One would expect a division of labor to emerge in a field as vast as 
democratization.  However, analysts occasionally aggravate these divisions by placing 
civil society and political institutions (or parties) in opposition to each other.  
                                                 
4
 This research is also relevant to international donors dedicated to strengthening CSOs and citizen 
participation.  
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Encarnación (2001a & 2001b), for instance, maintains that the post-transition “recession” 
of civil society in various countries is not cause for concern; rather, it indicates that 
political institutionalization, which is more decisive for consolidation, is occurring.
5
   
Encarnación (2001b) also suggests that civil society must be “subordinated” to political 
society to achieve consolidation.
6
  When one sphere declines, the other apparently 
thrives.    A number of scholars appear to draw their inspiration from what Avritzer (2002 
& 2000) calls the “Huntingtonian matrix,” which posits the dangers of social 
mobilization that outpaces political institutionalization.
7
   
Oppositional and dichotomous approaches merely widen the gulf separating 
analysts of civil society and institutions.  They also fail to address key questions.  Do 
most civil societal actors remain hostile toward conventional politics following 
democratic transitions?
 
 Do contentious forms of politics — common in both established 
and Third Wave democracies — threaten democratic consolidation or stability?  And how 
can we reconcile this view of civil society with perceptions of the “NGOization” of the 
sphere in democratizing countries (Alvarez 1998)?   
 In this project, I have refrained from discussing civil society, political society, or 
the state in monolithic terms, operationalizing civil society as an independent variable 
and democracy as the dependent variable, and arguing that the subordination of any one 
                                                 
5
 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) base their “demobilization” argument on similar logic, suggesting that 
civil society “surges” during the transition and then “declines” as political society returns to the fore.  Linz 
and Stepan reject the thesis as “bad democratic theory” and argue that neither civil society nor political 
society should be “neglected in favor of the other” (1996, 9).     
6
 Along similar lines, Berman (1997) argues that the “feverish” civil society activity that occurred outside 
of — and in opposition to — political institutions contributed to democratic breakdown in Weimar 
Germany. 
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sphere is a condition for successful consolidation.  Instead, I examine civil societal 
actors’ interactions with elites and institutions, motivated by the notion that predictable 
linkages among political society, civil society, and the state are necessary for democratic 
stability (Kubik 2000).  I therefore seek to transcend the great divide in the 
democratization literature and to encourage dialogue among scholars who generally 
speak past one another. 
Indeed, mediating, channeling, and representing societal interests and demands 
are fundamental aspects of political institutionalization and a smooth-functioning 
democracy.
8
  Bickford (1998), for instance, argues that the survival of democracy may be 
contingent on “stakeholdership” in policy making, or the extent to which citizens can 
claim a stake in policy decisions.  Citizens who perceive some degree of meaningful 
influence tend to be more invested in (and supportive of) the political system.  Such 
conclusions have special relevance for nations where dissatisfaction with political 
institutions and elites is widespread:  Latin Americans often believe that they lack 
political weight and that policy decisions are far removed from their concerns and needs, 
as outlined in Chapter 2.  Political environments that are rife with anti-institutional 
sentiment can become breeding grounds for populism.  To illustrate, Peru’s Fujimori and 
Venezuela’s Chávez ascended to power by using popular opinion to their advantage and 
rejecting traditional institutions and parties.  Populist leaders usually weaken the “real 
                                                                                                                                                 
7
 Avritzer (2002 & 2000) and Peruzzotti (2001) critique dichotomous views of civil society and political 
institutionalization. 
8
 At times, Berman (1997) and Encarnación (2001a & 2001b) seem to share this view of 
institutionalization, and Encarnación (2001a) even identifies the close ties between civil societal actors and 
parties as a boon for democratization in Spain.  However, rather than insist on stable linkages, they tend to 
privilege political society over civil society in an effort to debunk the scholarship on associational life. 
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and perceived effectiveness of these institutions,” setting a “self-reinforcing cycle” into 
motion (Hagopian 1998, 104).
9
  Moreover, even if the survival of democracy is not 
necessarily in jeopardy, its quality surely diminishes if decision making is exclusionary 
and stakeholdership limited (Bickford 1998; Fitzsimmons 2000). 
Few would disagree with the assertion that excluding organized groups of citizens 
from policy making lessens the overall quality of democracy.  However, does the 
involvement of civil society groups in the policy process necessarily signify more (or 
better) democracy?  Are groups able to “represent” some identifiable constituency?  Can 
their participation benefit broader segments of society?  Doubts about the responsiveness 
and legitimacy of CSOs are voiced routinely in academic and non-academic circles 
alike.
10
  NGOs in particular have been subjected to criticism because they usually lack 
clear “mechanisms of accountability to the citizenry” (Hagopian 1998, 126).  The 
Secretary General of CIVICUS, an international alliance of CSOs, explains:   
It is frequently said that civil society groups don’t represent the views of anyone but 
themselves and that if they are accountable at all, it is usually ‘upward’ to their funders, 
rather than ‘downward’ to those they purportedly serve. Those that offer this critique 
sometimes evoke a range of derogatory acronyms to describe certain kinds of wannabe 
NGOs:  BONGOs (business-organised NGOs), PONGOs (politically-organised NGOs), 
BRINGOs (briefcase NGOS), DONGOs (donor-organised NGOs), GONGOs 





                                                 
9
 Similar concerns are expressed in a report on Chile authored by the United Nations Development Program 
(PNUD 2000).  As mentioned in Chapter 5, an awareness of these potential threats to stability is one of the 
factors motivating the participatory reforms carried out under Lagos. 
10 Brysk (2000) provides a useful overview of the various “democratic deficits” within civil society. 
11
 World Bank Presidential Fellows Lecture by Dr. Kumi Naidoo, Secretary General and CEO of 
CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, delivered at the World Bank headquarters on 
2/10/03 (Available at:  http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf.  Accessed on 4/14/03).  CIVICUS, 
comprised of more than 650 members in 110 countries, was founded in 1993 to promote civil society and 
citizen action (http://www.civicus.org.  Accessed 1/25/05).   
 247 
In addition, governments and international donors sometimes regard NGOs as convenient 
“surrogates” for civil society and “intermediaries” to the grassroots (Alvarez 1999).  Yet 
given their tenuous relationship to base organizations, many do not deserve this status.
12
 
 Renditions of this debate can be found in comparative work on non-profits and 
other categories of voluntary associations, as well as in the American politics literature.  
Schattschneider (1960) famously remarked that the interest group chorus in the United 
States sings in an upper-class accent.  More recently, Skocpol (2003) concluded that 
associational life has become more elite and oligarchic and less participatory over time 




 My findings complicate several aspects of the received wisdom on representation.  
To begin with, many of the groups that I examine do not fit the generic profile offered in 
existing literature of the elite, professionalized, and/or bureaucratic NGO.  As discussed 
in Chapter 2, self-described NGOs in Latin America often lack the formal organizational 
structure and professionalized staff that the term evokes.  I also have argued throughout 
the dissertation that an examination of organizational resources per se tells an incomplete 
political story.  By engaging in framing and alliance building, even less privileged CSOs 
                                                 
12
 Piester (1997) and Segarra (1997) are more generous toward the Latin American NGOs included in their 
studies, suggesting that they give voice to the needs and interests of popular sectors in venues that 
traditionally have provided little access to such groups and that analysts should examine these processes 
instead of requiring direct ties to the grassroots as proof that NGOs are representative. 
13
 For Skocpol (2003), associational life reflects the privileged, professional makeup of elite America, 
which does not engage the rest of the citizenry yet often claims to speak for large numbers of Americans.  
The result is “diminished” democracy. Verba, Lehman Schlozman and Brady (1995) also address the 
question of whether voluntary associations in the United States are representative of the broader public.  
They refer to the disparity between the preferences and demographics of activists and those of the entire 
population as participatory “distortion.” At the same time, they note that “proxy representation” is 
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can participate in policy debates and decisions.
14
  An emphasis on these activities 
differentiates my analysis from most of the works that address the issue of representation, 
which fixate on the attributes of NGOs.   
Additionally, because the issues outlined here are so thorny, members of 
Argentine and Chilean NGOs rarely make broad claims of representation.  This is 
especially the case for NGOs dominated by individuals of higher social status, which 
approximate the image of the “typical” NGO in the scholarship.  During interviews and 
informal conversations, participants were quick to point out that their NGOs “do not 
represent anyone.”
15
  Some also emphasized that representation is the job of political 
parties and elected officials (in theory if not in practice).
16
   
 Although many NGO members consulted for this study resist using the language 
of “representation,” they still view their work as benefiting a broad cross-section of the 
public.  This is hardly surprising given my focus on public interest CSOs.  Indeed, the 
groups active in the dissertation’s policy domains often share an interest in extending, 
deepening, and defending citizenship rights:  many children’s advocates eschew 
paternalistic attitudes toward “minors” in favor of a rights-based approach; green NGOs 
struggle for the right to a healthy environment and sustainable forms of development, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
sometimes the only representation available to people less able to articulate their demands directly (e.g., 
children, prisoners, the homeless).  
14
 Alliances face their own set of challenges with respect to representing (and remaining accountable to) 
their members, as discussed in Chapter 4.  They therefore must establish mechanisms for internal decision 
making and governance. 
15
 Interviews in Citizen Power, 3/24/03, Buenos Aires, Economy of Work Program (PET), 9/25/02, 
Santiago, and Participa, 10/14/02, Santiago.  See Alvarez (1999) for similar comments concerning Latin 
American feminist NGOs.  Some more professionalized groups are reforming their internal structures 
partly in response to these issues.  For example, the Civil Rights Association (ADC) in Argentina, whose 
affiliates are mostly lawyers, is trying to broaden its membership base to enhance its internal democracy 
and accountability as well as its financial sustainability (Interview, 3/11/03, Buenos Aires). 
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well as access to information about the state of the environment; and transparency 
proponents support the right to all categories of public information.
17
  In the words of a 
veteran human rights activist, “if only one [social] group has rights, they are no longer 
rights, but privileges.”
18
  These issue areas therefore have special significance for 
democracy.   
The policy domains also affect the daily lives of Argentines and Chileans in more 
concrete ways; indeed, they literally can entail matters of life and death.  For instance, 
children’s basic dietary, health, and other needs often go unmet, with dire consequences 
for working and lower class families.  Meanwhile, environmental hazards, such as toxins 
and pollutants, affect the health, safety, and livelihood of entire communities.  We have 
seen how indigenous and environmental issues frequently overlap and that development 
projects can threaten ethno-cultural diversity as well as biodiversity.  While such 
problems affect society as a whole, they are closely intertwined with poverty and 
inequality.     
Furthermore, access to information is not an instrument for the exclusive use of 
public interest lawyers, journalists, or others considered to be “elites,” but a tool for 
citizens requiring public assistance to meet their basic needs.  Additionally, concern with 
high levels of corruption and low levels of accountability is a widespread phenomenon 
that cuts across class and other social cleavages:  almost two-thirds of survey respondents 
                                                                                                                                                 
16
 Interview in the City Foundation, 3/19/03, Buenos Aires.  
17
 In addition, increased transparency is often correlated with citizen satisfaction with the political system, 
which is advantageous for democracy.   
18
 Interview in the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (APDH), 7/24/97, Buenos Aires.  Scholars of 
Latin America have noted “the vast distance separating the formal sphere of law and the ways in which 
social subjects actually perceive and act according to their rights” (Jelin and Hershberg 1996, 7).   
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feel that corruption affects their personal lives “very significantly,” as mentioned in 
Chapter 3.
19
  In short, advocacy efforts — and policy reforms — in these issue areas can 
have a considerable impact on the lives of citizens.   
Thus, the CSOs and alliances that I analyze tend to emphasize themes of broad 
public concern.  While articulating their own interests, they often express the needs and 
aspirations of other citizens.  Doubts about the representational role of NGOs are 
justified; however, scholars can wrestle with these questions only by analyzing further 
comparative evidence.  Sweeping statements that either impugn or extol all NGOs (or 
other types of groups) are unlikely to resolve the debate.
20
  In fact, each of the themes 
discussed above deserves further scrutiny.  I suggest several additional areas of research 
that will advance our understanding of civil society’s political potential in the next 
section.   
 
AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
By this point in the dissertation, it should be clear that more work is needed to 
illuminate civil society’s engagement with the policy process.  Explaining patterns of 
political participation and influence in democracies is a fundamental task of the 
                                                 
19
 “The Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer: A 2002 Pilot Survey of International 
Attitudes, Expectations and Priorities on Corruption,” available at:    
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/barometer/dnld/barometer2003.en.pdf (Accessed 2/12/04). 
20
 Price wonders if CSOs are held to a higher standard of accountability than other entities, such as 
governments or corporations; the “very fact that civil society activism is needed is often testimony that 
these actors are responding to democratic deficits in existing institutions” (2003, 591).  Furthermore, it is 
not clear whether NGOs should answer to their board members, intended beneficiaries, or some other 
constituency (Hudson 2002; see also Taylor and Warburton 2003). 
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discipline.  Moreover, because scholars of re-emergent democracies have paid little 
attention to this subject, my call for research is anything but gratuitous.  
To begin with, future studies should test, refine, and/or extend the arguments 
presented here.  As I have suggested in previous chapters, further analysis of alliances 
and framing would be most welcome.  Possible topics could include the origins of frames 
and alliances, the internal characteristics and decision-making processes of partnerships, 
whether and how different types of CSOs use varying strategies, and, of course, the 
policy consequences of all of these factors.  Alternatively, research may uncover other 
patterns of successful advocacy and entirely new pathways to participation. 
Although I have privileged civil societal variables in this project, my findings 
suggest some interesting propositions concerning elites.  Specifically, it is feasible that 
the presence of “likeminded” individuals in government offices, legislative committees, 
or other sites of policy making facilitates CSO participation.  Such elites are more 
receptive to civil societal actors’ demands, policy goals and prescriptions, understandings 
of an issue, and frames; thus, they will likely listen to CSOs and heed their advice during 
the decision-making process.  In short, a “meeting of the minds” may occur.
21
  Some 
officials are sympathetic to a certain cause — or the objectives of a particular group — 
due to their ideological and political beliefs.  However, this sort of compatibility can stem 
from several other factors besides party affiliation.
22
  I submit that shared world views, 
                                                 
21
 A related idea, which civil societal actors frequently mention in interviews and conversations, concerns 
the willingness of government officials to pursue political and policy change.  Activists refer to the 
presence or absence of “political will” (voluntad política) on the part of bureaucrats, legislators, and other 
elites. 
22
 Other possible factors include the dominant culture within a particular government office or agency and 
whether most personnel are political appointees or civil servants. 
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approaches to issues, and experiences are equally important.  These commonalities 
between governmental and civil societal actors can result from exposure to international 
discourses and understandings of policy issues.  The transnational diffusion of general 
sets of ideas as well as more concrete policy alternatives and proposals may nudge CSOs 
and government officials closer together.
23
  Commonalities also can be an effect of 
leadership exchange, or the circulation of individuals between civil society, political 
society, and the government.   
 The freedom of information case provides support for both propositions.  As I 
noted in Chapter 2, several staff members of the Anticorruption Office previously had 
been active in NGOs.  They therefore shared similar backgrounds, world views, and 
policy goals with participants in CSOs who supported the legislation.  In addition, both 
sets of actors had access to the ideas about transparency that were circulating in 
international venues and to various transnational actors, such as Transparency 
International.  The Anticorruption Office, for instance, maintains contact with the U.N., 
Organization of American States, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, 
Mercosur, and foreign governments.
24
  The Office’s staff and members of NGOs also 
shared an interest in upholding the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and 
other norms.  
                                                 
23
  I address the international circulation of ideas, norms, and discourses in Chapter 5.  The literature cited 
there often underscores the role of international NGOs, networks, social movements, and epistemic 
communities, as well as multilateral banks, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other global actors 
as “carriers” of ideas.  For analyses that deal more specifically with policy diffusion, see Rogers (1995) and 
Weyland (2004). 
24
  For details, see the Anticorruption Office’s 2002 annual report (Informe Anual de Gestión 2002. 
Resumen Ejecutivo).  Chapter 5 discusses the Argentine NGOs’ ties to international actors and initiatives.  
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 Recent trends in the area of children’s advocacy further illustrate this pattern.  
Available evidence indicates that some governmental and civil societal actors have found 
common ground through their mutual adherence to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (and other sets of international norms and ideas).  In particular, children’s rights 
activists have found a receptive audience among the personnel of the Government of the 
Autonomous City of Buenos Aires involved in children’s issues.
25
  Their good working 
relationship owes in part to the staff members’ embrace of the rights-based perspective.  
This approach is reflected in the comprehensive children’s rights law that the legislature 
passed in the late 1990s with the backing of various CSOs.
26 
  
The presence of likeminded officials in the government may ease the work of 
civil societal actors, who try to sway policy makers to their side.  Nevertheless, this elite 
variable does not appear to be a necessary or sufficient explanation of CSO participation 
in (and influence over) decision making.  In an effort to secure their preferred outcome, 
groups endeavor to persuade a variety of other individuals involved in the policy process, 
as well as the broader public, that their cause is worthwhile.  For example, proponents of 
freedom of information had to target myriad policy makers outside of the confines of the 
Anticorruption Office, including other authorities in the executive branch and legislators.  
In spite of such limitations, this area of inquiry deserves more attention. 
                                                 
25
 The CSOs’ generally more positive assessments of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires contrast with their views of the national government agencies involved in child welfare, such as the 
National Council of Childhood, Adolescence, and the Family (CONAF). 
26
 I refer here to Law 114, the Ley de Protección Integral de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes 
(see the 2002 publication, “Una joven ley para los más jóvenes de la ciudad,” by the Children’s Rights 
Association, UNICEF, and the Council on the Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents). A number of 
children’s CSOs participated in the formulation and supported the passage of the law (Interviews in the 
Council on the Rights of Girls, Boys, and Adolescents, Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires, 4/15/03 and 4/23/03). 
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Additionally, scholars should continue to explore the global aspects of domestic 
civil society organizing and advocacy.  Political scientists who address these themes will 
be better able to grasp the empirical realities of Latin America and other regions and to 
construct theories that shed light on both comparative politics and international relations.  
Tracing the domestic effects of international factors is a crucial task.  For example, I have 
suggested that transnational actors can influence politics from below, or via civil societal 
actors.  However, more work is needed to ascertain when and how activists, NGOs, and 
donors intervene in domestic political events and shape outcomes. 
Research also can focus on the international forces that affect politics from above 
by influencing governments.  For example, the multilateral banks, among others, have 
heartily endorsed a global agenda that promotes citizen participation in governance, as 
discussed in Chapter 1.  Partly as a result of pressure from abroad (and also in response 
political exigencies at home), leaders in some Third Wave democracies are carving out 
participatory “spaces” within the government.  Although such institutions had a limited 
effect on policy involvement in the dissertation’s cases, they merit further investigation.  
Because the Lagos Administration has undertaken participatory reforms at all levels of 
government, Chile provides fertile ground for research on these top-down dynamics.
27
  In 
Argentina, future work could target the provincial and local levels.  For instance, the 
1996 Constitution of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires calls for 
the inclusion of civil society in policy making.
28
  Several advisory councils and other 
institutions have been created, though the process remains in an incipient stage.  Buenos 
                                                 
27
 I summarize these reforms in Chapter 5. 
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Aires also has been the site of participatory budgeting programs since 2002, and Citizen 
Power, the Center for the Implementation of Public Policies Promoting Equity and 
Growth (CIPPEC), and other NGOs have served in an advisory capacity.  In addition, 
various councils have been established at the municipal level.  
Scholars will likely discover that these institutions vary widely:  they are not 
“created equal” on paper, nor do they necessarily function as planned.  Consequently, 
while investigating a given body, it is necessary to pose several questions.  Does it 
convene regularly?  How are participants chosen, and how transparent and inclusive is 
the selection process?  Do they make meaningful decisions, and/or is the government 
bound to follow their advice?  Alternatively, do participants conclude that they are 
“invited but not paid attention to,” that this form of consultation is a mere formality?
29
   
Moreover, the government ministries and agencies in which councils and other 
entities are embedded differ substantially in terms of resources, authority, transparency, 
and legitimacy.  In fact, these institutional factors may be more significant than the nature 
of the participatory body itself.  For instance, the fact that advisory councils operate in 
Chile’s National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) does not erase the overall 
weakness of that agency as a locus of environmental policy making and a worthwhile 
target of advocacy.  As noted in Chapter 3, most observers agree that CONAMA lacks 
funding, strong leadership, political clout, and autonomy vis-à-vis the ministries that 
                                                                                                                                                 
28
 Examples of advisory councils include the Strategic Planning Council and the Economic and Social 
Council; some of the entities were not established until the early 2000s. 
29 
This is how an NGO member perceives an environmental advisory council in Chile (Interview in FIMA, 
10/2/02, Santiago).  Other civil societal actors have voiced similar concerns with respect to the Lagos 
initiatives.  For comparative perspectives on these issues, see Friedman and Hochstetler (2002) and Alvarez 




  Finally, the extent to which participatory institutions will fundamentally 
reshape policy processes in democratizing countries remains to be seen.  Seemingly novel 
institutions can be grafted onto ages-old practices, including clientelism and government 
co-optation of CSOs.   
Indeed, it is not clear that civil societal actors want to be “institutionalized” in this 
way.  After all, co-optation and other threats to organizational autonomy are major 
concerns for CSOs.  This brings us to another question and potential area of research:  do 
groups that participate in policy making jeopardize their integrity, authenticity, or 
independence from the state, governing elites, and political parties?  In addition to 
investigating the causes of CSO involvement in policy, my focus in the dissertation, 
scholars should examine its consequences.   
Thus far, existing work has emphasized the potential pitfalls of government-civil 
society interactions.  Analysts of civil society sometimes cast political institutions (and 
especially parties) as “colonizing pariahs” (Encarnación 2001a, 77).  Such perspectives 
have deeper roots in the scholarship on social movements — particularly the “new social 
movement” literature — which is susceptible to the “fetishization” of autonomy 
(Hochstetler 2000, 169; see also Hellman 1990).
31
  According to some analysts, 
movements that manage to avoid outright co-optation nevertheless may tone down their 
criticisms of the government, moderate their tactics, and/or experience a “watering-down 
                                                                                                                                                 
States, and Dalton (1994), who discusses the experiences of environmental groups with such institutions in 
Europe.     
30
 CONAMA is a coordinating body dependent on the Ministries of Economy, Agriculture, Mining, Health, 
and Planning, among others. 
31
 New social movement works on Latin America underscore activists’ distinctive ways of “doing politics” 
and their oppositional posture toward the state.  This approach is prevalent in analyses of movements that 
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of principles” (Taylor 1998, 159).
32
  As a result, they risk losing authenticity and 
legitimacy in the eyes of their members and the broader public.  Like social movements, 
CSOs face a dilemma:  remaining outside of conventional politics but risking political 
“marginalization” versus cooperating and possibly giving up their independence 
(Foweraker 2001; Waylen 2000).
33
 
Most of the groups examined in the dissertation did not appear to compromise 
their autonomy while engaging in advocacy.  As mentioned in previous chapters, the vast 
majority are committed to non-partisan goals and opposed to relinquishing their 
independence from the state.
34
  However, CSOs do perform a tricky balancing act:  on the 
one hand, they aspire to be involved in policy making; on the other hand, they want to 
maintain their freedom to criticize institutions, government officials, and parties.  Latin 
American groups often struggle with preserving the tradition of denuncia — condemning 
government actions — while also providing more constructive proposals.  Many 
                                                                                                                                                 
emerged under authoritarianism, when conventional political institutions were closed to civil societal actors 
(e.g., Jelin 1987 & 1985; Mainwaring and Viola 1984).       
32
 Other expected consequences include the professionalization of SMOs, decreased mobilization, fewer 
protests, and the fragmentation of the movement — the radicalization of some sectors and moderation of 
the ones that collaborate (e.g., Giugni and Passy 1998).  The dilemma of integration versus autonomy is 
discussed in the literature on feminist and women’s movements in Latin America (e.g., Alvarez 1999 & 
1998; Jaquette 1994; Molyneux 2001; Waylen 2000).               
33
 As noted in Chapter 1, civil society, political society, the state, and the private sector are not as distinct in 
reality as they are in theory.  In fact, civil societal actors themselves may become part of the policy-making 
establishment through their regular involvement in the process, as David Crow has observed during our 
informal conversations.  Scholars exploring CSOs therefore must be mindful of the areas of overlap 
between these spheres.      
34
 Moreover, a number of the CSOs are experienced watchdogs of governing elites and the state, a role 
which is contingent in part on impartiality and independence.  Because these groups do not constitute a 
representative sample of CSOs, the remarks made here are not generalizable to all civil societal actors.        
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Financial dependence on the government is probably a greater hindrance to 
autonomy than engagement with the political process.  When CSOs receive the majority 
of their funding from government sources, their independence is called into question.  
NGOs involved in policy implementation sometimes find themselves in this predicament; 
still, even groups that receive public funds to conduct research or undertake other projects 
must proceed cautiously.
36
  Civil societal actors express concern that recipients of such 
funding will hesitate to criticize the government and bite the proverbial hand that feeds 
them.  The ability of groups to deal with such challenges, which are perennial sources of 
anxiety for their members, deserves more scholarly attention.
37
  
Future research also should examine the effects of CSO involvement in decision 
making on policy outputs.  Does the quality of a given policy generally improve when its 
content reflects civil societal inputs?  Can we discern any patterns by comparing policies 
over which groups have exercised influence with policies that are bereft of their 
contributions?  In addition to developing appropriate indicators for “quality,” analysts 
will have to grapple with the fact that much depends on whether (and how) policy 
                                                 
35 
According to one of its members, the Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS) tries to strike a balance 
between the two traditions, though this can be challenging (Interview in CELS, 4/3/03, Buenos Aires).     
36
  The received wisdom suggests that NGOs in the service of the government (and the neoliberal model) 
risk losing their autonomy and ability to chart a course independent from that of the government.  On these 
and related issues, see Dagnino (2003), Edwards and Hulme (1996), Foweraker (2001), Gideon (1998), 
Loveman (1995), Pearce (1997), and Taylor (1998).  Bebbington et al. (1993), Meyer (1999), and Reilly 
(1995) approach the subject from a more technical standpoint.     
37
 The international sources of funding discussed in Chapter 5 help CSOs avoid becoming totally reliant 
upon government sources.  However, some fear that groups trade one form of dependence for another.  For 
examinations of the international donor community, see Carothers and Ottaway (2000), Foweraker (2001), 
Grugel (2000), Howell and Pearce (2001), Hulme and Edwards (1997), and Meyer (1999).     
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ultimately is enacted.  Policies that have been approved may not be implemented in the 
manner originally envisioned, especially when the necessary funds and administrative 
capacity are lacking.   
Scholars who delve into the issues discussed above can use and combine various 
modes of comparative analysis.  Cross-national, cross-regional, and sub-national studies 
would be welcome additions to existing scholarship, and comparisons of policy making 
can be made across different levels of government, distinct policy domains, and multiple 
cases of policy within a particular issue area.    
In conclusion, a number of worthwhile questions await answers.  Scholars who 
are interested in civil society’s advocacy and policy roles have much left to do.  Moving 
this proposed research agenda forward can enrich both the democratization literature and 
the comparative politics field by deepening our understanding of political participation in 
a neoliberal age and strengthening our grasp of the government–citizen nexus in 
democratizing nations.  O’Donnell and Schmitter have suggested that authoritarian 
regimes “trivialize” citizenship, which becomes “a matter of holding a passport, obeying 
national laws, cheering for the country’s team, and, occasionally, voting in 
choreographed elections or plebiscites” (1986, 48).  In contrast, citizenship in a 
democracy theoretically involves more meaningful activities, such as organizing in civil 
society, participating in public affairs, and making demands on governing elites.  The 
time has come to determine whether democratic citizenship actually lives up to its 
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